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Abstract 
 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, towards the end of the 1940s, British-
Romanian relations were strained, marked by accusations of espionage directed towards 
Britain’s diplomats and requests for recalls. The British Government reacted moderately, 
acquiescing to recall their diplomats but refusing to concede to the Romanians when it 
came to their ‘flimsy’ accusations. Negotiation was preferred to reprisals especially when 
certain Britons had to be rescued from the Communists’ hands.  
In one respect Britain was not that indulgent: when money was involved, 
particularly the assets of oil companies nationalized in 1948. Trade remained a priority 
for both the British and Romanian governments. After laborious negotiations, a trade 
agreement was signed in 1960 and the ascendant trend continued into the 1970s when 
Harold Wilson and Nicolae Ceausescu established a close relationship. Britain’s interest 
in Romania was defined at this juncture as being firstly political, then mercantile and 
cultural, in order of priority. As far as Romania remained a ‘thorn’ in the Soviet Union’s 
back, a means to reach the remote Chinese or a mediator between various sides of the 
world in conflict, politics was priority. Trade remained an issue for both parties. Anglo-
Romanian cultural relations however, were almost nonexistent for the duration of this 
period. Concern for human rights, Helsinki agreements notwithstanding, focused entirely 
on the predicament of a few persons who wished to marry or to reunite with their family 
in Britain. 
When political interest in Romania declined in the 1980s, due to the regime’s 
eleventh hour attempt to reconnect to the Eastern Bloc, Britain’s economic interest still 
remained. Relations between Britain and Ceausescu’ Romania remained strong until the 
Revolution of 1989 that swept away Ceausescu and the Communist regime. 
iii 
 
At the close of the decade, Romania's foreign and domestic policies were fiercely 
criticized by the Soviet Union’s more liberal Communist leader, Gorbachev. Although 
the “value” of Romanian deviance within the communist camp seemed to be diminishing 
in importance during the 1980s, Ceausescu’s fall was as big a surprise to London as it 
was to himself. Although Ceausescu’s policies of national assertion abroad, and promises, 
censorship and repression inside, had produced a seemingly a stable state, neither 
Ceausescu nor London, had grasped that a changing Eastern Europe would challenge 
even the existence of a complicated balancing act between the West and East which 
culminated with the disappearance of the Soviet led organizations and the Soviet Bloc. 
Once renowned for an assertive foreign policy, Romania was again in the spot of world at 
the end of 1989, this time for having executed its dictator and bloodily ending a regime. 
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Introduction 
 
 
This dissertation grew out of a paper which I presented in a seminar held by 
Professor Neville Thomson on British history. After reading my paper my colleagues were 
interested to find out more about Ceausescu and his foreign policy. My presentation had 
focused on British-Romanian relations in the mid-Cold War: the sixties and seventies. 
“How was Ceausescu perceived today”, my colleagues wanted to know. Is he still 
considered a ruthless dictator or is he praised for his stance during the Czechoslovak crisis 
when he condemned the Soviet led invasion by the Warsaw Pact countries in which 
Romania did not take part?  
To many people Romania was and still is a remote country whose relations with 
Britain were not of much interest. To many Romanians, Britain still represents the country 
of Churchill -- the ‘betrayer who sold us at Yalta’ -- and a country where it is good to go to 
work, particularly given high currency valuations. The eldest may recall that, in their 
youth, they had watched on TV the great pomp of Ceausescu’s visit to London and most of 
them would remember that the Queen took Ceausescu into her carriage. Only some would 
know that it was the first State visit by a Communist leader to Britain since the War and 
very few might draw a connection between Ceausescu’s stance of 1968 and his subsequent 
state visit to Britain of 1978. 
 In the aftermath of the Second World War Romania was not of much interest for 
Britain. Churchill ‘never felt’ that Britain’s relations with Romania in the past ‘called for 
any special sacrifice’ from Britons.1 Although changing sides on 23 August 1944, Romania 
was still a former Axis power.  
                                                 
1
 Churchill, The Second World War, II, Their Finest Hour, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1940, p. 208. 
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At the beginning of the Second World War Romania’s leaders adopted a policy of 
cautious neutrality and King Carol II looked to Britain to help offset the developing 
hegemony of Germany. In 1939 the Foreign Office conceived a plan by which military 
assistance could be given to Romania in case of a German attack. This implied an intention 
to form a bloc of states in Eastern Europe which would be able to provide direct military 
aid to Romania in case of attack.2 Following a request for economic assistance, on 20 
March 1939 the Foreign Office announced that it would send a trade mission to Bucharest. 
The mission arrived at the end of April and had the purpose of granting of five million 
pounds in credit and the promise to purchase two hundred thousand tons of Romanian 
wheat from the next harvest.3  
In order to gain a free hand against Poland, Hitler made important concessions to 
the Soviets, including the recognition of Bessarabia as a Russian asset. Following the 
secret additional protocol to the Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August 1939 signed by 
Ribbentrop and Molotov, the Soviets invaded Bessarabia and Bukovina. In a Foreign 
Office memorandum of 5 September 1939 Orme Sargent stated that it was in Britain’s 
‘vital interest’ to strengthen Romania. 4 This remained however just an intention. Romania 
led by General Ion Antonescu joined the Anti-Comintern Pact and six months later, on 22 
June 1941 declared war on the Soviet Union. The Romanians would soon find themselves 
engaged in war with the Soviets’ allies without wanting it. Britain declared war on 
Romania on 7 December, followed by the United States on 12 December 1941.5 
                                                 
2
 Paul D. Quinlan, Clash Over Romania. British and American policies toward Romania: 1938-
1947, American Romanian Academy of Arts and Sciences, Los Angeles, 1977, p. 42. 
3
 Ibid,, p. 46. 
4
 Ibid., pp. 49-50. 
5
 Nicolae Ciachir, Marile Puteri si Romania, 1856-1947 [The Great Powers and Romania, 1856-
1947], p. 296 and 303-305. 
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On 23 August 1944 the King Michael arrested Antonescu and announced the 
unilateral cessation of hostilities with the Soviets. Then, he decided to join the Allies 
against Germany. Romanians fought against their former allies until the end of the Second 
World War contributing decisively to shortening the war. 
In the aftermath of the war, in the new European split by the Iron Curtain, the 
British maintained interests in other Eastern countries, but not in Romania. The rise to 
power of the Communists, supported by the Soviet troops, made the split with Britain more 
dramatic. The British representatives in Bucharest witnessed how their employees were 
arrested and tried for treason and their war-time contacts were caught and accused of 
espionage in favour of ‘the Imperialists’. The fact that the Anglo-Americans were the 
Russians’ former allies and the ‘spies’ had worked for the Allied cause did not count to the 
Communist regime newly installed in Bucharest. Some of them, sentenced for up to twenty 
five years, died in Romanian prisons, while others ill, tortured, but surviving to be 
released, had their health severely shaken, and were prohibited from working as a 
prolonged punishment which denied them any means of survival.  
To the average Romanian the West, Britain included, remained inaccessible for 
the whole Cold War period. Nevertheless the hope endured that ‘salvation’ from 
Communism would come from the English speaking world. One of the most persistent 
rumours and convictions following the Second World War was that ‘the Americans would 
come!, ultimately.’6 The opposition parties’ leaders who, during the Second World War 
had supported the Allied cause, could not believe that the British refused to offer the 
Romanians minimum support against the recently installed Communist regime. The help 
they expected was like that offered to Greeks and Turks to fight the Communists. When it 
was obvious that neither the British nor the Americans would become involve in the 
                                                 
6
 Bogdan Barbu, Vin americanii! Prezenta simbolica a Statelor Unite in Romania Razboiului Rece 
[The Americans are coming! The symbolic presence of the United States in Romania during the Cold War], 
Bucharest, Humanitas, 2006. 
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survival of democracy in Romania, there was another rumour circulating: ‘They sold us! 
They sold us at Yalta!’ The very few optimists believed that, due to the isolation of the 
country and the Eastern Bloc in general, the West could not know what the real situation in 
Romania was. Western representatives were not only carefully watched but also confined 
to a perimeter of 50 km around Bucharest and when allowed to visit certain cities, they 
were accompanied by a Romanian official who produced their itinerary. Western 
representatives could only trust what the Communists were telling them since they had no 
way of knowing what was going on beyond ‘the red carpet’ set up for them. Moreover, 
Romanian officials were truly skilful in presenting the bright side of the country to the 
carefully selected visitors.   
 Disappointment was profound when the news that Ceausescu had been offered a 
state visit to Britain was published in the press. It was like a second betrayal. While the 
regime hid its atrocious nature and sequestered dissidents in psychiatric hospitals the 
British were inviting the dictator to the Queen’s House! Letters sent by Romanian 
immigrants and knowledgeable Britons complaining about the harsh rule of Ceausescu 
received a stereotyped, and unfriendly response. 
 The official response followed from the assessment of post-war British diplomats. 
None of them believed that Ceausescu was a democrat or a liberal leader. They were aware 
that he was in fact a complete and sophisticated dictator who totally controlled the 
Communist Party which, in turn, controlled the country. However, Britain had developed a 
renewed interest in establishing close relations with Romania, even though it was a 
Communist state. In the list of British interests, politics and trade were predominant. 
Cultural relations were almost nonexistent, while human rights concern focused entirely on 
the predicament of a few persons who wished to marry, or to reunite with families in the 
United Kingdom.  
5 
 
When political interest in Romania declined in the 1980s, due to the regime’s 
eleventh hour attempt to reconnect to the Eastern Bloc, Britain’s economic interest still 
remained.  Relations between Britain and Ceausescu’s Romania remained strong until the 
Revolution of 1989 that swept away Ceausescu and the Communist regime. 
 
My dissertation is based mainly on recently published and unpublished documents 
available in the National Archives in London and the National Archives in Bucharest, the 
Romanian Diplomatic Archives and the Council for Studying the Securitate Archives. 
Certain documents confirm what is already known about British and Romanian foreign 
policies in the 1970s while others contain new information on the evolution of the bilateral 
relations in the 1950s and 1960s.  
Outside the archives, very little has been published in English concerning Western 
relations with Cold War Romania. Most of the literature is Romanian and recent. A few 
memoirs and diaries belonging to former Western representatives to Bucharest have been 
published, such as that of Burton Berry, the American Political Representative to Romania 
between 1944 and 1947, offering new perspectives to the complex period of transition to 
the establishment of the Communist regime.7 C.V.R. Schuyler’s diary, the head of the 
American Military Mission in Romania, has also been translated and published. Much 
useful information concerning the decisive three years during which the Communists 
supported by the Soviet troops succeeded in taking the power is provided.8  
 The memoirs of former detainees who worked for the British and the Americans 
and were condemned for espionage by the Romanian Communist regime are now 
                                                 
7
 Burton Y. Berry, Romanian Diaries, 1944-1947, Iasi, The Centre for Romanian Studies; 
Oxford; Portland, 2000. 
8
 C.V.R. Schuyler, Misiune Dificila. Jurnal (28 ianuarie 1945 – 20 septembrie 1946) [Difficult 
Mission. Diary (28 January 1945-20 September 1946)], Bucharest, 1997. 
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accessible to a Romanian audience.9 These are fascinating accounts of Romanians 
condemned for real or imaginary offenses against the regime. The myth of the Americans 
coming to rescue the people from Communist domination persisted for several years after 
the Second World War. It was analysed recently by Bogdan Barbu in his book Vin 
americanii! Prezenta simbolica a Statelor Unite in Romania Razboiului Rece [The 
Americans are coming! The symbolic presence of the United States in Romania during the 
Cold War], published in 2006.10 The National Council for the Study of the Securitate 
Archives edited Arhivele Securitatii [The Securitate Archives], a series published in 2008 
attesting to the vigilant surveillance of any ‘subversive’ organization.11 A book by Valeriu 
Florin Dobrinescu and Ion Patroiu focusing on England and Romania between 1939 and 
1947 published in 1992, still remains an important reference for bilateral relations during 
and in the aftermath of the Second World War.12  
Some few historians such as Mark Percival, Maurice Pearton and Dennis 
Deletant13 have considered Britain’s relations with Romania during and after the Second 
World War. Mark Percival analysed the motives behind “Britain’s ‘Political Romance’ 
with Romania in the 1970s”,14 while Maurice Pearton approached the dynamic of British-
Romanian relations in “British-Romanian relations during the 20th century”, a conference 
                                                 
9
 Leonard Kirschen, Prisoner of Red Justice. An account of Ten Years’ Captivity in Communist 
Romania, Barker, London, 1963 and Annie Samuelli’s Women Behind Bars in Romania. First edition was 
published in the United States in 1967. Two Romanian editions were published in 1992 and 2001. 
10
 Bogdan Barbu, Vin americanii! Prezenta simbolica a Statelor Unite in Romania Razboiului 
Rece [The Americans are coming! The symbolic presence of the United States in Romania during the Cold 
War], Bucharest, Humanitas, 2006. 
11
 Arhivele Securitatii [The Securitate Archives], edited by the National Council for the Study of 
the Securitate Archives, Bucharest, 2008. 
12
 Dobrinescu, Valeriu Florin, Patroiu, Ion, Anglia si Romania intre anii 1939-1947 [England 
and Romania between 1939 and 1947], Editura Didactica si Pedagogica, Bucharest, 1992. 
13
 Dennis Deletant, Maurice Pearton, “British Policy towards Romania: 1939-1941,” Romania 
Observed, Bucharest, Editura Enciclopedica, 1998. 
14
 Percival, Mark, “Britain’s ‘Political Romance’ with Romania in the 1970s”, Contemporary 
European History, 4, I (1994), pp. 67-87. 
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paper presented at a colloquium hosted by the British Council in Bucharest.15 Given the 
lapse of time, some documents concerning Anglo-Romanian relations in this period have 
begun to appear in British Archives, mainly concerning preparations for the State Visit to 
London of 1978 and the fallout. Much however remains closed. The British and Romanian 
newspapers of the time covered the event extensively, the first focusing on reasons for 
having the Ceausescus invited to Buckingham and the nature of the regime, while the latter 
focused largely on pro-regime propaganda. An unusual degree of attention was devoted to 
the event since it was the first State Visit to Britain made by a Head of a Communist 
country. A book about Ceausescu’s visit was published in English in Romania in 1979, 
including favourable excerpts from British newspapers, interviews granted by Ceausescu 
in anticipation of the visit, and highlights of the visit.16 Elena Ceausescu’s translator, 
Violeta Nastasescu, published her memoirs in 2010, recalling, among other events to 
which she accompanied the President’s wife, the London State Visit of June 1978 and 
offering details about the behaviour of the Ceausescus.17  
From time to time, the Romanian press tackles certain aspects of bilateral 
relations, a sign that there is still an interest in analysing events involving British-
Romanian relations. An article published by the Romanian historian Mihai Retegan, for 
example, documented a 1966 visit by the former vice-premier Barladeanu to Britain to 
negotiate the purchase of equipment for modernisation of Romania. By Retegan’s 
showing, Britain’s interest in the 1940s was primarily strategic, and Romania irrelevant. 
The British focused in the aftermath of the Second World War on the line Gibraltar-Malta-
Suez-Aden-India. To control it Britain needed not Romania, but Greece. Part of this 
                                                 
15
 British Council, Romania, British-Romanian Symposium, New Europe College, Bucharest, 4-
5 April 2005, Romania and Britain: Relations and Perspectives from 1930 to the Present. The colloquium 
marked 125 years of bilateral relations. 
16
 State visit of President Nicolae Ceausescu to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, June 13-16, 1978, Media Publishing House, 1979. 
17
 Violeta Nastasescu, Elena Ceausescu. Confesiuni fara frontiere, Bucharest, Editura Niculescu, 
2010. 
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strategy was the Anglo-Turkish treaty of October 1939 and the ‘percentage agreement’. 
Otherwise, Retegan also indicated renewed bilateral interest in the 1960s for solving 
lingering financial issues in order to restart what had once been a substantial trade.18 
The main moments of Anglo-Romanian relations are thus familiar to a 
knowledgeable audience. Less known are the tactical variations which involved shifts of 
focus from high politics to economic or cultural interests. Emphasis changed from time to 
time as the conditions of the day seemed to demand while ideology and human rights 
counted for very little.  
My dissertation will focus on those specific junctures critical to the evolution of 
bilateral relations. First, would be the difficult moments in the early Cold War (1948-1949) 
when a newly installed Communist regime accused British diplomats and employees of the 
British Legation of espionage. Second is the relaxation in the mid 1950s, following 
Khrushchev’s search for peaceful co-existence. In the 1960s relations improved as the 
result of new policies promoted by Bucharest, including the release of political detainees in 
which the British were interested in. Since 1964 Romania was an oddity in the Eastern 
Bloc – uniquely independent in foreign policy, and open to economic collaboration, but 
also unusually repressive even given Soviet norms. Romanian willingness to move on 
vexing financial issues, the British reaction to Ceausescu’s denunciation of the Soviet 
invasion of Prague in 1968, and Ceausescu’s stopover to London in 1975, the subsequent 
meeting between Harold Wilson and Ceausescu in Bucharest in the autumn of the same 
year, and Ceausescu’s State Visit to London of June 1978 represented the apogee of a 
rapprochement in train for some time. I placed my analysis within the more complex 
international framework in which greater realities – particularly intra-Communist Bloc 
                                                 
18
 Mihai Retegan, “Un vice-premier pe Tower-Bridge” [A Vice-premier on Tower Bridge”], 
Jurnalul National, 20 December 2004. 
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dynamics, and Britain’s implication in general ‘Western’ policy shifts - which  helped to 
mould bilateral relations.  
The reports sent from Bucharest by the British representatives are particularly 
important in locating essential detail, for they accurately depict the atmosphere of 
Communist Romania, in contrast to the regime’s propaganda. The despatches sent by the 
Romanian representatives in London do not offer such a richness of details. They are dull 
in describing Britain’s internal realities and focused to a greater extent on finding useful 
contacts beyond the Iron Curtain willing to support the regime. In much greater measure 
than their British counterparts, Romanian diplomats were involved in amplifying 
Bucharest propaganda and presenting Ceausescu as an innovator and a progressive leader. 
When, for example, it was assigned the task of preparing for Ceausescu’s State Visit, the 
Romanian Embassy in London had the task in finding journalists to write positively for 
Romania, editors to publish Ceausescu’s books and diffuse the image of a modernized 
Romania, a country which was achieving a major success due to the rightness of policies 
initiated and propagated by its leader.  
Strained at the end of the 1940s, almost inexistent for the most part of the 1950s, 
British-Romanian relations resumed in the 1960s, reinforced by both sides’ desire to 
develop trade, initiate cultural exchanges and solve financial issues. The British were 
interested in a settlement of financial issues, specifically Romania’s debt, while the 
Romanians, still cautious, insisted on cultural exchanges in large measure to resist Russian 
domination. Interest in increased cultural interchange gradually subsided however as 
Bucharest became aware that cultural contact was not without risk while leaving the 
regime vulnerable to criticism concerning its prior treatment of the local employees of 
cultural institutions, particularly the British Council. Financial issues involved prolonged 
10 
 
negotiations for two decades until they were finally settled during the Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson’s visit to Romania in September 1975.  
Success on these issues set the stage for increased economic contact. The volume 
of Anglo-Romanian trade increased in the 1970s regardless of the different socio-economic 
systems. High politics had also their place in this framework strengthen by the special 
relation between Ceausescu and Wilson. Politics figured first on the agenda of all their 
meetings, followed by trade. Courted by many world leaders, Ceausescu gloried in the role 
of statesman, mediating between the West and Far East, and during fraternal fracases in the 
Communist World. Throughout, he bridled at Moscow’s pretensions. He not only courted 
the West, but retained friendly relations with China and Yugoslavia. He openly opposed 
the Brezhnev Doctrine, particularly during the 1968 Czech Spring. He recognized the 
Federal Republic of Germany. He involved himself in the Middle East crisis, maintaining 
friendly relations with both Palestine and Israel – recognized in 1967 -- and sought to 
encourage negotiations between the two sides without interference by Cold War patrons. 
Ultimately, Communist Romania was celebrated for its liberality, even though it remained 
one of the most repressive states in the world. In the end, Ceausescu was not executed as 
statesmen. He was not called to book, as Imre Nagy had been, as a deviationist. He was 
shot by his own people as a tyrant– a fact much of the West, including London, appears to 
have deliberately ignored, while other agendas were pursued. 
My dissertation analyses the evolution of British-Romanian relations from the 
establishment of the Communist regime in Romania to its end to find the answer to the 
close relations between a Liberal and a Communist country. By encouraging Ceausescu 
and his regime and letting him reap political and diplomatic dividends from his 
independent line in foreign policy, Britain contributed to the maintenance of a regime 
careless about human rights and the free flow of people, information and ideas as provided 
11 
 
by the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Britain, together with other Western states, facilitated 
the creation of a system which could not survive the sudden disappearance of the 
conditions for which it had been designed to cater. 
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 ‘We still have ten percent’ 
 
 
 
I had never felt that our relations with Rumania and 
Bulgaria in the past called for any special sacrifice from us.19 
(Winston Churchill) 
 
Once completed, the percentage agreement was broadly observed by 
the heads of empires, even though for the eyes of the world, they protested with 
indignation at every consuming act of the drama. Britain agreed with the 
abolition of the opposition parties in Romania and even with King Michael’s 
dismissal while, in exchange, the Soviet Union left General Marcos and his 
revolutionary troops to die from lack of food and ammunition in the mountains 
of Greece. 20 (Silviu Brucan) 
 
 
 
On 2 April 1944, Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 
stated publicly that the Soviets had neither the intention of threatening the territorial 
integrity of Romania, nor transforming it into a communist state.21 All they wanted was a 
friendly neighbour on their western frontier.22 The declaration was issued in a moment 
when the Romanians were negotiating their withdrawal from war and renewed 
immediately after Romania’s switch of sides. Molotov confirmed his April declaration. 
The Soviet Union had no desire to acquire any part of the Romanian territory or to change 
the social order in Romania and, in that way, to infringe Romania’s independence. The 
                                                 
19
 Winston Churchill, The Second World War, II, Their Finest Hour, Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1940, p. 208. 
20
 Silviu Brucan, GeneraŃia irosită. Memorii [The Wasted Generation. Memoirs], Bucharest, 2007, 
pp. 9-10. 
21
 The Soviet Union ‘does not pursue the aim of acquiring Romanian territory or of altering the 
existing social structure of Romania.’ OJR Report no. 4456, 18 July 1947 Department of State, Division of 
research for Europe, Office of Intelligence Research, referring to telegram T-1150, Moscow, April 3, 1944. 
Romania in anticamera Conferintei de Pace de la Paris. Documente, [Romania in the antechamber of the 
Peace Conference of Paris. Documents], Bucharest, Arhivele Nationale ale Romaniei, 1996, p. 448; 
Memorandum of the King Michael of Romania to President Roosevelt, 24 January 1945, Mircea Ciobanu, 
Convorbiri cu Mihai I al Romaniei [Conversations with King Michael of Romania], Bucharest, Humanitas, 
1991, p. 256. 
22
 In reaction, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joachim von Ribbentrop, characterized 
publicly the Molotov’s declaration, as insincere and underlined the danger the Soviets represent for Romania. 
Romanian National Archives [henceforth RNA], The Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party, 
[henceforth CC of RCP], Collection 147, Dossier 11/1947, vol. 2, f. 11.  
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Soviet government was just interested in re-establishing Romania’s independence together 
with the Romanians and free the country from the fascist yoke.23  
However, it must have been difficult for Romanians to believe that, after three 
years of confrontation on the battlefield, the Soviets would suddenly become Romanians’ 
loyal friends. Four years before, on 26 June 1940, the Soviets had issued an ultimatum, 
demanding the immediate surrender of Bessarabia, Romania’s Eastern province, and 
annexing also northern Bukovina.24 In the summer of the same year, vexed by Romanians’ 
determination to remain neutral, Hitler took the side of Hungary and favoured it against 
Romania. Through the Diktat of Vienna imposed by Hitler and Mussolini on 30 August 
1940, Romanians were obliged to cede the north-western part of Transylvania (an area of 
42,610 km square with a population of 2,388,774 of which 50,2 per cent were Romanians) 
to Hungary. One week later, on 7 September 1940, Romania gave up a southern province, 
Cadrilater, to Bulgaria. Overall, a territory of 101,129 km square representing 34.27 
percent of the country comprising a population of 6,821,007 inhabitants, of whom the 
majority were Romanians, had been lost.25 
On 23 November 1940 Romania led by General Ion Antonescu adhered to the 
Anti-Comintern Pact and sixth months later, on 22 June 1941, declared war on the Soviet 
Union.26 The Romanians would soon find themselves engaged in war with the Soviets’ 
                                                 
23
 On 25 August, V.M. Molotov reasserted the pledge that his government had no intention of 
annexing any part of Romania or changing the social and political regime. Valeriu Florin Dobrinescu, Ion 
Patroiu, Anglia si Romania intre anii 1939-1947 [England and Romania between 1939-1947], Editura 
Didactica si Pedagogica, Bucharest, 1992, p. 231; RNA, the Ministry of National Propaganda, Office of 
Intelligence, D 939, f. 5 cited by Gheorghe Onisoru, Instaurarea regimului communist in Romania, 
Bucharest, 2002, p. 29. 
24
 Part of Romania since 1918, Bessarabia was annexed by the Russian Empire in 1812 as a result 
of the Russian-Turkish war. Bucovina had never been a Russian territory and was not mentioned in the Nazi-
Soviet Pact of 23 August 1939. The Romanian provinces were annexed by the Soviets in the aftermath of an 
ultimatum issued on 26 June 1940, in accordance with the terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement. 
Nicolae Ciachir, Marile Puteri si Romania, 1856-1947 [The Great Powers and Romania, 1856-1947], 
Bucharest, Albatros, 1996, p. 301. 
25
 A. Simion, Dictatul de la Viena [The Diktat of Vienna], Bucharest, Albatros, 1996, p. 363. 
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allies without wanting it. Britain declared war on Romania on 7 December, followed by the 
United States on 12 December 1941.27  
In 1944 Romanians found themselves again in an unfortunate situation. By now, 
two thirds of the country had been lost. Although still fighting on the Eastern front and 
taking part in all important battles, it was clear that Germany had lost the war. Negotiations 
with the Western Powers for Romania’s exit from war commenced and continued through 
the spring with no result.   
While the Romanian Army was still engaged in war against the Soviet Union, 
King Michael acted in a decisive way. On 23 August he arrested Marshal Antonescu and 
announced the unilateral cessation of hostilities with the Soviets.28 Romania accepted the 
armistice terms offered by the United Nations, and announced the change of direction in a 
Royal proclamation.29  
From this moment cease any battle and hostility actions against the Soviet Union, 
as well as the state of war with Great Britain and the United States. Receive the 
soldiers of these armies with trust. The United Nations had guaranteed our 
independence and non-interference in our internal affairs. They admitted the 
injustice of the Diktat of Vienna through which Transylvania had been captured 
from us.  
Except for the last statement, all the rest was aspiration.30  
 
The ceasefire in the absence of a signed armistice had dramatic repercussions. 
Claiming that they had not receive any order to stop hostilities, the Red Army advanced 
from the Moldavian city, Iasi, where it had been held for four months taking prisoner large 
numbers of Romanian soldiers who offered no resistance. During a single day, 24 August, 
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6,000 officers, 6,000 non-commissioned officers and 15,000 soldiers were arrested, 
interned in camps and sent over the Prut River in the territories reoccupied by the Soviet 
Army.31 A total of 175,000 soldiers and officers were captured by the Soviets.32 The 
depredations of the Soviet Army as it advanced into Romania seemed more an invasion 
than liberation.33 Molotov’s assurances proved to be empty words.  
The Romanian situation was most unfortunate. Romania faced the consequences 
of an uncertain alliance with the Soviets, who advanced as into an enemy territory, and 
with the Americans who continued to bomb strategic sites, especially the oilfields. The 
Romanian Army, meanwhile, was soon engaged in battle with the Germans whose position 
had been endangered by Romania’s betrayal.34 It became apparent that the Soviets were 
taking advantage of the unclear situation of ‘no peace, no war’. Anxiously, the King urged 
the Anglo-Americans to send envoys to Bucharest, accompanied by a token military force 
and the Romanian Minister for Foreign Affairs submitted a formal protest to the Soviet 
Ambassador at Ankara.35  
Ceasefire in absence of a signed armistice convention was compared to a chariot 
placed ahead of the horse. ‘What else should we have done?’ the King asked?. ‘Say that we 
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withdraw from the Axis and, meanwhile, continue to fight?’36 The delay in concluding the 
armistice had dramatic repercussions; it allowed the Red Army to infiltrate into the 
Romania.37 Ultimately it was the Soviets who were accredited by the Anglo-Americans 
with initiating and carrying forward negotiations with Romania. 38  
The Romanian delegation sent to Moscow to negotiate the armistice convention 
arrived to have their plane seized by the Soviets. Eventually reaching Moscow, they 
complained to the British Ambassador that their country had been occupied by the Red 
Army, the later replied that he would inform London. 39 The Romanians should not expect 
help from Britain, but deal with the Russians. The American Ambassador replied in a quite 
similar way. Neither was helpful during the negotiations. This prompted the leader of the 
Romanian delegation, Lucretiu Patrascanu, to remark sadly that, as regards Romania at 
least, the agreement between the Allies was ‘perfect’.40 Patrascanu might have hoped that, 
as a Communist, he had the keys to the Russians’ heart and could negotiate lenient 
conditions for his country.41 His hopes were in vain. He wondered what he was going to 
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tell to his comrades when he would return home.42 He could not have known that the Allies 
had already reached agreement concerning Romania. 43  
 In the spring of 1944 Churchill let the Soviets know his intentions regarding 
Romania. While Romanian envoys were attempting to negotiate their country’s extraction 
from war, Churchill sent a telegram to Molotov, reminding him that, as previously agreed, 
he regarded the Soviet Union as ‘the predominating power’ on Romania. ‘We are relying 
on you to take the lead about Romania,’ Churchill maintained in another telegram to 
Molotov. On 16 April 1944 Churchill wished Molotov success in Romanian negotiations. 
Two days later, in another telegram, Churchill assessed that he liked the firm tone of Lord 
Moyne’s messages from Cairo to Marshal Antonescu and Monsieur Maniu.44  
Although Churchill seemed eager to please Molotov, the later had reproached 
Churchill for having established a link with Antonescu without informing him in advance. 
Information about a secret operation named AUTONOMOUS leaked into press and 
reached the Soviets. The mission composed of Lieutenant Colonel De Chastellain, 
formerly Manager of ‘Unirea’ Oil Company, Major Porter and Captain Metianu was 
parachuted by the SOE into Romania on 21 December 1943. They had apparently the 
purpose of re-establishing contact with Iuliu Maniu, the pro-Western leader of the National 
Peasant Party, and convincing him that ‘the only possible course for Romania was 
unconditional surrender to the three principal Allies.’ Sabotage was another issue to be 
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addressed.45 According to the Romanian press the officers carried with them a photostat 
copy of a peace treaty which the Germans allegedly intended to propose to the Russians.  
The operation conducted by SOE caused considerable resentment in Moscow. 
Molotov’s message to Churchill of 29 April was ‘couched in offensive terms’ and although 
the Russians were invited to participate in further SOE – OSS operations in Romania, the 
Western Allies decided to suspend ‘for the time being’ other operations in Romania.’46 
On 16 January 1944, three weeks after the failure of Operation AUTONOMOUS, 
Churchill mentioned to Eden that the Russians might take possession of the territories 
which lay on the western borders of the Soviet Union. Britain would not attempt to remove 
the Russians from that area.47 Romania was ‘a Russian affair’ as Stalin desired, while 
Britain would take care of Greece and continue to remain the leading Mediterranean 
power.48   
Although providing to fight in the West against Germany and its allies, none of 
the articles of the armistice convention signed in Moscow on 12 September 1944 made 
reference to the release of Romanian prisoners. The armistice just provided that Romania’s 
military forces were put under the direction of the Soviets.49  
While the bulk of the army was fighting outside the country, the Communists 
became very active politically within what was now occupied Romania. Backed by 
Marshal Rodion Y. Malinowski, the chairman of the Allied Control Commission [ACC] 
set up with the purpose of supervising the implementation of the armistice agreement in 
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Romania, the Communists and certain left-wing groups established the National 
Democratic Bloc [NDB]. The organization was joined for a short time by the National 
Peasant and National Liberal parties. At the beginning of October the Communists 
unleashed a campaign of attacks against the government.50  
As provided by the Armistice Agreement, the Soviet Union was entitled to 
eradicate pro Axis influences and mobilize all available resources in the war against 
Germany. The Soviet interference in Romania was not however confined to measures in 
support of the common war effort. 51  
The British had already decided not to oppose the ‘reasonable demands’ of the 
Soviet Union where they did not conflict with their ‘vital strategic interest.’ In exchange, 
the Soviets were supposed not to oppose their claims.52 An Eastern Europe dominated by 
the Russians was preferable to a Western Europe dominated by Germany.53 The figures 
agreed by Churchill and Stalin in Moscow in October were just a transcript of both sides’ 
interests. 90 per cent of Romania and 90 per cent of Greece were to be controlled by the 
Soviets and the British respectively. In case of Yugoslavia and Hungary the percentages 
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were 50-50; 75 per cent of Bulgaria under Soviet influence; the last one was changed by 
Stalin to 90 per cent; everything was then approved by a tick of a pencil. 54 
In November the Soviets made their 90 per cent political influence over Romania 
felt. It was ‘recommended’ to King Michael that a change of Government was advisable.55  
Meanwhile, a new municipal administration was installed in Constanta, an 
important Black Sea port, with the support of the Soviets. The City became now an overt 
Russian dependency.56  The local civil administration in Transylvania was handed over to 
Communist representatives with Russian help.  
When, at the end of November, the Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs, A. 
Vishinski, arrived in Bucharest, he obtained the replacement of the new Prime Minister, 
General Sanatescu, by yet another General, Nicolae Radescu. It was 6 December, one 
month and one day after the fall of the previous Cabinet.57 The Soviet interference in 
Romania’s affairs was more than evident. 
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Had Romania been abandoned to the Soviets? The question was addressed by 
Maniu to the British representative in Bucharest, Le Rougetel.58 ‘Surely, we are not called 
upon to make such admissions,’ wrote Churchill on the report received from Bucharest in 
December 1944.59 Maniu asked the same question when meeting the chief of the American 
political mission in Bucharest, Burton Berry. If the Americans intended to abandon 
Romania, they ‘owe him the obligation of saying so and saying so at once, that he might 
make the best possible terms with the Soviets for the Romanian people.’ Maniu reminded 
the Anglo-Americans that he was a sincere supporter of the Western Allies during the war 
and had involved himself in the negotiations for his country’s withdrawal from war. Berry 
pointed out in his report to the Department of State that Romania was being re-organized 
as something of a Soviet experiment. Unless the Americans persuaded the Soviets ‘to 
desist in their efforts to communize Romania,’ they would be ‘too late and the experiment 
being worked out in Romania would be repeated elsewhere in a more perfect form on a 
larger scale’.60 The ‘arrangement’ concluded by Churchill and Stalin was however 
approved by the American President, even against the State Department arguments.61  
There was no question of spheres of influence, Churchill assured the Americans, 
merely ‘practical politics’ and that the arrangement would last only for three months after 
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which it would be subject of the Allies’ review.62 The percentage agreement was presented 
as a ‘preliminary agreement’ in a letter to Roosevelt, and ‘an interim guide for the wartime 
future’ in a memorandum to the War Cabinet.63  
Besides the ‘pedantic interference of the United States,’64 something else 
displeased Churchill even more: the stance adopted by the British representatives in 
Bucharest. Ten percent should not have entitled them to behave ‘as if they were in 
Greece.’65 To Eden ten percent meant something. In January 1945, when Orme Sargent, 
the Deputy Under-Secretary, second in the hierarchy at the Foreign Office, underlined that 
Britain could not prevent the Soviets from plundering the Romanian economy because 
Romania had been conceded to the Soviet Union, Eden replied: ‘Not quite. We still have 
ten percent.’66 In what ways the ten percent influence would have prevented the Soviet 
from controlling Romania remained a mystery.  
Ten percent certainly meant little for Churchill. His only concern was to make 
sure that the 90 per cent of the Soviets would become reality.67 With this aim in mind he 
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interfered frequently with the activity of the Foreign Office.68 Instead of building up an 
anti-Soviet political front ‘without realising what is at stake in other fields,’69 Britain’s 
representatives should have ‘encouraged’ the Romanians to co-operate ‘fully and frankly 
with the Russians and not to look to us or the Americans for support.’70 Churchill was also 
indignant that the British representatives made ‘such a fuss’ about the deportations of 
about 70,000 Romanians of German origin to the Soviet Union.71   
The Russians’ discourse concerning Romania had meanwhile changed. ‘Whereas 
in November 1944, the Russians said their only interest in Romania was in seeing the 
fulfilment of the terms of the Armistice,’ in the spring of 1945 the ‘theme song’ centred on 
security and stability.72 In fact, the Soviets were directly assisting the Communists in 
provoking agitation and inciting the peasants and workers to riot against the government.73 
Then, accusing the Romanian authorities of being incapable of maintaining order and 
securing the rear of the front, Vishinski demanded from the King the replacement of the 
Prime Minister, Radescu, with Petru Groza, currently Vice Premier. Gheorghe Tatarescu 
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was to become Vice Premier.74 Unless the King agreed with Vishinski’s designations, the 
Soviets could not guarantee Romania’s independence.75 To prove the seriousness of this 
statement, Marshal Rodion Malinowski came to Bucharest and Soviet troops patrolled the 
streets.76 The police and the gendarmerie were disarmed. The guard division was sent to 
the front, leaving the King with no defence to face the Communists supported by the 
Soviets. 77 
The situation inspired a request for action from Western envoys in Bucharest. The 
American representative, Berry, telegraphed to Washington, requesting an immediate 
examination of the situation in Romania at the highest level in the spirit of the Yalta 
Declaration.78 The British representative, Air Vice-Marshal D. F. Stevenson, also sent a 
note to London, requesting instructions. Once again Churchill asked Eden to temper the 
British representatives in Bucharest. London warned Ian Le Rougetel, the head of the 
newly re-established legation in Bucharest, not to get involved and not to provide any 
advice or encouragement for the King or the opposition. They had to cope with Soviet 
interference in Romania’s domestic affairs on their own. Although, when the American 
State Department invoked the Yalta Declaration on free territories and called for 
consultation over Romania, the British ambassador in Moscow, Archibald Clark Kerr, was 
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instructed to back Harriman’s actions. If the Americans strongly believed that their reading 
of the Yalta agreement should be implemented then the British would support them, it was 
resolved. Clark Kerr should however not forget about the agreement which set up the 
Soviet preponderance in Romania.79 Churchill had a ‘Gentlemen’s Agreement’ with Stalin 
and pledged to observe it. The British should not therefore adopt too firm an attitude and 
irritate the Soviets;80 otherwise Stalin could say ‘I did not interfere with your action in 
Greece, why do you not give me the same latitude in Romania?’81  
Admitting in a Cabinet meeting on 6 March – the day when Groza was appointed 
Prime Minister - that the principles of Yalta had been disregarded in Romania, Churchill 
stated that the British could go no further than inform Stalin about their distress. Admitting 
that ‘the Russians had succeeded in establishing ‘the rule of a communist minority by force 
and misrepresentation,’ he was hampered in protesting against these developments by the 
fact that, ‘in order to have freedom to save Greece, Mr. Eden and I at Moscow in October 
recognized that Russia should have largely preponderant voice in Romania and Bulgaria 
while we took lead in Greece.’82 London authorized through the legation to offer protection 
                                                 
79
 Clark Kerr in a paper on Soviet policy dated 27 March 1945 assessed that ‘the Yalta Declaration 
is being treated by the Soviet government as little more than a sedative which cannot be allowed to interfere 
with what is, in the eyes of the Russians, their established right, fully admitted by us, to do as they like in 
Romania.’ Dennis Deletant’s foreword in Ulrich Burger, Misiunea Ethridge in Romania [The Ethridge 
Mission in Romania], Bucharest, 2000, p. 12. 
80
 FO telegram to Clark Kerr, the British Ambassador in Moscow, sent at midnight on 2 March 
1945 mentioned the previous agreement with the Soviets and instructed him to support all Harriman’s 
actions. The telegram was annotated by Churchill. PREM 3/274, f. 196, Ioan Scurtu (ed.), Viata politica in 
documente. 1945, [Political Life in documents. 1945], Bucharest, Arhivele Statului din Romania, 1994, pp. 
167-8.  
81
 Dinu C. Giurescu, Romania’s Communist Takeover: The Radescu Government, New York, East 
European Monographs, Boulder, 1994, p. 96. 
82
 On 11 March Roosevelt replied to Churchill, admitting that Romania was not a place for a 
confrontation with the Russians. S. Radulescu-Zoner, D. Buse, B. Marinescu, Instaurarea Totalitarismului 
Comunist in Romania. [The Establishment of the Communist Totalitarianism in Romania], pp. 84-85. 
According to Giurescu, Roosevelt gave complete credit to the Soviet motivation for interfering in Romanian 
political affairs as related to the need to secure the rear front communication lines in Romania. Dinu C. 
Giurescu, Romania’s Communist Takeover: The Radescu Government, pp. 96-98. 
26 
 
to the former premier, General Radescu. The Legation guard detachment was ordered to 
open fire if there would be attempts to extract Radescu from the location.83  
Groza, whose appointment as a Prime Minister was aggressively demanded by the 
Soviets, was a wealthy Transylvanian landowner, with limited administrative experience 
who had served in minor Cabinet posts in the late Twenties and early Thirties. Although 
not a Communist, he would gain the appellation the Red Bourgeois for accomplishing 
whatever the Communists decided.84 The other Russian favourite, Tatarescu,85 was a 
person ‘thoroughly compromised by his past record;’ Prime Minister in 1939 he 
distinguished himself ‘by the alacrity with which he invited German troops into Romania, 
cooperated with the Nazis in every possible way and ceded the northern provinces of 
Bessarabia and Bukovina to the Soviet Union.’ He was saved from the fate of Marshal 
Antonescu, condemned to death, ‘solely by the direct intervention of the Soviet Union.’86 
Tatarescu’s flexibility may have made him the perfect candidate in any political 
circumstance. 
Beyond the appointment of these two, there was something else that made 
Churchill admit that a Communist minority had been established by force: the Communists 
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took hold of key posts in the Ministries of the Interior, Justice and Communications.87 ‘A 
government of non-entities, with a notable exception, Tatarescu,’ the former King, Carol 
II, noted in his diary. What was his former Prime-Minister doing ‘within this gang’ 
manoeuvred from Moscow?88 ‘Behind the scene, Ana Pauker, Stalin’s right hand in 
Romania, leads every move. Groza is under Pauker’s influence and praises her to the 
sky.’89  
 Under the façade of a coalition seemingly reuniting all democratic forces of the 
country but excluding the major political parties, the National Peasant Party [NPP] and the 
National Liberal Party [NLP], the new government started to limit the activity of the 
opposition, removing political opponents and appointing loyalist elements in local 
structures.90 Claiming that many newspapers served the Fascist cause, the government 
restricted freedom of press and closed down many newspapers.91 People’s tribunals were 
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established, overriding or ignoring legal procedures, to punish seemingly those identified 
as war-criminals. 92 
Whatever decision Groza adopted in domestic or foreign policy, it was taken 
subsequent to obtaining Soviet consent, strictly limiting Romania’s sovereignty.93 
Appointed on Soviet demand, Groza did whatever was required. Two months after his 
appointment, he took measures to strengthen Romania’s ties with the Soviet Union to the 
extent that the country’s economy was soon controlled by its neighbour. The first 
capitulation of major importance was an agreement signed in Moscow on 8 May 1945 by 
which Sovroms (Soviet-Romanian) joint companies were established.94 ‘It is probably the 
Russian intention to prepare by the creation of these companies [Sovroms] for the 
complete integration of the Romanian economy with that of the Soviet Union, from which 
it is but a short step to the political incorporation of Romanian territory into the Union of 
Socialist Soviet Republics,’ the British representative in Bucharest reported.95  
Although it could not fool the people, the close collaboration with the Soviet 
Union was presented as having the purpose of speeding up the country’s economic 
recovery. Trade exchanges would be based on full equality, the prices being those of the 
international market and the two parties would have equal share and equal rights within the 
Sovroms, the propaganda claimed.96 In fact using these devices the Soviets controlled the 
Romanian economy, while the commercial agreements prevented Romania from resuming 
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its relations with countries which were not under the Soviet influence. ‘To this game Groza 
had adhered without scruples.’97 
 In the meantime, as provided by the armistice convention, the Romanian army 
had to fight under Soviet command, contributing to the capture of Budapest and to the 
advance into Czechoslovakia. The role of the Romanian army was acknowledged by Eden. 
He indicated in the House of Commons on 24 January 1945 that Romania had rendered 
substantial support to the Allied cause by maintaining fourteen divisions on the anti-
Hitlerite front.98  
Romania contributed to the war against Germany and its allies with an army 
which ranked fourth amongst the armies fighting the Third Reich. The casualties of the 
Romanian army in the war against Germany and Hungary amounted to 169,822 men 
(including dead, wounded and missing). Romania’s defection from the Axis was an 
important factor in the collapse of the German Eastern front;99 it prevented the Germans 
from making a stand at the Carpathians, thereby shortening the war.100 
The Romanian troops were cited in orders of the day by Stalin.101 King Michael 
was awarded the ‘Victory’ order for his ‘brave act of determinedly orientating the 
Romanian policy towards rupture with Hitlerite Germany and siding with the United 
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Nations at a moment when the German defeat could not yet be clearly foreseen.’102 The 
King was also awarded the American Legion of Merit in degree of Chief Commander for 
‘extraordinary fidelity and exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of 
outstanding service to the cause of the Allied Nation in the struggle against Hitlerite 
Germany.’103 The awards did not impede, however, Romania’s sovietisation or Michael’s 
approaching downfall. 
For many years thereafter, the government would point out that the Soviet Union 
was ‘genuinely and disinterestedly concerned’ with the development of Romania. The 
press periodically published articles to illustrate that fact. Normal economic exchanges 
were presented as evidence of the invaluable economic assistance which the Soviet Union 
[was] according Romania’104 and exports to Romania were announced as economic aid.105 
The agreements concluded in 1949 led however to an increasing dependence of Romania 
upon the Soviet Union. ‘It is probable that the Soviet Union counts for over one half of 
Romania’s total foreign trade and the Russian orbit countries altogether for at least two 
thirds. That the Soviet Union has, from her insignificant pre-war position in the pattern of 
Romanian foreign trade, become by far the most important of this country’s customers and 
suppliers are an undisputed fact.’ Mentioning that an economic agreement was signed by 
Barladeanu, the Minister of Foreign Trade, Scanteia of the 5 March 1949 was ‘full of 
eulogies’ of the Soviet Union, pointing also to the previous abuses of the ‘capitalist and 
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imperialist Western countries’. That were ‘the normal ingredients of any speech or article,’ 
the British noted. Romania was to supply to the Soviet Union oil products, timber, 
locomotives, wagons, chemical goods, meat, consumer goods etc, while the Soviet Union 
would supply industrial equipment, motor cars, agricultural machinery, iron ore, coke, 
cotton, seeds etc. 106 
 By the summer of 1948 the Romanian POWs were freed from Soviet labour 
camps. Their return in a steady flow of about 1,000 a day was hailed by the press as one of 
the many ways in which Romania was helped by her great Eastern neighbour. While it was 
not explained why the POWs returned home three years after the end of the war, the 
newspapers underlined that they were ‘unanimous’ in praising the ‘humane treatment’ they 
had been accorded in captivity. Back home they were expected to take part in another 
‘struggle,’ this time for the rehabilitation of the national economy. 107 
 While they were in the Soviet camps, the POW’s were told that it would be better 
for their country to become a republic of the U.S.S.R. since Romania was just ‘a small and 
a poor country.’108 Many Romanians began to fear that their country would be annexed by 
the Soviets.109 That was not going to happen, Gheorghiu-Dej, the Communist leader, 
believed. His confidence was based a simple reason: ‘the Soviet Union would have nothing 
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to get from this.’110 He was right. The Soviets could not have gained more from a formal 
annexation of the country than they had using all the methods and devices they used to 
control Romania.  
Even without incorporating Romania, the Soviets exerted a total domination over 
the country’s economy and military, refashioning also education and culture. The 
Constitution, the ‘Parliament,’ and the local councils were all remodelled on the Soviet 
pattern.111 The Soviets also exerted an important political influence through the 
Communists of non-Romanian origin; trained in the Soviet Union they arrived in Romania 
along with the Soviet Army. Many of them had an unsavoury reputation as being 
unscrupulous in accomplishing the Soviet objectives. Some of them such as Ana Pauker 
were confident that the best option for Romania was to become a member state of the 
Soviet Union.’112  
From the very beginning, the Communist Party from Romania acted as Moscow’s 
agent and its policy was but a reflection of the Soviet party line. Once the line was 
established, it bound all party members and those that depended upon them. Although 
proudly proclaiming ‘we made the revolution, we did nothing but play the roles prescribed 
by Moscow in its script for Romania,’ the ideologue of the Communist Party, Silviu 
Brucan, would later admit.’113 
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A day after Groza’s appointment as Premier, on 7 March 1945, a Soviet 
delegation led by Evgheni Suhalov went to Bucharest to transmit the new instructions for 
the country’s communization. A three-year plan, followed by another two of five years 
duration each, was to be implemented by the new government. The plans provide for a 
land reform in which peasants were to be deprived of their land designed to pave the way 
for their inclusion in the collectivist system and the further reorientation of population 
from countryside to urban centres. Other measures included: the reorganization of the 
army, including the creation of a popular militia of the NKVD type; the liquidation of the 
banks owned by the National Liberal Party leaders; the King’s abdication and the royal 
family’s expulsion from Romania; the gradual suppression of import-export companies 
trading with the U.S. and Britain; the reorientation of the exports towards the Soviet 
Union; and the exclusion of the traditional parties from political life. Not a single foreign 
citizen, except from the countries under Soviet influence would be allowed to enter 
Romania.114  
By 1948 everything from the list seemed to have been accomplished. Industry was 
nationalised, collectivisation had begun, private traders and artisans reorganised into 
cooperatives, the Church had been subdued. Romania was virtually cut off from the non-
Communist world. 
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To go to war for Romania? 
 
 
I left Bucharest with a feeling of sadness, and 
deeply thankful that I had not been born a Romanian. 
(Archibald Clark Kerr)1 
 
 
 
Once installed as Prime Minister Groza attempted by every possible manoeuvre to 
associate himself with the very popular King Michael and establish the ‘unshakable 
solidarity’ between the King and the Government.2 The ‘royal strike’, which followed 
Groza’s refusal to resign, did not help in the maintenance of this charade. The King 
refused to sign any documents sign from his rebellious Prime Minister and appealed the 
Anglo-Americans representatives in the Allied Control Commission for support. 
The Vice-Premier Tatarescu stated that the King’s strike was determined by foreign 
pressure. He alluded in this way to the British’ and Americans’ declarations that they 
would not recognize the Romanian government for it did not represent all political forces. 
‘But how could they know what the real situation in Romania is?’ Tatarescu wondered. 
‘How could the British, who were incapable of appreciating their own domestic situation, 
pretend they could understand the politics of a far away country with which contact and the 
possibility of information had been lost?’3   
The summer of 1945 brought new British and American Governments, and a firmer 
attitude toward their former War Ally. Both the Attlee and Truman administrations were 
determined to challenge the supremacy of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. Clement 
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Attlee, and the Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, began to call for a tough line against Soviet 
ambitions in Eastern Europe and an end to the apparent drift in British policy.4 The British 
ambassador in Moscow was instructed to tell the Soviets that the British ‘found themselves 
unable to consider the governments [of Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary] as representative 
or democratic within the meaning of the Potsdam decisions and complained that the 
Soviets were acting in the ACC of these countries without consultation with the British and 
American representatives.5 
The new Truman administration also challenged the Soviets, pointing to Yalta 
Conference at which it was agreed that ‘interim governmental authorities’ should be 
broadly representative. Harry Truman rejected Stalin’s attempt to insert an amendment to 
the American proposals at Potsdam on 21 July which would have involved the recognition 
of the East European satellite governments. Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Romania 
would only be recognized when they were established on a proper basis, not before. At 
Potsdam, the Americans were firmly supported by the British delegation. Truman was 
supported by Churchill and Attlee, while James Byrnes enjoyed backing from Anthony 
Eden and Ernest Bevin at meetings with Molotov.6 
Soon after the return of Stalin and Molotov from Potsdam, on 6 August, the 
Soviet government communicated to their representatives in Bucharest, Colonel General 
I.Z. Susaikov, the chief of the ACC, and A.P. Pavlov, the political adviser, the decision to 
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restore diplomatic relations with Romania. The Romanian government was officially 
recognized by the Soviets.7  
Protesting against the way the Soviets undertook to implement the Yalta 
Declaration the Americans called for free elections and proposed that a Council of Foreign 
Ministers meet to discuss the issue.8 In his radio speech to the American nation on 9 
August, President Harry Truman recalled that at Yalta it was agreed that  
the three governments would assume a common responsibility in helping to re-
establish in the liberated and satellite nations of Europe governments broadly 
representative of democratic elements in the population. That responsibility still 
stands. We all recognize it as a joint responsibility of the three governments. It 
was reaffirmed in the Berlin Declarations on Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. 
These nations are not to be spheres of influence of any one power. They are now 
governed by Allied control commissions composed of representatives of the three 
governments which met at Yalta and Berlin.9 
 
On 17 August Roy Melbourne, the American representative in Bucharest, 
transmitted to the Romanian government a verbal note, reminding them of the Potsdam 
communiqué of 3 August and President Truman’s speech addressed to the American nation 
on 9 August.10 The United States could not re-establish diplomatic relations with Romania, 
as it had been configured, as it was ruled by an unrepresentative government.  
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We made known our attitude when Groza government came to power, and 
anything of what the government had done since, do not justify a change of 
attitude. It goes without saying that we cannot consider, in any case, this 
government truly representative and therefore cannot initiate diplomatic relations 
with him.11 
Untroubled Groza told the King that he considered the American note null and 
void.12 He had a similar opinion on the British Government’s note which the King showed 
him on 19 August. Although shorter and more moderate than Melbourne’s communication, 
it had a similar content: the Romanian government was not considered representative. 
Groza was unmoved. Since the British note did not come through official channels it 
should be disregarded, he maintained. ‘There is a government and there is a Foreign 
Minister. A foreign power that directly contacts the King does not follow the official 
channel.’ The Americans had submitted their note to the Foreign Minister, Groza admitted. 
However, they were in error as well. Since Romania was under the Armistice convention, 
the note should have been addressed to the ACC, particularly as the Americans did not 
recognize the present government. Direct, official communication with the Foreign 
Ministry and its subordinate bodies implied an implicit recognition, Groza assessed. 13 
Thus, both the Americans, who contacted the Foreign Minister instead of the ACC, and the 
British, who submitted their note directly to the King and not to the government since they 
did not recognize it, had failed to proceed correctly, in Groza’s view. Both 
communications were ignored. 
Encouraged by the Potsdam Communiqué and backed by all the party leaders who 
had previously supported him in Antonescu’s removal from power – excluding the 
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Communists -- the King determined to appoint a new Prime Minister.14 It was important to 
install the new before the parade scheduled for 23 August since the Soviets could have 
used the anniversary of the coup to demonstrate support for the Groza Government.15 
During his conversation with the King, Groza himself maintained that his government was 
stronger than ever, and assured King Michael that the Soviets would eventually ensure the 
government’s recognition by the Anglo-Americans. He suggested that the King would do 
well to maintain him in power.16 When King Michael asked for Groza’s resignation 
anyway, the Prime Minister refused to comply. The following day, on 20 August, he again 
met the King and, according to his account, attempted to clarify the situation.  
“Your Majesty, I am an old man, so please help me to remember when did you 
ask for my resignation?” His Majesty replied that he had not said that to me. I 
insisted: the Marshal of the Court told Maniu about that. The King said that 
neither the Marshal nor he could have said that. Mr. Maniu and the Marshal [of 
the Court] shall resolve on this issue! . . .  coming back again to the resignation, I 
said, “Majesty, I don’t recall when exactly during our conversation I was asked to 
resign.” “I asked you to help me.” “Was the word resignation pronounced the 
previous day?” His Majesty said that it was not. “But I understood that you would 
help me and let me establish another government which would be recognized.” I 
said that I did not know that by giving help he meant to resign. It did not cross my 
mind that His Majesty had this desire.’17 
 
It was for the first time in Romanian history that a resignation was demanded by a 
King and the government’s chief refused to resign.’ 18 King Michael requested assistance 
in the establishment of a representative and democratic government. On 20 August the 
King met Air Vice-Marshal Stevenson and General Schuyler. The following day Susaikov 
reproached the King for ‘playing the British and American game.’ Had the King discussed 
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the issue with him, he would have suggested a convenient solution. 19 Until Groza 
resigned, the King decided, he would not sign any documents originating from the 
government; nor would he participate in any public meeting that would have required the 
presence of any member of the government.20  
Faced with this challenge, Groza convened the Council of Ministers and reassured 
them of continued and unconditional Soviet support, as reaffirmed by a recent note signed 
by Molotov himself.21 On 23 August, the Soviet Deputy Chairman of the ACC made clear 
that the Soviet government was against Groza’s removal. The Soviets claimed that Groza 
government enjoyed the full support of the population and fulfilled its responsibilities and 
obligations in a manner worthy of all praise.22 
While Schuyler called Washington for immediate consultations concerning 
Romania, the Air Vice-Marshal Stevenson seemed convinced that the Soviets would 
eventually back off. Stevenson apparently behaved as instructed by London: keeping aloof 
if events headed to a climax.23 
Although the Romanians desired to resume ties with Britain and the United States, 
‘the resumption of these relations should not distress and weaken our relations with the 
other friends, vital to our country,’ the Vice-Premier Tatarescu maintained. Claiming that 
he was the first politician in the country who had advocated for an alliance with the Soviet 
Union, Tatarescu assessed that friendship with the great Eastern neighbour constituted the 
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prerequisite of Romania’s development.24 Collaboration with the Soviet Union was ‘a vital 
condition and, at the same time, a guarantee of our political, economic and social 
consolidation.’ Therefore, those trying ‘sometimes accidentally, but most of the time 
intentionally, to damage the Soviet-Romanian friendship’ or ‘to prevent the Soviet-
Romanian collaboration’ were not serving Romania’s cause. Tatarescu had in fact accused 
the opposition of trying to undermine the state since anyone challenging the validity of the 
government worked, in his view, against Romania’s interests.25   
Interestingly, these views came from a politician who was perceived even by the 
Communists as an opportunist. A former dissident of the National Liberal Party, Tatarescu 
established his own faction in the aftermath of the Second World War. Then, asserting that 
his party had a left orientation, he accepted collaboration with the Communists. 26 For this 
and many others of his gestures, Tatarescu was seen as being the ‘personification of 
political immorality.’27 His appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs, favoured by Ana 
Pauker, who later replaced him, was opposed by Patrascanu, the Minister of Justice. It 
would have been better to collaborate with the National Liberal Party instead of 
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Tatarescu’s faction of ‘blackmailers and well-known bribers,’ Patrascanu assessed.28 
However, Tatarescu remained loyal to Groza and refused to concur with the King’s request 
for resignation. ‘Without asking time for reflection, I told the King’s envoy that I remain 
faithful to my commitments to the Bloc and the King should not count on me as an 
accomplice to the biggest mistake of his reign.’29 
Tatarescu hinted to the Anglo-Americans as having influenced the King’s 
decisions.30 The assertion that the King’s gesture was inspired by the Anglo-Americans 
was however a recurrent theme. On 10 September 1945, the Romanian newspapers 
reproduced an editorial from Izvestia, highly critical of the ‘political interference’ of the 
United States and Britain in Romania. It was maintained that the King had nothing to 
reproach to his government and in asking for Groza’s resignation, he was just following 
the suggestion of the Anglo-Americans.31 ‘The clash between the Anglo-Saxons and Stalin 
had begun,’ the former King Carol II noted in his diary, ‘but it is sad that it is taking place 
at Romania’s and Michael’s expense . . . It had conceded too much to all the Soviet 
requirements in the past, adopting the nefarious policy of spheres of influences, for anyone 
to believe that England would fight today with any arm than that of intrigue.’32 
The political crisis reached its climax on 8 November, the feast day of the 
Archangels Michael and Gabriel, when people gathered peacefully in front of the Royal 
Palace to celebrate and show their support for King Michael. The government’s reaction 
was brutal. In the clash which followed eleven people were killed and 75 injured.33  
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In mid-November the Americans sent an envoy to evaluate the situation. He met 
members of the government and the leaders of the opposition. The first were optimistic 
about finding a solution to the royal strike. Casting the blame upon the King’s entourage 
the Minister of War, General Rascanu, maintained that the crisis could be resolved in a 
very simple way. Groza should pretend that he would step down and the King refuse to 
discharge him. This would save the King’s prestige.34 The Minister of Justice, Patrascanu, 
also believed that the King should reconsider his position and make the first move, 
summoning General Susaikov for a discussion and, subsequently, the American and British 
representatives in ACC.35 Maniu called for a firmer Anglo-American attitude toward the 
Soviets. ‘More than words were necessary if anything substantial was to be achieved’. 
Threats would be more effective. The threat to leave the negotiations or even the threat of 
war!36 Maniu’s advice suggests despair rather than hope.37 The Soviet puppet government 
whose only aim was to subordinate Romanian interests to those of the Soviet Union had to 
be overturned promptly, Maniu recommended.38 The leader of the National Liberal Party, 
Bratianu, suggested that the Soviets be compelled to apply the principles of the Yalta and 
Potsdam Conventions.39 
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In his report, the American envoy concluded that Groza government was ‘in no 
sense representative under the Yalta formula because the two political groups which had 
the support of the vast majority of the Romanian people were excluded from the 
Government, their leaders are being harassed, their local political chapter absorbed, the 
newspapers entirely suppressed and all public meetings of the opposition barred.’ To the 
difficulties arising from the repressive actions of the Government were added the presence 
of a large Soviet garrison that was fed, clothed and paid largely at Romanian expense. The 
American envoy advised firm action: ‘Unless we can take firm and effective action in 
Romania it will soon be too late. We are jeopardizing the confidence of the Romanian 
people in our intent and ability to carry out commitments we have made to the world.’40 
The political situation in Romania was addressed at the Moscow conference of 
Foreign Ministers held between 16 and 26 December 1945. The Soviets maintained that a 
change of government in Romania would lead to turmoil. They would not allow this to 
happen at the border of the Soviet Union. The Anglo-Americans agreed eventually to 
recognize the Romanian government once it was broadened by the inclusion of two 
Ministers, representing the two opposition parties. As well, free universal and secret 
elections had to be held as soon as possible, and all democratic parties must have the right 
to participate in the elections and nominate candidates. The Romanian government 
meanwhile should work to protect the freedom of the press, free speech, freedom of 
religion and of association. When these conditions were fulfilled, Britain and the United 
States pledged to recognize the Groza government.41 Moscow agreed to these requests and 
sent Vishinski to Bucharest to ensure the fulfilment of the resolution. He was joined by 
Clark Kerr and Harriman.  
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Although the two would be Ministers without Portfolios, Groza fought for the 
rejection of the nominees of the opposition parties as if it was a matter of life or death. The 
Liberal leader, Bratianu, was accused of being morally responsible for the bloodshed of 8 
November while Mihalache, the vice-president of the Peasant Party, was blamed for ‘being 
responsible for driving Romania into war and volunteering in the campaign against the 
Soviet Union,’ actions which proved his ‘undemocratic and fascist views.’ 42 Although the 
accusations brought against the two nominees were flimsy, Harriman and Clark Kerr gave 
up at the end of one week of negotiations. Two other candidates were nominated by the 
NLP and NPP.43 In fact they would be excluded from all important governmental debates 
and decisions.  
Leaving Bucharest, Vishinski declared that he had never left Romania with such a 
light heart.44 He ensured that the Moscow resolution would be applied the way the Soviet 
wanted not allowing any prominent political figure to be included in the cabinet.45  
Although Britain’s and the United States’ envoys gave publicly formal assurances 
that they guaranteed the application of the Moscow agreement, Harriman advised Maniu 
privately that he should try to get closer to the Soviet Union since Romania was 
inescapably under Soviet influence. Clark Kerr, the British Ambassador in Moscow, was 
convinced that Groza would never acquiesce to Anglo-American demands, or comply with 
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the agreement since he was just a docile performer of Stalin’s orders and governed 
Romania as if it were a Russian province. 46 On the basis of the formal and superficial 
assurances assumed by Groza, often referenced later, Britain and the United States 
officially recognized the Groza government on 6 February 1946. Prominent front page 
articles were dedicated by Romanian newspapers to recognition. The Communist official 
Scanteia printed the communiqué of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, 
announcing in the headline that the government was recognized, but ignoring in its 
coverage the very essence of the British and American communications of 5 February 
1946.47  
Six months of crisis resolved in a minor political change that did not alter the 
essence of the government. It remained Soviet in creation and communist in inspiration. 
Such was the government that was expected to hold free elections and ensure democratic 
rights. The attempt to implement the Potsdam Decision in Romania had actually been 
thwarted by the Moscow Decision. The important positions of Justice and Interior 
continued to be controlled by Communists and the government’s program remained that of 
6 March with certain amendments. More than an attempt to solve a political crisis, the 
Moscow agreement was an unhappy compromise. Britain and the United States agreed to 
the Soviet point of view on resolving the Romanian political crisis by the enlargement of 
the government with two members of the opposition appointed ministries without 
portfolios.  
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On the basis of Groza’s commitment to observe democratic liberties, Britain and 
the United States recognized the government. The American Department of State was 
however aware that although the Soviets continued to maintain the fiction of Romanian 
independence, they ‘were pursuing independent aims in Romania, with the general purpose 
of influencing Romanian political and economic developments in a direction favourable to 
the U.S.S.R. without regard to the interests of the other Allies or of the Romanians.’48 
 
In keeping with the agreement, an election followed, and during the summer 
febrile election campaigning took place in Romania. Every political organization chose an 
electoral emblem. That of the Bloc of the Democratic Parties, formed on 17 May 1946, an 
umbrella for the Communist Party, was the sun.49 The Bloc’s slogan as weird as it 
sounded, ‘vote the sun!’ was made visible on buildings, trams and train carriages, and even 
printed on packs of matches. The Communists also initiated a campaign to discredit their 
opponents. The peasants who were granted small holdings in the agrarian reform the year 
before were advised to vote for the Bloc, otherwise the great landowners belonging to the 
opposition would claim their land back. ‘You preserve your land by voting the Sun!’ read 
the leaflets of the Bloc,50 while the opposition’s leaflets announced that ‘a vote for Groza is 
a brick for a kolkhoz’ and urged the peasants vote for ‘Nation and the King.’ Otherwise, 
after the elections the government would take back the peasants’ land by incorporating it 
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into kolkhoz.51 The other theme besides collectivization was deportation to the Soviet 
Union which should be expected if the Communists won.52    
From the publication of the electoral law violations of the promised freedoms 
increased day by day. Prominent members of the National Peasant and National Liberal 
Party were attacked by armed bands, while the Government’s reaction was to accuse the 
leaders of the opposition of subversive activities. Members of the leadership of the NPP 
and NLP were arrested. Bratianu was placed under house arrest. People taking part in 
meetings convened by the opposition were attacked by paramilitaries transported in official 
vehicles.53  
The massive scale of repression stood in contrast to the political freedom 
proclaimed by Groza. The British and the Americans delivered notes of protest on 27 May 
and 14 June respectively. Although the notes were released to the press, the censor forbade 
their appearance. The government admitted that political violence ‘sometimes’ occurred 
but it was the result of the campaign of ‘agitation and hatred’ undertaken by the opposition 
parties against the government. The authorities had done nothing than ‘tempering these 
manifestations and maintain the calm and public order.’54 
The application of the principle of free elections was however incompatible with 
what the Soviet Union conceived to be its security interests. As in Poland and East 
Germany, the Soviet Union used its influence over Romania to compensate for the 
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weakness of the local Communist party. There was an increased Soviet activity in military 
field with an influx of military airplanes and troop movements in that period. 55 
While the Romanian Government accused certain employees of the American 
mission of taking part in ‘reactionary’ plots,56 the Soviets ousted journalists who reported 
about Soviet intrusion in Romania’s political life. A correspondent for the Christian 
Science Monitor, Reuben H. Markham, who wrote about the disturbances created by 
Soviet soldiers at political meetings, was accused by the Soviet representative in ACC, 
General Susaikov, of showing a ‘hostile attitude’ to the Red Army stationed in Romania 
and ordered to leave the country.57 Although the chief of the American military 
representation in the ACC, General Schuyler, protested the Soviets refused to rescind the 
expulsion order against Markham.58 Every foreign news correspondent accredited to 
Romania was obliged to be supportive of the Groza regime or remain silent.  
In contravention of the facts and common sense, the government claimed that it 
was following the recommendations of the Moscow conference. Political meetings were 
‘held more and more frequently throughout the country’ and ‘all the political parties enjoy 
freedom of [the] press as proved by the appearance of new dailies, the columns of which 
display abundance of polemics.’59 It was in the interest of most Romanians that political 
meetings be controlled since they proved to be just ‘occasions for clashes between 
extremists,’ Groza maintained. He invoked the necessity of maintaining order as the main 
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reason for the restrictions infringing the freedom of assembly. There was a difference 
between the Anglo-American and the Russian views concerning the elections, Groza 
admitted. The difference consisted in the fact that the first conceived them as they were 
held in Britain or America, whereas Russians had in mind the Russian model. The role of 
the Soviet Army was to ensure that the elections would be ‘free and unfettered.’60  
While the State broadcasting service transmitted continuously the Government’s 
propaganda, opposition publications were hampered by censorship.61 Admitting that 
broadcasting facilities were available only to persons with official responsibilities in the 
performance of their governmental or administrative duties, Groza referred to the necessity 
of preserving public order and security. 62 These equivocations and outright lies caused the 
frustrated American representative to the ACC, Burton Berry, to suggest to the Department 
of State that the opposition should be given time on the Voice of America.63 
Seeking to ensure some element of democratic practice, opposition leaders 
requested that official observers be sent to Romania during the campaign and on the 
election day. If the Communist won the elections by fraud, Romania’s political future 
would be in danger. The new parliament would vote for the removal of the monarchy and 
for the country’s inclusion within the Soviet Union, Maniu maintained. He was so much 
concerned with the attacks upon his local party leaders and innocent people taking part in 
political meetings that he was thinking of withdrawing from the electoral campaign. 64 
‘Those who don’t fight, lose the game,’ Berry replied, to his misgivings.65  
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Berry urged the American government to adopt a prompt reaction to give ‘courage 
and strength’ to the Romanian democratic leaders. Economic leverage might be employed 
to extract political concessions. The American government should be just as hard as the 
Soviet in commercial matters, refusing the Romanian government all loans, financial 
inducements or commercial advantages until the government functioned in a 
representative, democratic and independent manner.66 Letting down the opposition leaders, 
‘our friends in Eastern Europe’ would be like giving the ‘coat of whitewash to [the] Groza 
façade of the Communist Party’. If, on the other hand, we are going to insist on free and 
unfettered elections for Romania, according to our interpretation of those words, it is 
important to confirm now to the Romanian representatives in Paris that such is our 
intention.’67  
Although Romania was of low priority for Britain, as the British Minister, Adrian 
Holman told Maniu,68 the British continued to join the Americans in sending protests to the 
Romanian government, reminding it of assurances given by Groza in January 1946. On 28 
October, for example, the British and the Americans protested against the irregularities that 
were occurring in connection with the election preparation and the severe restriction on 
freedom of expression imposed. They invited the Government to change its attitude and to 
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show by its future actions the sincerity of the promises given in January.69 ‘All democratic 
parties should have the same possibility to participate in political activities leading up to 
elections without discrimination,’ the British note chided.70  
Continuing to maintain that the fulfilment of the obligations assumed remained 
the constant purpose of the Romanian government, the Foreign Minister Tatarescu replied 
to the Anglo-Americans that the Moscow decision was an agreement between the three 
Allies and pointed out that any act controlling its implementation could not belong to one 
signatory government.71 The Romanian government could not therefore accept any 
‘imposition dictated’ by a single foreign power, either British or American. Any 
comments, criticism and recommendations would be understood as attempts to infringe 
Romania’s sovereignty by interfering in the country’s internal affairs.72  
It was evident that the British and American governments could not influence the 
trend of events in Romania unless joined by the Soviet government although diplomatic 
protests could not be considered as an infringement of Romanian sovereignty or 
interference in a matter of domestic jurisdiction. The British continued to press the 
Government to tolerate freedom of speech, of press and the right of association in the note 
submitted by Holman to Tatarescu on 16 November 1946.73  
The Groza Government continued to respond that the two opposition parties were 
to blame for the situation. The upcoming election was ‘the first electoral battle for a truly 
democratic political regime. . . . There had been no true democracy in Romania before, not 
                                                 
69
 Burton Y. Berry, Romanian Diaries, 1944-1947, 2000, pp. 411-412 infra. 
70
 The government should respect all electoral procedures; votes should be counted in the presence 
of all parties’ representatives, official reports published immediately in each voting section and election 
issues be addressed to an independent authority for appeals. Romania. The Political Life in Documents. 1946, 
pp. 374-376; Henry Prost, Destinul Romaniei (1918-1954) [Romania’s fate. 1918-1954], Compania, 2006, p. 
263.  
71
 Reply of the Romanian government following the notes of protest of 28 October. Romania. The 
Political Life in Documents. 1946, pp. 424-425.  
72
 Romania on the antechamber of the Peace Conference of Paris. Documents, pp. 327-9; Ioan 
Scurtu (ed.), Romania. Political Life in Documents, 1946, p. 43. 
73
 Romania on the antechamber of the Peace Conference of Paris. Documents, pp. 327-9. 
52 
 
even in the strictly formal meaning of the law, and even less with regard to the political 
morals and practice in everyday life.’ 74 The elections to be held on 19 November 1946 
would be different from the previous, Groza asserted. They would be a consultation of the 
popular will and the electorate would not be misled ‘in order to obtain the greatest possible 
number of votes or to steal them from the ballot boxes or buy them.’75 So Groza promised. 
In fact, a theft is what transpired.  
On 19 November 1946 terror reigned. The opposition voters were denied access 
to the polls in twelve polling stations in Bucharest. When the ballot boxes in some 
provincial cities were opened, fighting erupted, and casualties were reported. The 
techniques used for falsifying the election included depriving about a half of the people 
eligible to vote of voting cards, permitting multiple voting by government supporters, not 
allowing scrutinizers from the opposition to be present at the count, and stuffing the ballot 
boxes before Opposition observers arrived. 76  
Although admitting that certain ‘incidents’ happened in connection with the 
elections, the government blamed them on the Opposition parties.77 A communiqué issued 
by the Ministry of Interior shortly after election indicated that violence resulted from 
attacks on polling stations by opposition supporters.’78 The Minister of the Interior, 
Teohari Georgescu, confirmed ‘fair voting’, as did ‘some fifty foreign journalists from 
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every European country’ who came to Romania to cover the elections.79 Indeed, forty-six 
journalists from various European capitals signed a statement claiming that no intimidation 
(physical or moral) took place during the elections, that there were no complaints regarding 
the procedure of voting and that the entire process took place in an atmosphere of calm.80 
However, more than 10,000 complaints and protests were submitted to the American and 
British Missions the day after the elections. A list containing the names of 60,000 citizens 
who were not allowed to vote was also submitted.81  
Were the elections an efficient and sufficient tool for establishing democracy?82 
Certainly, the Declaration of Liberated Territories approved at Yalta by the ‘Big Three’ 
guaranteed free elections in Eastern Europe. And undoubtedly, no such elections had been 
held in Romania. Yet all the protests submitted before the elections did not lead to any 
change in the practice of the Romanian government. What result could the protests 
submitted after election possibly have? 
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The Communist dominated Bloc of ‘democratic parties’ won about eighty percent 
of the vote, obtaining 347 seats in a 414 seat Parliament.83 The democratic parties all 
together hand only taken seven per cent of the seats in parliament, a fact signalled in the 
British note of protest which followed.84 
After its electoral victory, the Government intensified its repression of the 
opposition. About 2,000 politicians were arrested in March 1947. The opposition did what 
it could do, which was little. Maniu protested against the abuses of the Government in a 
memorandum addressed to the Ministry of Interior.85 The Independent Social Democratic 
Party addressed a petition to all socialist parties and democratic nations, pleading the cause 
of hundreds of Socialists arrested for their political views.86 The leader of the National 
Liberal Party, Bratianu, seeking relief, submitted a memorandum to the King asking him to 
cease collaboration with the government in protest. While during Antonescu’s dictatorship, 
the Dictator signed all decrees, the laws issued by Groza government bore the King’s 
signature. The King should appeal once again to the Three Signatory powers, Bratianu 
suggested. He might have believed that this time the King would succeed since the country 
was to become sovereign once again. The Peace Treaty, concluded in Paris on 10 February 
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1947, which officially ended the Armistice period, waited only for Parliamentary 
ratification to consecrate the sovereignty of the state.87 
The conclusion of the Peace treaty did not confer the signatory states the right to 
intervene in Romania’s internal affairs as the Romanian government pointed out in the 
reply to the British who delivered a note of protest for the massive scale of repression.88 
The government also accused the leaders of the opposition of heinous crimes, including 
acting as an ‘apple of discord’ between the Great Powers.89 
Why was Romania abandoned while Greece and Turkey were assisted? Not long 
after Truman’s speech on 11 March 1947, Maniu reproached Berry that the Americans 
were doing little to defend democratic values in Romania.90 He likewise reproached 
Holman and Porter at other meetings. Holman exploded: ‘What do you want from us, Mr. 
Maniu, to go to war for Romania?’ Porter intervened, evoking the heroic deeds of the anti-
Communist Greeks. Maniu should follow in their footsteps and resist firmly, ‘the great 
endeavours being won by fight, not by lamentations.’ Had Porter been aware of the danger 
threatening Maniu and the NPP leadership, he might not have rebuked him so 
unsympathetically for ‘expecting the Western powers to fight for the Romanian 
opposition.’91  
At the end of July the National Peasant Party was outlawed after the so-called 
‘Tamadau affair,’ when the vice-president of the party, Mihalache, together with other 
leading members were arrested while waiting for a plane to flee the country. Thousands of 
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arrests followed.92 Maniu’s hope for support from the Anglo-Americans even if trouble 
with the Soviets resulted was utopian.93 Other of his predictions about the political 
evolution in Romania proved to be very astute.  
 Although the Groza Government had assumed certain obligations in order to 
obtain recognition from the other Great Powers, all the previous pledges were disregarded. 
King Michael’s attempt to force a change with his ‘royal strike’ failed. All appeals of the 
opposition leaders to the West for help did not change the situation. The notes sent by the 
British and American governments to the Romanian government stated the obvious but had 
no effect. Once recognition was conceded, further representations were dismissed as 
interference in Romania’s internal affairs. 
Although determined to challenge the supremacy of the Soviet Union in Eastern 
Europe, the Attlee and Truman administrations were eventually forced to accept the Soviet 
predominance over Romania and recognize the Groza government installed with the 
support of the Soviets. The recognition of the Romanian government on 6 February 1946 
and the Peace Treaty signed with Romania on 10 February 1947 consecrated the new 
regime in Bucharest. Although the Groza government was not representative or democratic 
within the meaning of the Potsdam decisions, the Council of Foreign Ministers which met 
in Moscow in December 1945 did not change the substance of the government, Communist 
in inspiration and subordinate to Soviet interests.  
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Supporting the Communist Regime? 
 
 
 
Some people said that the golden dream of the 
humankind was Communism and that the dream was almost 
tangible in Eastern Europe. But they did not want to ask 
themselves why thousand and thousand people were running 
away from this dream and why the exodus does not take the 
other way too. (King Michael) 94 
 
 
 
While the political situation worsened and the Romanian judiciary system focused 
through a series of political trials on eliminating the leaders of the opposition, a few 
members of the British Parliament reiterated their favourable views on Romania’s 
democratic regime. The Labour MP Leslie J. Solley and the Communist Phil Piratin 
seemed impressed by the ‘complete freedom of speech and action for all democrats’ in 
Romania and pointed out that only carrying on fascist propaganda or indulging in anti-
Semitic activities were prohibited.95 Ironically the accusation of carrying on fascist 
propaganda was one the most commonly one used by the regime against political 
opponents. As Le Rougetel, the British political representative in Bucharest, noted, it was a 
simply process ‘of calling black white’. That way ‘a legend is being built up which unless 
challenged will soon be accepted as epitaph of an independent Romania.’ Who was 
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supposed to challenge the regime since Eden believed that the British had ‘more important 
fish to try. And what would be the result of challenging it? Nil.’96  
The label ‘fascist reactionaries’ was applied to the opponents of the Communist 
Party and anyone who opposed the policies of the government and was extended to the 
outside ‘enemy’.97 One of the many misrepresentations spread by the government was that 
the opposition parties were compromised for having accepted as members former members 
of the Iron Guard.98 Recent accounts disclosed that it was the Communist Party who 
collaborated with former Iron Guard members and even accepted them as members to 
increase their very low membership.99 The Left represented by the Social Democrats was 
also accused of not adhering to the Communist ideals and not encouraging close relation 
with the Soviet Union. 
By declaring that the ‘counter-revolutionary forces’, assisted by foreign countries 
had conspired against the Romanian government, Solley, clearly followed the Communist 
propaganda of the time. Solley and Piratin were not, however, the first supporters of the 
Communist regime to visit Bucharest, exchanging favourable press for comradely 
hospitality. A year before, in 1946, John Mack, a Labour MP, had visited Romania 
following the invitation of Groza government. Assessing that ‘very little is known in 
England about Groza government’s politics,’ Mack was apparently eager to convey ‘a just 
and objective idea’ about Romania. For this purpose, he accepted the invitation to visit, 
which proved to be an ‘exhilarating experience’. Welcomed as a distinguished envoy from 
Britain, Mack was invited to speak at a meeting organized in his honour in Bucharest. He 
then spent Easter in the company of the Prime Minister, at the latter’s private residence in 
Deva. He had repeatedly been told about how ‘gloomy’ Romania’s past had been. Until 
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1946, it seemed, the country had lacked a strong and stable government. This might have 
encouraged Mack to construct a glamorous image of the present.100 Confident that the 
Romanians had ‘a strong desire to throw away forever the legacies of the past’ and rebuild 
the country ‘on a modern base in harmony with the great democracies of the West,’ he was 
persuaded that the Groza Government would ensure a wide representation for all political 
forces. In his view, the government was also ‘animated by a sincere desire for friendship 
with Britain and the Soviet Union.’101  After the November elections, Mack suggested in 
the House of Commons that the Romanian government be congratulated for its victory. 
Any such fraternal message, he was informed, was unlikely since the elections had been 
‘neither fair, nor free. They had not contributed to the British-Romanian friendship and, 
consequently, there was no need to congratulate the Romanian government.’ 102 
Just before the Romanian elections, another Labour MP had visited Romania. For 
John Platt-Mills ‘the best criterion for judging whether or not a regime is good’ was to find 
out how ‘the respective people, its workers, peasants, intellectuals and employees, respond 
to this regime.’ Although less effusive than Mack in praising the regime, Platt-Mills was 
certain that ‘the progressive people’ in Britain would view with sympathy the struggle of 
the Romanian democracy to achieve better living conditions for common people. He took 
the opportunity to voice an opinion on the reparation issue, discussed at the Paris Peace 
Conference. The British government conveyed indemnity claims on behalf of the ‘big 
industrialists’ who invested in Romania. Romania was requested to make compensation for 
damages caused to property of the Allied countries and to their citizens during the war, the 
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sum of the compensation being established later.103 A distinction had to be made between 
the damages caused by Romania to invaded territories and the damages which were caused 
to Romania, Platt-Mills assessed. As far as he knew, Romania ‘never bombed London or 
New York’. Platt-Mills pinned much importance in his statement on commercial relations 
between the two countries. ‘To Great Britain it is of great importance to find a market for 
her manufactured goods and I am quite sure that your ploughmen want our machinery. In a 
like manner, Great Britain requires the food and timber which has always been found in 
Romania in plenty.’ 104 
In the autumn of 1947, an official parliamentary delegation led by Hubert 
Beaumont, a Labour MP, and including two other Labour MPs, Somerville Hastings and 
Ernest Popplewell, two Conservatives - Sir Walter Smiles and Colonel Clifton Brown, and 
a Liberal, Emery Roberts – arrived in Romania at the invitation of the Romanian 
government.105 Once the visit was confirmed and the composition of the delegation known, 
the Romanians decided that other MPs should be invited to Romania ‘so that they may be 
able to respond to criticism made by the delegation upon their return’. 106 
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During the summer, the Romanians had unsuccessfully attempted to manoeuvre 
for the inclusion in the delegation of certain MPs known for their pro-Communist 
sympathies. The delegation’s composition had been decided by Parliament proportional to 
its membership, they were told. The remaining option was to invite the desired MPs as 
private guests of the government. On the Romanian list stood Leslie Solley, Phil Piratin, 
Denis Pritt, John Platt-Mills, Konni Zilliacus, Richard Crossman, and Kingsley Martin, the 
editor of the left-wing magazine New Statesman and Nation.107 They should support the 
regime and neutralize a presumptive negative evaluation made by the official 
delegation.’108 
Of these, ‘the most suitable person to rely on’ was believed to be Pritt who, as a 
lawyer, defended the Soviets brought to Court in Canada for espionage.109 Although an 
independent MP after a contention with Bevin, he worked ‘hand in hand’ with Zilliacus 
and Platt-Mills. While the Romanian government put much hope in Pritt, he declined the 
invitation. It was not because he was reluctant to endorse the Romanian regime but 
because at that time he was in Prague supporting that Communist regime under 
construction there.110 Solley, a cunning person who had previously rendered services to the 
Romanian government ‘with all kinds of information’ was also on the list. 111 Eventually, 
he and the Communist Piratin accepted the invitation. They managed to get to Bucharest 
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on the same day as the official delegation and accompanied it everywhere.112 Hubert 
Beaumont, the chief of the delegation, expressed, upon his return to Britain, his anger at 
the discourtesy of the Romanian government that had simply attached the two 
unrepresentative MPs to the delegation.113 
The additions earned whatever hospitality might have been shown them. 
Accompanying the official delegation, Solley proved to be, as he was in the House of 
Commons, ‘talkative and even quarrelsome,’ arguing frequently with the members of the 
delegation and even accusing them of insulting Romania. Although he was told that the 
delegation was not interested in his opinion since he was not an accredited member, he 
replied that as a member of the British Parliament, he could declare whatever he wanted.114 
Piratin went even further in his criticisms, accusing the British Government of not 
spending a penny to help Romania although it had assisted Germany, Austria and 
Greece.115 
As the Romanian government expected, the two did not just work to hamstring the 
official delegation but also made favourable remarks on the regime on their return and 
created that way a distorted image for British public opinion of what was actually 
happening in Romania. Their attitude prompted the Conservative Clifton Brown to assess 
that the Soviet Union represented not only a huge military potential, but also an ‘altar of 
social beliefs’ having its ‘fanatic agents’ in the House of all capitalist states.’116 King 
Michael was of the same opinion. ‘Stalin had admirers among people with influence on 
public opinion in the West,’ he assessed. ‘Philosophers, journalists, poets… while 
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applauding the communist experiment they took [for themselves] the best of [what] 
capitalism’ could provide.117 Without knowing how Soviet propaganda could be restrained, 
Brown was at least certain that the British public was beginning to wake up from the 
‘illusion that the Left stands for a valid political option. Had the elections been held’, by 
the time the visit occurred, ‘the Conservatives would [have] take[n] power.’118 
Travelling throughout the country, the delegation had the opportunity of seeing to 
what extent the Communists had succeeded in establishing control over Romanian society. 
Criticizing certain measures initiated by the regime such as the financial stabilization 
implemented in August 1947, Brown assessed that this measure had the purpose of 
undermining the capitalist basis of the society.119 His colleague, Smiles, criticized the 
procedure of appointing rather than electing local officials. These would, however, prove 
to be faithful to the regime which had appointed them. 
While visiting Sibiu, a city with a significant German population, Brown, Smiles, 
and Roberts ‘began the attack,’ asking how many enterprises had been taken from the 
Germans and for what reason. The Communist appointed Mayor mentioned that there was 
a law which decided on the confiscation. That made Smiles retort that the Communist 
regime had adopted certain measures, it seemed, only to uproot the German population 
irrespective of its war record.120 “Was there any political organization in which Romanians 
could freely express their political beliefs?” Popplewell asked, approaching Anton 
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Alexandrescu, a former colleague of Maniu, by then a collaborationist of the regime. 
Alexandrescu was by then Minister of Cooperation. 121 Why had Alexandrescu agreed to 
adhere to the Communists and leave the National Peasant Party after twenty years? And 
what kind of democracy was that in which state officials were forced to resign just because 
they held a different political view from the official line?122 Achile Saraga, an MP 
accompanying the British delegation, was also a former member of the National Peasant 
Party.123 The day the Assembly of deputies voted for the exclusion of the NPP from 
political life, Saraga paid a veritable homage to the Minister of Interior “that discovered 
the plot orchestrated by the NPP”. 124  
Constantly challenging the officials they met, the British MPs warned them ‘how 
wrong they were in walking on this line of totalitarian policy.’ Mentioning the story of a 
naïve girl, unaware of the danger of riding a tiger who ended by being eaten, Smiles 
pointed to the danger of the misalliance between the Social Democrats and the 
Communists the result of which could only be the end of the social democracy in 
Romania.125 
However emphatic it might have been in some of its criticism, the British 
parliamentary delegation could do nothing more than condemn certain measures adopted 
by the Communist regime. They could not even be present at Maniu’s trial, since, as was 
the case with all the other political trials, the judgement took place behind closed doors. 
Maniu was tried and sentenced to life imprisonment on 11 November for ‘plotting against 
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the government’. By then he was 76 and the sentence was the equivalent to death.126 
Several months before, on 29 July 1947 the National Peasant Party was banned from 
political life on the ground that it was a ‘reactionary and fascist’ party.127 Smiles was too 
optimistic in believing that the authorities would not refuse entry to the court building 
because ‘if refused, everyone would realize what kind of freedom is that promoted by the 
Romanian justice.’128 
The critics displeased Romanian officials who worked to limit the damage. A 
scheduled visit to Constanta, the major Romanian port on the Black Sea, was cancelled due 
to ‘some changes in the train schedule.’ It was more likely, the Britons commented, to keep 
them away from seeing the numerous Soviet ships loading Romanian goods for the Soviet 
Union.129 Soon after, while the delegation waited to be led to a visit with the Minister of 
the Interior,130 they were told that the audience was cancelled because they had showed a 
consistently unfriendly attitude towards the Romanian Government during their visit. The 
brutal tone used by the functionary tasked with conveying this announcement and the 
gesture itself left the British speechless. The only response, it seemed, was to leave the 
hotel in which they were staying and ask for refuge in the British Legation for the 
remaining days. The visit was seemingly leading to a diplomatic incident. Only after long 
explanations and supplications would the British return to the hotel. The Romanian 
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parliament could not be made responsible for the government’s attitude, the British were 
told.131 
Overall the visit proved to be a great disappointment for the British delegation 
which concluded that the only ones with power in Romania were the Communists. The 
Romanian regime and the Soviet one were similar. ‘Being in essence a communist one, the 
Romanian regime suffers of the same weakness as the Soviet communist regime: mistrust, 
suspicion and extreme sensitivity.’132 Beaumont, the chief of the delegation, who at the 
beginning of the visit expressed his hope that the visit would contribute to the 
improvement of relations between Britain and Romania, noted sadly at its end that none of 
the democratic values such as the freedom of speech, freedom of thinking and of 
movement were observed in Romania.133 
The regime did not react well to even mute criticism. A few weeks after the visit 
of the British delegation, the Foreign Minister Tatarescu was dismissed for his negligence. 
An intensive press and radio campaign was launched in the first days of November, 
demanding an investigation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was ‘the solemn 
obligation of the Government’ to the people to eliminate the ‘nest of reactionaries and 
traitors’ from the Ministry. The press had insinuated that Tatarescu might have acquiesced 
with the ‘traitorous activities of his subordinates’. On subsequent days the attack was 
directed against Tatarescu’s party. 134 On 3 November, the Parliament’s committee for 
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foreign affairs adopted a motion of non-confidence. Two days later the Assembly of 
Deputies convened in an extraordinary session and voted a motion of non-confidence 
concerning the Minister of Foreign Affairs. On 6 November 1947 all ministers belonging 
to Tatarescu’s Liberal party were dismissed.135 Tatarescu himself was replaced by the 
Communist Ana Pauker. He had been closely watched during the visit of the British MPs 
and criticised for being too courteous to the chief of the delegation, Beaumont. The private 
conversation between the two remained an irksome enigma for the Communists.136  
As revealed later, a plot against Tatarescu had been concocted during the 
investigation of the NPP’s leaders, when it was alleged that high officials from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been supplying secret information to members of the 
British and American Legations.137 Did Tatarescu expect his dismissal since his name was 
mentioned during the trial?138 Did he talk about his fears to Beaumont? We may never 
know.    
Although not a Communist, Tatarescu helped the Communist Party to carry out 
the electoral fraud in November 1946. Apparently he had given instructions that the staff 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should vote for the government, warning that sanctions 
would follow for anyone that did not comply.139 Able but unscrupulous, Tatarescu 
managed to keep on friendly official terms with both the Soviet and the Western powers 
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and ‘clearly endeavoured to give the impression to the latter that he was working to resist 
the designs of the Communists.’ In his dealings with diplomats representing countries 
outside the Soviet orbit, Tatarescu was usually ‘quite frank in stating the reasons (Soviet 
opposition) behind his inability to meet their demands in his capacity as Foreign Minister 
and quite bland in assurances that were he, a free agent, he would satisfy them 
immediately’.140  
Meanwhile, Tatarescu did not hesitate to criticize publicly the British and the 
Americans for protesting against the government’s policies. Seemingly to prove his 
independence he issued his own critique of the government not very much later. In April 
1947 when his Party had reached the point of abstaining to vote for the reorganization of 
the Ministry of National Economy, Tatarescu told the British Representative that he would 
have a serious talk with the Communists and was prepared to quit the government on this 
issue. Although he seemed firm, Tatarescu continued to walk the Communist line, the 
American representative judged, ‘for he knows full well he cannot withdraw from 
government, continue to be active in politics and remain free man in Romania.’141 
Nonetheless, one month later, in May, Tatarescu underlined the motives that made the 
government unpopular in an extensive memorandum.142  
‘Innocent people have been arrested for reasons which had nothing to do with 
public order’ creating an atmosphere of growing dissatisfaction and even hatred against the 
government, Tatarescu assessed in his memorandum, pointing out that ‘mass arrests were 
never and are not even today a barrier against subversive currents. Mass arrests actually led 
to the recruitment of new elements in the service of turmoil and disorder.’ Although Groza 
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promised before the general election to grant amnesty for political offences,143 a 
resurgence of repression followed triggered by the tendency to view ‘any unwanted 
behaviour as a crime, any crime as a political act and any political crime as treason.’ The 
atmosphere of panic, distrust and insecurity paralyzed everything. Uncertainty, preventive 
arrests, requisitions and abuses created a climate of mistrust, so that no one invested any 
more in Romania. A growing dissatisfaction was shared by the military, magistracy, 
professors, peasants and priesthood. 144  
The ministers should contemplate the country’s image abroad. After the peace 
treaty ratification, they would request admission into the United Nations, to ‘resume the 
country’s place among the free countries of the world and enjoy all the rights and benefits 
given by the member status of the international organization.’ However, Romania’s 
admission depended on the vote of the General Assembly, then composed of fifty five 
states. ‘Would these states vote for Romania’s acceptance?’145  
Tatarescu reminded his colleagues that although Romania benefited ‘from the 
unconditional support of the Soviet Union and their friends,’ those votes would not 
represent the majority. The British and the Americans would invoke the observance of the 
provisions of the peace treaty, particularly Article Three referring to the obligation to grant 
all the citizens the free exercise of fundamental liberties.146 A list of fifteen measures was 
proposed by Tatarescu to improve the operation of the government. Ministers had to revise 
the country’s administration. Those in leading local institutions had to be persons entrusted 
by the population. Economically, besides stimulating private initiative and limiting state 
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intervention, the government should implement a policy of economic parsimony. Monetary 
stabilization had to be carefully prepared. And the list continued.147  
Seemingly Tatarescu did not have the intention of making the memorandum 
public. ‘It was not my intention to shake the government’s stability through a public and 
passionate discussion of governmental decisions,’ Tatarescu would later state from prison, 
pledging that he would refrain from any further action that ‘could make the game of the 
government’s opponents’ and giving assurances that the memorandum would not affect the 
collaboration of his team within the government. By putting forward ‘certain suggestions,’ 
he had in mind the consolidation of the administration through the ‘review and correction 
of certain errors, unavoidable errors in any government.’148 
Some thought that Tatarescu was lured by the Soviets into a trap. Before 
submitting it to his cabinet colleagues, Tatarescu had showed his memorandum to the 
Soviet Ambassador Kavtaradze and possibly to the ACC Chairman, General Susaikov. 
Having the Soviet Ambassador’s approval, Tatarescu distributed the memo to the 
Government.149 That was a mistake. The Memorandum constituted his resignation. He had 
barely resigned before the press was unleashed with accusations of hypocrisy and betrayal, 
speaking of him as 'the one of the biggest scoundrel of the Romanian political life.’ By 
collaborating with the Communists, Tatarescu had attracted nothing but contempt. 
Defamatory articles also appeared against his Foreign Ministry team; a ‘ministry of traitors 
in the service of the Anglo-American imperialists.’150 
The precision with which his resignation was secured, the rapidity of the purge of 
his adherents from Government office, and the uniformity of the press attacks on 
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Mr. Tatarescu all show clearly that this demarche was prepared long in advance 
and was put into action when a favourable moment arose. The purge of Dissident 
Liberals from all phases of public life is still continuing and extends down to the 
most petty office holders in the provincial, municipal, and central governments. 
The press for November 16 announced the dismissal of all Dissident Liberal 
deputies from offices in parliamentary committees although the ultimate fate of 
the deputies themselves is still unknown.151 
 
Displaced from the leadership of the Foreign Ministry on 6 November 1947,152 
Tatarescu was arrested three years later, on the night of 5/6 May 1950, together with other 
politicians, and held in the notorious Sighet gaol until 1955.153 A few days after 
Tatarescu’s downfall, Maniu and Mihalache, the president and vice-president of the party, 
were sentenced to forced labour for life (subsequently, to life imprisonment), deprivation 
of civil rights and confiscation of all possessions. They were charged with organizing and 
heading a plot with the aim of forcible overthrowing the government with the support of 
Anglo-Americans. The trial provided “overwhelming proofs to what had been pursued by 
the warmongers in maintaining in these parts of the world a vast network of espionage”; it 
was alleged that Grigore Niculescu-Buzesti and Constantin Visoianu, former Foreign 
ministers, who succeeded in escaping the country in 1946, organized abroad an espionage 
network guided by ‘the Imperialists’ while the leaders of the NPP carried on ‘a feverish 
activity towards overthrowing the democratic regime.’ Former high officials from the 
Foreign Ministry, Alexandru Cretzianu and Niculescu-Buzesti were sentenced to forced 
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labour for life, Grigore Gafencu to twenty years of forced labour, and Visoianu, to fifteen 
years forced labour.154 
The King and the Queen Mother left Bucharest on 12 November to attend the 
wedding of Princess Elizabeth and Philip Mountbatten.155 In London, the King had many 
conversations with high officials. What did they intend to do to help him? Bevin, the 
Foreign Minister, did not give King Michael any encouragement but advice: not to return 
to Romania.156 It was also what the Communists expected.157 By now they should have had 
Stalin’s agreement for the removal of the monarchy.  
The King’s reputation was affected by incidents that had taken place during the 
three years of his reign. While during his ‘royal strike’, Stalin remarked that ‘Kings can be 
originals, [which is] an extremely rare feature’ he was also determined not to act directly 
against the King and the monarchy.158 The King was however not just original. By 
deciding in August 1945 not to sign any of the government’s decrees unless Groza 
resigned, the King made himself the symbol of Romanian national resistance. Even the 
Communists recognized that. ‘The King is now the symbol of the nation and its resistance 
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to Communist policies,’ Sraer, the Secretary General in the Ministry of the Interior, adding 
that the Communists did not act without the full assent of the Soviets.159  
To what extent the prolonged royal crisis eroded the King’s position is difficult to 
assess. An event which took place several months after Carol’s strike produced 
considerable public confusion. The day the Anglo-Americans submitted their notes of 
protest against the Government’s abuses, on 27 May 1946, by an unhappy coincidence, the 
King, at an elaborate ceremony in Constanta, awarded his defiant Prime Minister the Order 
of ‘Faithful Service.’ The King had seemingly concurred with granting the award to 
appease the Soviets, at this juncture angry about a previous manifestation of people’s 
solidarity with him, on 10 May. According to the American representative, Berry, the King 
committed a political mistake by decorating Groza since his action could to be used for 
Government electoral purposes since the election was then in progress.160 
After the result of the election was announced, protocol dictated that the King 
open the parliamentary session. On 1 December 1946 he declared that he was ‘happy to be 
amongst the country’s representatives convened together for the first time after a long 
adjournment of parliamentary life.’ The government had actively participated in the 
consolidation of international peace, pursuing the development of political, economic and 
cultural relations with Great Britain, the United States, France and all the other peace-
loving countries, he maintained. The stress was put however on developing collaboration 
with the Soviet Union.161 
                                                 
159
 Memorandum of Conversation, November 27, 1945. Ulrich Burger, Misiunea Ethridge in 
Romania [The Ethridge Mission in Romania], p. 371. 
160
 Although the participants in the manifestation of the 10th of May were sentenced to 
imprisonment up to three years, Susaikov claimed that the King should do something to show his displeasure 
of the action undertaken by ‘disorderly elements’. Tatarescu seems to have suggested that a high decoration 
be awarded to Groza ‘because the Soviets so wished’. Burton Y. Berry, Romanian Diaries, 1944-1947, pp. 
415-416 and 419. 
161
 The Royal Message delivered by King Michael at the opening of the works of the Assembly. 
Ioan Scurtu (ed.), Romania. The Political Life in Documents. 1946, Bucharest, 1994, pp. 45 and 523-5; 
Rumanian Review, 8-9/January 1947, p. 27 and 31. 
74 
 
Although Maniu hoped that the King would not proceed with the opening of the 
Assembly of Deputies before the ratification of the elections by all the three signatories of 
the Moscow agreement,162 the King had obviously decided to do what was necessary to 
survive, and hope for the best thereafter. Considerable dismay was inevitable. Opposition 
leaders warned that he had made a grave error. ‘This Parliament whose session you open, 
will eventually vote for a Republic,’ Maniu warned.163 It did not take too long for the 
prediction to come true. 
The King’s options were previously debated by his councillors. There was no 
chance that the British and the Americans could influence the political situation, the King’s 
personal adviser maintained, recalling that eight notes asking for the fulfilment of the 
January guarantees had been sent to the Romanian government to no result. The 
acceptance of the fraudulent election would however affect the King’s popularity. It would 
destroy the last vestiges of the King’s ties with his subjects and, ultimately, his reason for 
being. The King could not be a traitor to himself: he should refuse the result of the 
elections. Such a firm stance would probably bring the King into open conflict with the 
Government and the Soviets, and, eventually result in his abdication. But who could 
guarantee that if the King accepted the results of the election, he would continue to be 
tolerated by the Soviets? He might be removed anyway as he would lose popular support, 
the King’s Private Secretary maintained, pointing out that by refusing to accept the result 
of the fraudulent election the King would act in agreement with the will of his people. The 
Marshal of the Court disagreed with the rest of councillors. 164 If the British and the 
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Americans could not bring about an alteration of the political situation, the King should 
accept the Government-Soviets’ report on the election, he suggested. The King would 
subsequently have the chance, although a slight one, of re-establishing his popularity; this 
chance depended, however, on his survival during the Soviet occupation. All of the King’s 
advisers concurred that the acceptance of the fraudulent elections would erode much more 
the King’s popularity and undermine his prestige. 165 
The King seemed resigned to accept, as well, the necessary re-orientation of 
Romania’s foreign policy towards its great Eastern neighbour. In a later speech opening a 
new session of the Assembly, in October 1947, after mentioning the government’s 
endeavours to reorganize the economy and raise the life standard of the working masses, 
the King mentioned that Romania’s foreign policy was based on friendship with the Soviet 
Union, ‘the defender of peace, democracy and peoples’ independence’.166 The new 
direction was approved by the Communist Party. In November 1947 the newly appointed 
Foreign Minister, Ana Pauker delivered a speech in which she referred to Romania’s 
‘previous vassalage to Imperialistic quarters and the interests of foreign Big Finance’ and 
underlined that Romania’s foreign policy would not be as in the past ‘the exclusive 
appendage of a close cast and a book with seven seals’ for the common people. 167 
The end of the year was approaching when Groza called the Palace for an 
appointment with the King for the following day, 30 December. He mentioned ‘a family 
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issue.’168 The King had told his Prime Minister about his intention to marry Ana, princess 
of Bourbon-Parma whom he had met in London at his cousin’s wedding. As provided by 
the Constitution, the King needed the approval of the government for the marriage. ‘A 
family matter’ should mean that Groza would bring up the issue during their meeting, the 
King assumed.169 The appointment turned, however, into something else.  
Accompanied by Gheorghiu-Dej, the First Secretary of Communist Party, Groza 
entered the Palace at noon.170 Gheorghiu-Dej’s unannounced appearance displeased the 
King.171 His discontent turned immediately into astonishment with Groza’s first words: 
‘We came to talk about an amicable divorce.’ After this abrupt beginning, Groza stuttered 
disparate phrases about the country’s severe situation, the Great Powers that ‘could wait no 
longer’ and the monarchy itself which was no longer a necessity for Romania since it 
impeded the country’s ‘democratization’. Then he handed the King a paper, and asked him 
to sign it right away. Realizing what the paper was, the King protested vociferously.172 
Before such a grave step was taken, it was first necessary to consult the people, he said. 
There was no time for such subtleties, Groza replied.173 He should have a few days respite 
to consider before signing an Act of Abdication, the King insisted; or, at least one day . . . 
just a few hours . . .  only a few minutes. ‘I do not have a mandate to give you days,’ 
Gheorghiu-Dej intervened, ‘I have only two hours available. If you sign, you will be 
remembered in history as having understood the situation, if not, tell me!’ In the end, he 
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allowed the King a short break. ‘Why, the heck, not give him a few minutes since it will be 
the same anyway,’ he thought and told the King, ‘talk to your advisers!’”174 
The King left the room. The Marshal of the Court and the King’s personal 
secretary, Mircea Ioanitiu, informed him that the Palace links with the exterior had been 
cut off, the phone connections broken,175 and the Guard disarmed and replaced by people 
in the service of the Communists.176 What was going to happen to her son? the Queen 
Mother inquired. ‘Nothing is going to happen to him’, Gheorghiu-Dej maintained 
placatory. However, she should be aware that the King’s fate also depended on her; she 
should advise him to sign the Act of Abdication. That was ‘the only reasonable attitude 
under the present circumstances.’  
The King continued to hesitate. ‘How can I admit this without any struggle? 
People would think that I was a coward because I abdicated without a fight, I surrendered 
the throne without a fight.’ ‘But whom do you want to fight with?’ Gheorghiu-Dej 
asked.177 Groza intervened and said that any delay would just complicate the matter. 
People could realize that something unusual was happening at the Palace.178 Eventually, 
the King yielded. ‘He signed it,’ Gheorghiu-Dej later commented, ‘as one sign a voucher 
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to the cafeteria. I took it, blew it dry, folded it and put it into my pocket… It was a peaceful 
way to take the power.’179  
Smiling, Groza approached the King, asking him to touch the pocket of his coat. 
He had a pistol inside and he wanted the King to know it. Then he turned to the Queen 
Mother who had not taken her eyes from her son, and said, ‘this is to prevent from 
happening to me what had happened to Antonescu,’ implying that he would have reacted if 
the King had tried to arrest him.180  
What were the King’s intentions? Would he remain, or leave the country? The 
King, of course, could hardly remain a citizen in the new People’s Republic. ‘Remaining in 
Romania would have been like consenting to be their prisoner,’ the King believed.181   
The Council of Ministers convened immediately after the King’s abdication.182 
All the Ministers approved the decision of the Communist Party.183 The proclamation 
issued immediately pointed out that the Romanians had now the liberty of choosing the 
form of state they wanted. The Assembly of the Deputies opted of course for a Republic.184 
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At the end of January, the royal family’s immunity was removed,185 their properties 
confiscated and their citizenship withdrawn.186  
Thereafter, all civil servants were required to take a new oath of allegiance to the 
Republic.187 The army was given the utmost attention. Those on leave, and therefore not in 
garrison to take the oath, had to go to the nearest gendarme’s office and take the oath by, 
the latest, the following day, 31st of December at 12.00 PM. The military Guards of all 
Royal residences had been displaced and hundreds of career officers were quickly sacked. 
‘The only ones who remain in the army are the cowards and the fools. I don’t know to 
which group to attach myself,’ a captain of the School of artillery noted.188  
A secret protocol of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance signed with the Soviets 
in January 1948 aimed at the transformation of the Romanian army into an apparatus to 
serve Soviet interests.189 The Romanian army had to become ‘a school for communism’ 
and ‘a mass organization for the better dissemination of Marxist doctrine’, continuing the 
                                                 
185
 Patrascanu submitted to the Assembly a draft to amend certain provisions of the Criminal Code. 
It was among his latest decisions; the following month he was replaced by Avram Bunaciu who proposed the 
expropriation of all assets belonging to the Royal family. S. Radulescu-Zoner, D. Buse, B. Marinescu, 
Instaurarea Totalitarismului Comunist in Romania [The Establishment of the Communist Totalitarianism in 
Romania], Bucharest, 2002, p. 296. 
186
 Minute of the Council of Ministers’ meeting, 22 May 1948. Magazin istoric, 11/November 
1997, p. 31. 
187
 ‘I swear to be faithful to the people and defend the People’s Republic against its external and 
internal enemies. I swear to observe the laws of the People’s Republic and to safeguard state secrets.’ Ioan 
Scurtu (ed.), The Political Life in Documents. 1947, Bucharest, 1994, pp. 296-7. Nicoleta Ionescu-Gura, 
Stalinizarea Romaniei. Republica Populara Romana 1948-1950: transformari institutionale [Romania’s 
Stalinization. Romanian People's Republic 1948-1950. Institutional transformations], Bucharest, 2005, p. 22. 
188
 Lieutenant-Colonel Mircea Chiritoiu, “Armata tinuta in frau,” Magazin istoric, no. 
11/November 1997, p. 29. 
189
 In November 1945, Mark Ethridge, the envoy of James Byrnes to Romania, reported that the 
Groza government had produced disarray in the Army. It was a disorganisation ‘by communization in order 
to satisfy the wish and aim of the Allies (Soviets)’. Measures taken included: dismissal from the army of 
officers who, by their capacity and past actions, had become obstacles, entrusting leading positions in the 
army to general officers who not only were not professionally capable but who were also compromised by 
their former activity; introduction in each unit of political commissars following the Soviet model; and the 
permanent threat of a purge of officers to destroy the morale of any potential opponents. Ulrich Burger, 
Misiunea Ethridge in Romania [The Ethridge Mission in Romania], Bucharest, 2000, p. 372. 
80 
 
political education started in the youth organization and continued after the return of 
conscripts to civil life in the trade unions. 190 
‘The removal of the monarchy constituted an act of violence in the process of the 
country’s enslavement,’ the King maintained in a press conference held in London. ‘The 
Romanian government installed and maintained in power by a foreign country . . . utterly 
unrepresentative . . . violated all the international pledges, falsified the elections, and 
annihilated the democratic political leaders who enjoyed the people’s confidence.’191 It was 
however too late for such a declaration to produce any consequence. 
Meanwhile, in Romania, an intense campaign began to discredit the fallen 
dynasty. It focused on presenting the Hohenzollern dynasty as having pursued a foreign 
policy based on dynastic relations which conflicted with the national interests of the 
country. The King was portrayed as the country’s biggest capitalist and the royal family as 
having been involved in ‘scandalous affairs.’ 192 Romanians would forget about the 
monarchy, Groza told the King on 30 December. An order emanating from the Ministry of 
the Interior ordered the renaming of streets and other public places bearing name of the 
King or of other Royal family members.193 ‘Linked at home with the reactionary and 
abroad with the imperialistic quarters, the monarchy had collapsed like a castle of playing 
cards. The Romanian Popular Republic was proclaimed to the satisfaction and joy of the 
whole people.’194 Or, at least to the satisfaction of the Communists who had conquered 
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‘rampart to rampart’ and won ‘the battle with the reactionary forces’.195 The monarchy 
represented for the Communists an obstacle on the path of building the ‘popular 
democracy’ while increasingly becoming the focus of popular opposition to the emerging 
regime. 
All of Romania’s neighbours had already fallen under overt Communist 
domination.196 Regardless the extent to which the Groza government was pro-Soviet and 
dominated by Communists it would have been difficult for everyone to assert that the 
country was genuinely Communist while the King remained in place, even with reduced 
powers.197  
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Spies everywhere 
 
                          
 
 ‘It was the policy of the Romanian Government 
to make life difficult and unpleasant for our 
representatives in Bucharest.’1 
 
 
 
Despite the sharp frost, on 30 December 1948, people were treated to a military 
parade. A demonstration of ‘working masses’ also passed through Victory Square in 
Bucharest where the large portraits of the leaders of the Communist Party and the 
Presidium of Grand Assembly were visible from afar.2 The festivities were occasioned by 
the first anniversary of the People’s Republic. In the evening a reception was offered by 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs to all the diplomats. 
The British seemed to have forgotten the previous allegations of espionage aired by 
the Romanian government that autumn and misinterpreted as the end of the ‘studied 
revolutionary discourtesy’ the fact that they were seated together with senior members of 
the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and separately from the Soviet diplomats. 3 
True, they were not the only ones targeted. Similar accusations had been launched against 
the American and Turkish diplomats. In September the American minister Rudolf E. 
Schoenfeld was handed a note in which it was mentioned that four of his staff ‘had used 
their position and the immunity they enjoyed in order to carry out espionage against 
Romania;’ their presence was therefore no longer desirable. The note delivered by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs referred to events in Giurgiu on 6 September 1948. Allegedly, 
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‘the authorities and civilians’ of the city observed a group of four persons in the 
neighbourhood of the harbour taking pictures from a car of various installations and sites 
of which photos must not be taken.’ Arrested, the four persons were released only after 
their identity was confirmed by Schoenfeld.4 The Turkish diplomats were also blamed for 
‘systematically carrying on an unlawful activity’ against Romania. It was alleged that the 
Turkish diplomats fostered the departure of Romanian law offenders to Turkey and utilized 
them in ‘a slanderous campaign’ against the People’s Republic of Romania.5 
From the summer of 1948 the Romanians intensified their ‘campaign of 
vilification against Britain and Ernest Bevin to a point at which it can be properly called 
planned political warfare,’ the British minister in Bucharest reported. Both the press and 
the radio conveyed unfavourable comments culled from authentic sources, ‘indulging in 
misquotation, removal from context and deliberate falsification. Statements like ‘68% of 
the British population desire co-operation with the USSR’,6 or headlines such as ‘London 
police openly support Fascists’ and ‘London police praised for protecting Fascist meetings’ 
appeared in various Romanian newspapers.7 
The BBC proved to be ineffective in this ‘campaign of lies,’8 although a Foreign 
Office department was formed, at Christopher Paget Mayhew’s initiative, specifically 
designed to counteract this offensive propaganda.9 Attacks on life in Britain supplemented 
broad political articles and radio reports while cartoons ridiculing Bevin and other Western 
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leaders were regularly printed in the press. ‘Some of the sources which feed this campaign 
may lie within the Romanian Legation in London in the shape of a press reading staff 
which is specially briefed to supply ammunition for Bucharest propagandists.’ On 9 July, 
Viata Sindicala stated that in Britain, ‘Lords, Barons and Counts own immense estates 
covering thousands of hectares while the workers are being treated as slaves. This tradition 
is being faithfully respected under the ‘Labour’ Government.’ 10 A virulent press campaign 
was carried out in the autumn against the first councillor of the Legation, Charles 
Robinson, the Commercial Attaché, William Watson, and Colonel William Young. Two 
members of the American Legation, Henri P. Leverich, first counsellor and Colonel John 
R. Lowell, the Military Attaché were also targeted as playing a part in a plot against the 
government.11 
In October and November 1948, twelve Romanian high officials were tried in 
Bucharest and the press announced emphatically that the court had elucidated the part 
played by the espionage services of certain imperialistic powers in their attempt to 
overthrow the government by force. The twelve were found guilty of high treason, 
espionage and economic sabotage by the Bucharest Military Tribunal.12 The first 
indictment was pronounced against Alexandru Popp, formerly director general at Uzinele 
de Fier ReşiŃa [The Resita Iron Works]. He was accused of industrial sabotage, part of a 
vast plan aiming at ‘disorganising production, impeding improvement of the economic 
situation and the consolidation of the democratic regime’. ‘Due to a combination of actions 
attributable to the director general, Popp, a catastrophic decline in production’ of ‘a third of 
                                                 
10
 TNA, PRO, FO 1110/97, PR 632/G, Adrian Holman, British Legation Bucharest, to Ernest 
Bevin, 27 July 1948. 
11
 “Procesul grupului de complotisti, spioni si sabotori. Actul de acuzare, ” [The trial of plotters, 
spies and saboteurs. The Act of Indictment], Scanteia, no. 1261, 28 October 1948, pp. 2-5. 
12
 The debates of the trial went on between 29 October and 11 November 1948, even on Sundays 
and legal holidays and often prolonged until late night. Articles such as “The People’s Enemies on Trial 
before the People” were published by the party’s newspaper, Scanteia [The Spark], presenting the plotting 
organization which would have conveyed secret information and received instructions from the British and 
American representatives in Bucharest. 
85 
 
the achievements of the previous years’ was registered at Resita. Also cited were 
explosions that had taken place at the foundry, sub-standard production and delays in 
paying wages. Popp and ‘his band’ tried to blame the hold-ups in production at Resita on 
‘accidents.’13 
Allegedly, Popp together with the former minister of Industry and Trade, Ioan 
Bujoi, and the other defendants led a network of agents created with the purpose of 
collecting state secrets. The network included prominent officials such as the former 
governor of the National Bank, top personnel from the Ministry of Finance and the 
Ministry of Mines and Petroleum, the Director General of the oil company ‘Astra,’ a 
former Naval Undersecretary of State, the former General Secretary of the Air Ministry, 
and a few attorneys and lawyers.14 The network was organized deliberately by Max 
Auschnitt, it was claimed, the owner of many enterprises and banks, among them The 
Resita Iron Works, one of the biggest corporations in Romania, and ‘his overseas masters, 
in accordance with directives received from Roy Melbourne, Henri P. Leverich, Charles 
Robinson, Robert Shea, and other agents of the Imperialists.’15 
Secret military, economic and political information, it was pointed out, was 
conveyed to the British and Americans. Robinson, Watson and Colonel Young were 
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mentioned repeatedly during the trial. The number of Americans involved was even larger 
than Britons. Besides Leverich, the First Councillor, and Lowell, the Military Attaché, both 
declared subsequently persona non grata, Roy Melbourne, Robert Shea, Thomas R. Hall, 
James C. Hamilton, Burton Berry and Donald Dunham were indicated.16 The information 
conveyed to the Anglo-Americans was said to be of great variety and consequence: data 
referring to Romania’s military potential including organization, manoeuvres and changes 
in the garrisons’ effective strength, weapons and equipment, aerodromes and buildings, 
instruction, training camps, special schools for officers and non-commissioned officers, 
means of locomotion, metallurgical plants and weapon production at ‘Astra’; facts and 
figures on Romania’s industrial production (especially petrochemical production but also 
tractor fabrication), mining and agriculture (income, expenses, taxes, production). Details 
of the Convention recently concluded with Czechoslovakia were also conveyed. The 
defendants confessed that they had also submitted, at Melbourne’s request, reports on oil 
production, the requirement for oil equipment, a study on inflation, a report on timber 
exports, and an assessment of agricultural equipment based on statistical data before and 
after the agricultural reform.17 
Melbourne’s departure from Romania at the end of 1947 did not suspend 
communication. Leverich who replaced him, continued to maintain contact with the 
‘conspirators.’ Although the vigilant Colonel Lowell was careful to avoid any risks and to 
maintain secrecy, he continued to request and received data about the Navy, the port Sulina 
and about prominent political figures. The Americans disposed of two sources who offered 
regular information about the Soviet operations in Romania: eight sources in the Special 
Service of the Romanian police, two in the Chief of Staff of the Army and two in the 
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Siguranta [Romanian police]. Hall and Hamilton led the operation of collecting the 
information, while Charles Hostler was in charge of counter-information.18 
In exchange for the information provided, as agreed by Melbourne and Leverich, 
the Americans agreed to provide the plotters with armament and technical equipment. 
These were to be parachuted in certain areas at a convenient date. The plotters also 
requested financial support. Loans were to be repaid after the removal of the regime. The 
Romanians pledged to attack weapon depots, bridges and tunnels and occupy public 
institutions. According to the defendants, the Americans were motivated primarily by the 
desire to preserve Romania as a market, and to protect their investments.  The British were 
also implicated. Information on the structure and the number of the people involved in the 
subversive organisations was requested by the British representatives Watson, Young and 
Robinson.19 It is impossible to be certain to what extent the British and the Americans 
involved themselves in the ‘conspiracy’ but secret organisations evolved throughout the 
country; they were coordinated by the former General Aurel Aldea and Admiral Horia 
Macelariu. It is likely that the leaders of the opposition hoped for a support from the 
Anglo-Americans. People fighting in the mountains were convinced that the ‘Americans 
would come’ and waited for their intervention against the Soviet occupation and later 
against the Communist regime.20 
                                                 
18
 The Americans succeeded in rescuing their agent at the Chief of Staff of the Army, Manicatide, 
together with his family; hidden in postal bags, they left Romania by an American military plane on 16 
October 1946. The operation was the first of a series under the name ‘Carola.’ The next person rescued was 
Constantin Visoianu, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, also hidden in the postal bags of the American 
army, followed by Grigore Niculescu-Buzesti, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, chosen by Maniu to 
represent the National Peasant Party in exile and Ioana Bujoiu, that served as interpreter for Hall at the later’s 
meetings with the leaders of the movement of resistance. Visoianu and Niculescu-Buzesti were taken to 
Austria. Magazin Istoric, no. 7 (352), July 1996, pp. 7-8. 
19
 These subversive organisations were apparently infiltrated by the Romanian police. Magazin 
Istoric, no. 7 (352), July 1996, pp. 7-8. 
20
 This included organizations such as Haiducii lui Avram Iancu, Divizia Sumanele Negre [The 
Black Coats] (constituted from former participants in ‘Iuliu Maniu’ guards), Graiul Sangelui, Grupul Sinaia, 
Vlad Tepes II and others. Dosarele Istoriei, no. 9 (14), 1997, pp. 3-4. 
88 
 
In his summation the Prosecutor stressed the connection between the Romanian 
plotters and members of the British and American Legations.21 In view of the ‘disclosures,’ 
the presence of Robinson and Watson was ‘no longer desired’ and their early recall was 
requested.22 
On 14 December 1948 the British Legation replied to the Romanian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs indicating that, although in accordance with international practice, the 
British government acceded to the request they ‘must categorically reject the grounds on 
which the recall had been requested’. 23 ‘The allegations in this trial were most flimsy, the 
Foreign Office considered; moreover, the documents received by Robinson and Watson 
had been given to them ‘voluntarily and without payment in the normal course of their 
duty, some during the Armistice period when we had every right to be fully informed on 
what was happening in Romania and some later during the Peace Treaty regime, during 
which Romania has given no evidence whatsoever that it is implementing any of its Treaty 
obligations.’ Trouble arose from the Romanian government’s practice of not drawing any 
distinction between ‘the normal diplomatic practice of collecting information and 
espionage since it considered all information secret.’24 
After recalling Robinson and Watson, the British did not take any retaliatory 
diplomatic actions. In contrast, the Americans, receiving the note in regard to Henri P. 
Leverich, First counsellor and Colonel John R. Lowell, the Military Attaché, requested 
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immediately that two Romanian representatives, Preoteasa and Lazareanu, be recalled from 
Washington.25 
A man’s life was behind the decision to not react to the expulsion of the 
diplomats. His rescue from Romania was ‘far more important than the empty satisfaction 
of retaliation.’26 And although there was a strong pressure in Parliament for reprisal, any 
action had been deferred to avoid prejudicing Alexander Evans’s chances of leaving 
Romania.27 Manager of one of recently expropriated British Petroleum companies, ‘Steaua 
Romana’ [Romanian Star], Evans disappeared soon after returning from London where he 
was called for consultation.28 Reaching the Romanian frontier on 8 June 1948, he was 
detained and taken to an unknown destination.29 Strong representations to the Romanian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs were met with evasive replies and the British consul was 
denied visitation until the end of police enquiry.30  
The delay in proceedings produced anxiety in London. There was no precedent 
for a refusal to produce a charge against a British subject and for denying access to him by 
                                                 
25
 The US Government retaliated by informing the Romanian Legation at Washington that the 
presence of two of its members, both with rank of rank of Counsellor and one a special protégé of Ana 
Pauker, the Romanian Foreign Minister, ‘was no longer required.’  
26
 TNA, PRO, FO 371/78608, R 2213/1051/37. The Secretary of State decided on 14 December 
that the British should take retaliatory action but the request for the recall of two Romanian diplomats was 
postponed until Alexander Evans could be extricated from Romania. The hope that Evans’s petition for 
pardon might be granted before Christmas, proved vain. FO 371/78608, R 136/1051/37 G, FO MINUTE. 
27
 TNA, PRO, FO 371/78608, R 136/1051/37 G. Telegram of ‘particular secrecy’ to be retained by 
the authorised recipient and not passed on. Departmental distribution from FO to Bucharest, no 24, 17 
January 1949. 
The Earl Howe’s question referring to the grounds for the request of the Romanian government 
intended to be addressed in the House of Lords on 18 January was postponed for 25 January. ‘In the event of 
HMG not concurring in it, whether they will take similar action to that reported to have been decided upon by 
the US Government in a similar case.’ FO 371/78608, R 825/1051/37.  
TNA, PRO, FO 371/78608, R 604/1462/37, Bucharest telegram no. 47 announced that Evans’s 
projected escape may drag on indefinitely. FO Minute, 20 January 1949. The draft note to the Romanian 
Minister was to be despatched on January 25 at the latest and the reply to Lord Howe should consist simply 
of an announcement of the despatch of the Note. 
Lord Vansittart’s Motion on Romania was postponed until 15 February. Lord Howe’s suggestion 
was put also off to round about that time. W.R. Cox, Private Secretary, to Henderson, 22 January 1949. 
28
 Evans’s call to London might have been in connection with the nationalization decided by the 
Romanian government and publicized on 11 June 1948. 
29
 British Information Office, News and London Press Comment, no. 526. 17 June 1948, p.3. 
NCSSA, Documentary Fond, Dossier 121, vol. 2, f. 178. 
30
 Note of the British Legation to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. RDA, Foreign 
Diplomats, Dossier 4/Repr. R 9, William Charles Robinson.  
90 
 
the British consul, Bevin asserted in the House of Commons. The Romanian authorities 
‘must be pressed to give Evans the opportunity of clearing himself. The British consul 
should continue to insist to see Evans immediately.’ 31 When the news about the trial of 
‘Steaua Romania’s managers was made public, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed 
that Evans was arrested.32 The Romanians refused however to admit that they should have 
notified the British on the charge against Evans. 
Brought to court and found guilty of fraud -- on a charge of mal-administering the 
company’s funds -- Evans was sentenced to three years imprisonment.33 He was placed in 
Vacaresti Prison in a common cell together with seventy other prisoners. ‘No contact with 
the outside world was permitted; parcels of food, medicine, and clothing only on the rarest 
exception reached the person for whom intended; questioning proceeded twenty-four hours 
a day with the prisoners awakened repeatedly during the night for further grilling, and 
those detained were subject to the crudest forms of torture and were left entirely without 
adequate food or medical attention.’ 34 The cell was so crowded that there was barely 
enough floor space for each to lie down and, when on Legation insistence, a mattress was 
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provided for him, Evans was compelled to refuse it since  the width of the mattress would 
have deprived two prisoners of the space to lie down.35 
At the end of January 1949 Evans was released on bail, and eventually left the 
country with the connivance of the Romanian Government.36 One week after Evans’s 
arrival in Britain, the British government requested the recall of two Romanian 
diplomats.37 It was the Romanians’ turn to declare their astonishment on receiving the 
British note.38 The Romanian Minister called the Foreign Office for an appointment, 
requesting explanation for the ‘arbitrary measure’.39 Two members of Parliament, 
Langford-Holt and Denis Pritt, also required explanations for the expulsion.40 The 
Romanian representatives also reacted angrily to an article published by The People which 
underlined Evans’s innocence and his maltreatment by the Romanian authorities.41 
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The recall of two members of the Romanian legation in London produced surprise 
and embarrassment to the Romanian Minister since there was no motive provided. It would 
therefore be very difficult for him to explain the situation to Bucharest.42 Although 
reminded of the expulsion of two British diplomats from Bucharest, he refused to draw any 
parallel between the two cases ‘since in Bucharest an open trial had taken place, the 
evidence had been published, and the public knew exactly the reasons for the recall of 
Robinson and Watson.’ In contrast, the British Government had arrived at the conclusion 
that the trial was ‘a trumped up affair entirely lacking in bien fonde. The action taken by 
the Romanian Government was only one of a series designed to make life difficult and 
unpleasant for the members of the British Mission in Bucharest.’ The British had therefore 
retaliated against the ‘intolerable situation’ in the only way open to them.43  
Meeting upon the request the British Secretary of State, the Romanian Minister in 
London insisted that ‘nothing that he or his Legation had done had provoked any such 
course.’ Once again he was reminded of the recall of the two British officers which ‘could 
not be justified by what had been produced in Court.’ The charges against Robinson and 
Watson were ‘flimsy and the evidence produced most uncertain.’ The British could also 
have made out a valid case for their request, but they ‘did not think this called for any such 
action.’ To the complaint that the treatment accorded to the Romanian Legation was 
unfriendly the Secretary of State replied that the whole behaviour of the Romanian 
Government towards Britain and its representatives could not be called friendly.44 The 
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Romanians continued to protest the expulsion of the diplomats as being ‘an entirely 
arbitrary measure.’45 ‘It seems that the Romanian Government is bent on having this issue 
clearly stated before the public,’ the British concluded.46  
In August 1949 another member of the Romanian Legation was considered a 
candidate for expulsion in reprisal for the expulsion of other British diplomats.47 Two 
members of the British legation in Bucharest, R.F.G. Sarell48 and H.S. Marchant,49 were 
involved in an incident in July. Sarell was about to leave Romania, waiting for the entry 
visa to be granted to his successor, when he was arrested by the Romanian police.50 
There are two versions on what happened during the night of 25 July. The British 
referred to the fact that Sarell, by then Charge d’ Affaires, was seized by armed men and 
forcibly abducted to the Bucharest Prefecture of Police. Only on arrival did the men reveal 
their identity as police officers. In spite of the production of relevant identity documents, 
the police refused to recognise Sarell’s diplomatic status until the arrival of a person from 
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the Protocol Department of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The later 
apologised courteously and caused the police authorities to do likewise. The British 
Legation protested ‘at the high handed and violent action of the Bucharest police.’51 The 
Romanian version was to some extent different. It claimed that ‘a band of blackmarketeers 
and smugglers’ was caught by the police. At their identification, one of them declared that 
he was a diplomat. Subsequent to verification of the latter’s identity with the help of a 
representative of the Protocol Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the British 
diplomat was released. Nevertheless, the actions he had engaged in were ‘contrary to the 
diplomatic usages and duties which members of a legation have to fulfil in the country 
where they are accredited,’ the Romanians maintained. 
The ‘intolerable activity’ of Sarell consisted in fact in offering assistance to 
certain Romanian citizens in their attempt to flee the country. The persons arrested 
recognized that they aimed at illegally crossing the frontier, their destination being Vienna. 
The British diplomat allegedly organised their clandestine departure and agreed to keep 
their jewellery and works of art at the British legation. For this action, the Romanians 
asked for Sarell’s immediate recall.52 Marchant’s name was also mentioned during the 
police enquiry and in the note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was implicated in 
depositing certain valuables at the British Legation.53 The British government rejected the 
ground on which the Romanian recall was advanced, denying the allegation that Sarell was 
involved in the activities of a ‘band of blackmarketeers and smugglers.’54 
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The Romanians’ great ‘discovery’ was something they certainly knew from the 
beginning since the legation was watched closely: that the trumpeted ‘blackmarketeers and 
smugglers’ were actually employees of the British and American Information Offices. 
Since they could not obtain passports they attempted to depart secretly the country.55 The 
group consisted of Constantin Mugur, the chief of the Romanian staff at the British library, 
Eleonora Bunea of the British Press Office, Nora Samuelli from the American Press 
Office, Annie, her sister, from the British Press Office, and Liviu Nasta, a Romanian 
journalist, correspondent of the New York Times. All of them had been arrested, accused of 
espionage and detained for trial the following year. During the trial, Sarell, Ramsden, 
Francis Bennet, Ivor Porter, John Bennet and Marchant were ‘unmasked’ as spies.56 
With the arrest of the Romanian staff the existence of the Information Centre in 
Bucharest became uncertain; ‘its sphere of interest, already small, must inevitably become 
yet smaller.’57 Compared to the Soviet staff of 500 people, the British Information Office 
had 35 employees; the French 27 and the United States Information Service [USIS] 15 
employees and 8 auxiliaries.58  
In the autumn of 1949 the British Consulate and the Information Office were 
brought under one roof. The position of the First Secretary (Information) filled until then 
by Marchant was cancelled. The Consul assumed the Information Officer’s responsibilities 
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except those concerned with press reading, political reporting and the BBC which were to 
be carried by Chancery.’59 Sarell and Marchant left Romania, the first recalled, the second 
transferred to another post in November 1949.60 Although recalled, Sarell had to wait for 
more than one month to obtain not just an exit visa but also an approval for the inventory 
of his household effects.61 Comments on the strained relations with Romania appeared in 
British newspapers. For the Romanian representatives in London the publicity around 
Sarell’s recall had but one single purpose, to justify the forthcoming retaliation.62 
In the meantime, the exchange of notes between British and Romanian Foreign 
Offices continued; the British protesting against the attitude of the Romanian authorities, 
the Romanians emphasizing that Sarell’s involvement in the band of ‘blackmarkeeters and 
smugglers’ was confirmed by the testimonies of those arrested and questioned. It was 
proved that Eleonora Bunea, who worked for the British Information Office, deposited her 
valuables at the British Legation.63 ‘Certainly not’, replied the British, denying that Bunea 
had delivered any valuables to Marchant, Sarell or any other member of the staff. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in answer, submitted to the British legation a letter signed by 
Bunea together with the Prosecutor’s request for the valuables belonging to Bunea and a 
note of protest against the activities contrary to Romanian laws undertaken by certain 
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British diplomats. 64 Rejecting the charge of illegal activity, the British stated that they 
could not accept as a true statement the letter of Bunea enclosed in the Romanian 
Ministry’s note, since it was dated after her disappearance and bore ‘every sign of having 
been extorted from her under pressure.’ The British note concluded that ‘the sole aim of 
the police authorities was to attempt to discredit this legation.’65 
As expected, reprisal came soon. Two members of the Romanian Legation were 
requested to leave London. Drafts for notes of protest to be presented by the Romanian 
Legation to the Foreign Office were prepared by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, referring to the ‘arbitrary measure of reprisal’ and pointing out again that Sarell 
was involved in an illegal incident, which was not the case with the Romanian diplomats in 
London.66 Many reams of paper were squandered to justify, deny, protest and posture. 
The recall of the British diplomats and the arrests of the British legation’s 
employees affected the image of the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pauker, the 
more so since she had previously agreed with the British Minister to inform him whenever 
a member of the Legation staff would be questioned by the police.67 Following a article 
critical of Pauker published by the Sunday Express, the Romanian Minister in London 
requested an explanation from the Foreign Office. 68  He was reminded that the press was 
free in Britain. Although relations between the two governments were strained, the Foreign 
Office denied responsibility for Pauker’s negative image in the British press. 
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After two years of harassment and vexation, the closure of the British and 
American Information Offices did not come unexpectedly. At the beginning of March 
1950, Donald Dunham, the chief of the American Office of Information, received a note 
from the Romanian government demanding the closure of the Press Office and the library. 
The British were delivered a similar notification on 3 March 1950.69 There was nothing 
they could do, contended the British minister, Walter Roberts, sceptical about the impact 
which a minute drawn up by the Foreign Office could have on the Romanian government’s 
decision.70 An important number of files, among them those relating to local staff, were 
destroyed.71 The same happened at the American legation where the Associated Press 
representative in Bucharest found the United States Information Service [USIS] ‘upside 
down’ while ‘packing was in full progress.’  
A table had been set in the hall for the farewell buffet and in the yard outside 
smoke was rising from the burning fires. Although not containing secret matter, 
there was always the fear that if one moved, a case of files might be stolen on the 
way and if it contained any names of Roumanian nationals, these would be in for 
needless trouble. In the afternoon when the USIS staff left, the majority were 
arrested by the Security. The same thing happened at the British library. The 
remaining few correspondents representing the Western Press, were now waiting 
anxiously to see what the future held.72  
 
In reprisal, the British requested the cessation of Rumanian News, a daily bulletin 
edited by the Romanian Legation in London.73 While British anger was inevitable, and 
reprisal could have been safely predicted, official rancour was muted by the fact that the 
closure of the Information Centre in Bucharest had been considered by London the 
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previous autumn for financial reasons.74 The small budget covering the wages of the few 
local employees in the English Library and some other expenses for concerts, film and 
shows slated for cancellation starting on 1 April 1950. London decided that there was no 
reason to maintain ‘even our present slight degree of activity in Bucharest’ in present 
circumstances.75 
The Information Office was however closed sooner than the British themselves 
intended, following the demand of the Romanian government. Budget cuts were thereby 
‘complete instead of partial.’76  The closure endangered the Romanian employees. By 
being in British service they had incurred the hostility of the Romanian authorities and 
lived under the constant shadow of arrest.77 Two persons were mentioned: Ion Has and 
Vasile Nicolau, as being recruited in November 1947, who rendered ‘able service to the 
Information Officer . . .They would probably find it very difficult to get other employment, 
and indeed in present circumstances this might be the least of their difficulties if we 
discharge them.’78 
 
Official paranoia continued to grow. ‘Routine practices in the free world became 
capital offences under the new regime. Statistics usually published in company reports or 
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newspapers, and the movement of government and Party personalities were top secret 
overnight and their disclosure punishable. ‘The tempo of arrests, trials, confiscation 
decrees and death sentences intensified.’79  Individuals who frequented the British and 
American libraries were arrested after being closely monitored by the Securitate.80 
Romanian employees of Western press agencies were continually shadowed and advised 
on the ‘correctness of a public recantation’. ‘Recantation’ would involve denunciation of 
Western press agencies for ‘spying against the working class and wrecking their 
happiness’.81 
Accusations of espionage continued to be lodged against British diplomats. In July 
1950, the First Secretary, R. A. King, was charged with espionage after receiving, 
according to Romanians authorities, an envelope containing secret papers. He was taken 
into custody and then asked to leave the country.82 During the trial of a ‘group of spies and 
traitors in the service of British Intelligence’ King was denounced together with the former 
British representative, Adrian Holman, the former executives of the petrochemical 
company ‘Unirea,’ E. Bowden and W. Wilson, and the director of ‘Astra,’ M. Fitzgerald. 
While all of them had left Romania before the trial, the Romanian defendants were 
sentenced to death for high treason. Mihai Romanescu, aviation commander, allegedly 
recruited as agent in 1946 by E. Bowden, was accused of providing him military 
information. A shareholder at various companies, Gheorghe Polizu Micsunesti was 
apparently recruited as spy by a British officer, Tom Hogg, and reactivated by Bowden in 
1946. Alexandru Liciu, President of the Court of Appeal, was also accused of espionage. 
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He was supposedly recruited in 1949 by Gipson, the head of representatives of foreign 
press in Romania.83 
Twenty four alleged ‘spies and saboteurs’ working in the petrochemical industry 
were accused of transmitting military information to the British and Americans. During the 
trial which took place in the oil centre of Ploiesti between 9 and 13 February 1953, Colonel 
Forster, the Chief of the Economic Department of the British Mission and an engineer at 
‘Astra company,’ Lieutenant Colonel Masterson, from ‘Unirea’ and Lieutenant Colonel 
Galpin, from ‘Steaua Romana’ were ‘unmasked as spies’. Enjoying diplomatic immunity 
as members of the military mission, they had left the country before the trial.84 The 
Romanians indicted were accused of espionage and high treason.85 By the time of the trial, 
Constantin Capsa, Mihail Ciupagea, Constantin Matasaru from ‘Steaua Romana’ and Aurel 
Bente had already spent three to four years in prison.86 After the nationalization of the oil 
industry, Capsa, the Chief of Staff at ‘Astra-Romana,’ and Bente, a technician at the same 
company, had allegedly organized a network of espionage under Anglo-American 
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supervision. Alexandru, the former Minister of Finance and Atanasie Christodulo from 
‘Romano-Americana’ company were also indicted.87 
Another series of trials ‘unmasked’ other networks of espionage under British 
supervision. James Gibson, Commercial Attaché at the British legation, was mentioned in 
1953 in connection with a group of ‘spies and traitors in the service of British intelligence.’ 
This group led by Petre Gheorghiu, engineer, was allegedly constituted with the purpose of 
overthrowing the regime by force, with the help of the ‘Imperialists.’ Gheorghiu was 
sentenced to life for high treason.88 Another team recruiting leader, Ion Bodea, did not 
benefit from the Court clemency and was sentenced to death for treason. Bodea was 
allegedly recruited by British Intelligence and trained in Turkey between 1950 and 1953, 
when he returned illegally to Romania and recruited people for espionage activities until 
April 1954 when he was caught.89 
In 1954 the trial of ‘the group of spies’ led by the former Minister of Justice, 
Patrascanu, commenced. Accused of being an agent of the former ‘bourgeois’ police and 
the British Intelligence, Patrascanu was alleged to have attempted to destroy the 
Communist Party from the inside. He was also accused of crimes against peace for 
‘paralyzing’ party action against the Imperialists and for having supported Marshall 
Antonescu in the anti-Soviet war, an absurd accusation. Patrascanu led allegedly a group of 
conspirators that, with the help of the Anglo-American Intelligence, prepared for the 
violent overthrow of the regime. He was said to have provided the British and American 
Intelligence organizations secret information concerning state security. Other Communists 
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were also accused of crimes against peace for having served as agents of the British and of 
high treason for providing secret information concerning state security to the British 
Intelligence and the CIA.90 
According to Eduard Mark, the American agents Louis E. Madison, Henry L. 
Roberts and Thomas were briefed between 1944 and 1946 on Soviet policies in Romania 
by Belu Zilber and Patrascanu. 91 The American Secret Intelligence reports and a letter sent 
by Edward G. Boxhall, colonel in British Intelligence, reveal the existence of a trend of 
national communism in Romania. At the beginning of 1946, certain Romanian 
communists, aware of the danger represented by Soviet economic directives began talking 
about the establishment of a national Communist party to carry out Romania’s interests. 
These attempts would not be accomplished, Boxhall believed, as long as Ana Pauker was 
the leader of the Communist party and Bodnaras the chief of the secret police.92 Although 
Zilber and Patrascanu, members of the delegation to the Peace Conference, foresaw the 
disastrous consequences of the Soviet domination for Romania, they were disappointed 
with the Western policies as well. Seemingly Patrascanu considered the possibility of 
becoming a political refugee in the United States, but abandoned the idea because ‘the 
Americans are nuts. They give up to the Russians more than the later demanded and 
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expected. Reaching the United States, the Americans might deliver me to the Russians. I 
prefer returning at home.’93 
It is a fact that the West generally, and Anglo-Americans particularly, had not 
entirely given up hopes of a regime change and worked with pre-war and wartime contacts, 
and with irreconcilable anti-Communists to facilitate the change. British Intelligence was 
involved in supporting an active Romanian anti-communist resistance that persisted until 
the end of the 1950s. In July 1953, for example, thirteen British and American trained 
agents were parachuted into Romania to support the resistance groups. Nonetheless, by 
1954 certain members of the intelligence began seriously questioning the wisdom of 
supporting resistance activities behind the Iron Curtain.94 Innocent Romanians were 
sometimes caught up in the search for very real spies and saboteurs. 
The Bucharest regime, if it detected these contacts, had been given a new cause 
for suspicion and in potential a new slate of enemies. The trials generated fear of any 
connection with the British, genuine or imputed. In its frantic hunting of spies, Romanian 
authorities seem to have been actually convinced that those working for the British or 
Americans in any capacity were part of a large network of secret agents.95 A reading of the 
proceedings would lead one to believe that the whole of MI6 worked in Bucharest.96 This 
was not far from what the Romanian leadership believed. In 1951 Gheorghiu-Dej accused 
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the Western states of transforming their diplomatic missions ‘into teams of spies and 
conspirators,’ pointing particularly to British and American missions.97 
In asking for the recall of Western diplomats and accusing them of espionage, the 
Romanian regime was, however, not original. It just followed what Moscow did in the 
period.98 Seeing foreign agents everywhere, the Romanian government required help from 
the Soviets in 1949. Despite the presence in Romania of a significant number of NKVD 
agents, more agents were expected to come and destroy the ‘network of Foreign 
Intelligence.’99 The Soviets did not wait long to oblige. In 1963, the Soviet agents were 
still there while the Romanian leadership, paranoia abating now worked to send them 
home.  
‘We have an Agency,’ Khrushchev admitted in 1962 during his visit to Romania. 
‘Had we not, we would not have known how you comply with CMEA decisions.’100 What 
was annoying for the Romanian leadership was that the Soviet Intelligence recruited 
Romanian citizens.101 The chief of the Soviet network in Romania was, according to 
Nicolae Ceausescu, Pauker. Until being purged in 1952, she was the ‘brain’ of the 
communist administration.102 In inviting the Soviets in to help, the Romanian Government, 
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inadvertently, accentuated Soviet penetration. In fighting Western spies they increased 
their vulnerability to a real threat, Soviet espionage. 
Officially resumed in October 1947, after the ratification of the Peace Treaty, 
British-Romanian relations saw an involution. Diplomacy was largely reduced to a never 
ending round of tit for tat expulsions, slander and vilification. Except for the notes of 
protests effective relations disappeared almost altogether.  
                                                                                                                                                 
state funds for supporting the Zionist movement and the Jewish migration to Israel. This had led to Pauker’s 
dismissal. In that Gheorghiu-Dej was backed by Stalin. Denis Deletant, Teroarea comunista in Romania. 
Gheorghiu-Dej si statul politienesc, 1948-1965, Bucharest, 2001, pp. 250-252. 
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The Romanian Thaw 
         
        
 
               ‘The Kremlin must indeed be glad to 
have so amenable a Satellite.’  
(Allen Dudley, British Embassy, Bucharest)1 
 
 
         
        
 
On 9 May 1956, for the first time since the Second World War an impressive 
ceremony was held at the British cemetery in Bucharest, on the anniversary of Victory in 
Europe Day. The ceremony was attended by a detachment of officers and troops as well as 
representatives of trade unions. The British Minister, D.F. MacDermot, the Military 
Attaché, Colonel J.A. Mars, the Air Attaché, Group Captain Joseph S. Kennedy and other 
members of the British legation took part in the service.2 Besides them, were two MPs who 
had accompanied the Rugby Football team ‘Harlequins’ invited to play two matches in 
Bucharest.3 One of them, Wavell Wakefield, was also the president of the ‘Harlequins’ 
Rugby Club, while the other was a former Harlequin player, J.P. Mallalieu. Both enjoyed 
an ‘unbounded hospitality’. Although as official guests of the government, the two could 
expect ‘the thickest red-carpet treatment,’ the fact that they were to be accommodated at 
                                                 
1
 TNA, PRO, FO 371/122696, N R 1016/19. Allen Dudley, British Embassy, Bucharest to Selwyn 
Lloyd, 8 November 1956. 
2
 The Council of Ministers, the Presidium of the Great National Assembly, the Ministry of the 
Armed Forces, the Board of the People Capital and trade unions sent wreaths. Scanteia, no. 3591, 10 May 
1956, p. 3.  
3
 A Romanian team played in Britain in 1955. TNA, PRO, FO 371/122750, NR 1801/11, 
MacDermot, British Embassy Bucharest, to H.A.H. Hohler, FO, 19 April 1956, on the visit of the 
‘Harlequins’ team to Romania. 
Romanians had the chance of seeing the best Rugby Football players from England, Wales and 
Scotland such as C.G. Woodruf, Sandy Sanders, Nick Laburshagne and Micky Grand. Scanteia, 9 May 1956, 
p. 3.  
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the government guest house was ‘an honour unheard of for anybody except high Soviet 
officials.’4  
The British guests were also offered the opportunity of visiting ‘whatever they 
wanted’ in Romania.5 Invited to the mountain resort Sinaia, Wakefield found himself 
involved in a ‘full-scale conference on Anglo-Romanian relations’ with the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, several of his deputies, the Ministers responsible for Foreign Trade and 
Sport and other senior officials. The Romanians underlined the importance of bringing the 
trade discussions then underway in London to a successful conclusion and held out 
glowing prospects if a trade agreement were concluded.6 The government was ready for 
exchanges of any kind, would consider renewing payment on the legacy national debt and 
welcomed a British trade delegation to Romania.7 
The overall friendly attitude enchanted Wakefield to the extent that, although he 
did not have an official mandate, he expressed his desire to see members of the Romanian 
government in Britain.8 Since Grigore Preoteasa, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
happened to be also the president of the Romanian Rugby Football Federation, he could be 
invited to London in the later capacity, Wakefield suggested to Foreign Office. This way, 
British ministers could meet him informally and discuss Romanian debt service. ‘What an 
ingenious Foreign Minister!’ remarked the Foreign Office staff, reading Wakefield’s 
report. Although contemplating with amusement the likelihood of seeing Preoteasa in 
                                                 
4
 Wakefield and his wife received the invitation to visit Romania as official guests. A Labour MP, 
Mallalieu, also travelled to Romania. TNA, PRO, FO 371/122750, NR 1801/10. Wakefield to MacDermot, 
British Minister in Bucharest, 9 April 1956. 
5
 TNA, PRO, FO 371/122709, 1052/2. Wakefield’s report on his visit to Romania between 7 and 
13 May 1956, p. 3. 
6
 A Romanian delegation left Bucharest in the morning of 14 April with the purpose of concluding 
a commercial agreement and solving financial problems. The same day Khrushchev and Bulganin left 
Moscow for London. Scanteia, 15 April 1956, p. 1. 
The conclusion of any trade arrangement was, according to the British, contingent on a satisfactory 
settlement of the debts. 
7
 TNA, PRO, FO 371/122750, NR 1801/13, MacDermot, British Embassy Bucharest, to Selwyn 
Lloyd, May 17, 1956.  
8
 Though, apparently he was warned in London by Lord John Hope, before leaving, ‘on some of 
the pitfalls’. ‘Guidance’ to Mallalieu was believed to be unnecessary. [Mallalieu was a Socialist MP]. TNA, 
PRO, FO 371/122750, NR 1801/11, FO Minute (Hohler). 
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Britain ‘either in football boots or in striped pants,’ their suspicion that the invitation to the 
‘Harlequins’ was a gambit to gain political entry to Britain was confirmed.9 The British 
were, however, reluctant to countenance Preoteasa’s visit to London. The Romanian 
government ‘would do all to give the visit a political character’, which the British wanted 
to avoid it.10 
Another initiative was even more astonishing since the regime’s repression of 
Clerics other than those belonging to the Orthodox denomination was widely known. 
Claiming that the theology of the Orthodox Church was similar to Anglicanism, the 
Romanians invited Anglican Church representatives to Romania. Wakefield’s response to 
this proposal produced displeasure at the Foreign Office, in large measure because he was in 
fact supposed to raise the question of detained intelligence operatives. Wakefield decided to 
leave this sensitive issue to be raised by the clergy ‘that would certainly visit Romania’.11 
The Romanians were ‘so pleasant and hospitable,’ that he found it inappropriate to disturb 
the atmosphere of cordiality ‘by raising such a disagreeable subject.’12 Wakefield may have 
been unaware that the former Minister in Bucharest, Sir Walter Sullivan, had condemned 
strongly the Orthodox Clergy for collaborating with the Communist regime and for the 
forcible incorporation of the Uniate Catholic Church. Thus the Romanian Orthodox Church 
was ‘hardly a more desirable candidate for hospitality than the state to which it was 
                                                 
9
 ‘Our only concern is to prevent international sporting events from being used for the purposes of 
Communist propaganda,’ H.A.F. Hohler, assessed on February 21, 1956. FO 371/122750, NR 1801/5, FO 
Minute. 
10
 There was no likelihood for Preoteasa’s visit to Britain even ‘disguised as a football fan.’ A visit 
of Preoteasa would bring ‘just a lot of unpleasantries.’ The fact that Wakefield wanted to take the initiative in 
this matter, but only submitted his suggestion to the FO two months after returning to Britain made J. E. 
Ward believe that he had been ‘taken for a ride’. TNA, PRO, FO 371/122709, NR 1052/2. 
11
 Briefed previously on the question the former employees of the Legation still in prison and of 
denial of exit permits to British subjects and other individuals who wished to join their relatives in Britain 
Wakefield agreed to approach informally the Romanian Foreign Minister. TNA, PRO, FO 371/122750, 
1801/12, E.F. Given to D.F. MacDermot, May 4, 1956; FO 371/122750, N R 1801/14, MacDermot, British 
Embassy Bucharest, to Hohler, FO, May 17, 1956. 
12
 TNA, PRO, FO 371/122750, N R 1801/15, FO Minute, H.A.F. Hohler, 24 May 1956. 
Supplementary comments from the British Minister in Bucharest regarding the visit of W. Wakefield and 
J.P.W. Mallalieu. 
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notoriously subservient.’13 Proclaiming that they were interested in visits by religious 
dignitaries, the Romanian government were hoping ‘to give an air of respectability to the 
regime and foster the impression that there was complete religious freedom’ in Romania, 
the British representative believed. MacDermot was of the opinion that a visit by Church of 
England clergy should not be encouraged since it would be fully utilised for propaganda 
purposes. ‘The time was not ripe for the opening of relations with the Romanian Orthodox 
Church’, he concluded.14 A visit of the Archbishop of Canterbury to Romania would take 
place almost ten years later, in June 1965.15 By then, most of political detainees, including 
intelligence operatives, had been released from prisons and many of the later were allowed 
to leave Romania for Britain. 
The Communist regime had already adopted a strategy, determined to impress the 
official guests invited to Romania by offering them a generous welcome and a VIP 
‘ritual’.16 While offering conducted tours Romanian officials gave visitors the impression 
that they were seeing everything they wished.17 Although, according to Soviet directives, no 
foreign citizen from countries outside the Soviet influence was allowed to enter Romania 
except the diplomats, certain Western visitors were welcomed even before Khrushchev’s 
proclamation of ‘peaceful coexistence’. Because it was a ‘real democracy,’ Romania 
believed itself to be attractive to ‘honest people, eager to get informed on the regime’s 
achievements and ‘the new life of the working masses.’ Moscow was content that the 
                                                 
13
 Any exchanges with the Orthodox Church representatives were unpopular. However, the FO 
could not oppose them. Wakefield was advised to contact the Archbishop of York, ‘less partisan’ than the 
Bishop of Chichester.  W. Wakefield to Lord John Hope, 10 July 1956, TNA, PRO, FO 371/122709, 1052/2, 
p. 2. 
14
 TNA, PRO, FO 371/122750, NR 1801/13, MacDermot, British Embassy Bucharest, to Selwyn 
Lloyd, May 17, 1956.  
15
 TNA, PRO, FO 371/182502, N 1054/3 c- Secretary of State, Visits to Eastern Europe, 24 May 
1965. 
16
 Romanians succeeded in impressing their guests. FO 371/122750, N R 1801/15, FO Minute, 
H.A.F. Hohler, 24 May 1956. Supplementary comments from the British Minister in Bucharest regarding the 
visit of W. Wakefield and J.P.W. Mallalieu. 
17
 TNA, PRO, FO 371/122750, 1801/14, MacDermot, British Embassy Bucharest to Hohler, FO, 
May 17, 1956. 
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Romanians showcase their achievements since, in doing so, the myth that Romania 
remained independent was encouraged. ‘Outstanding personalities’ came to Romania in 
1953 for the Third World Youth Congress.18 Of course ‘outstanding personality’ should be 
taken to mean ‘actual communist’ or ‘useful dupe’. Monica Felton from Britain, a laureate 
of the International Stalin Prize for promoting peace, chaired the reunion of the ‘Young 
Women’ at the Pioneers’ palace.19 Dr. Hewlett Johnson, Dean of Canterbury and vice-
president of the British-Soviet Society was invited by the Romanian government in 
September 1948 and left impressed by the diffusion of the ideas of ‘social justice and 
planned production, the basis of an organized society, originating from the Soviet Union.’ 
While ideas were diffused, Soviets were invisible.  Johnson ‘had hardly seen any Soviet 
soldiers,’ although they were there until 1958.20 Johnson might have implied that the 
Romanian government was carrying an independent policy out of any Soviet interference. 
Seemingly, there were visitors prepared to appreciate the Communist regime and 
disregard its more negative aspects. Others, such as Wakefield, arriving less gullible and 
pre-disposed to celebrate the accomplishments presented to him, could not resist the 
hospitality offered. The two MPs who visited Romania in May 1956 were impressed with a 
lavish hospitality, including a visit to the luxurious Sinaia resort, the former summer 
residence of the Royal family, and the offer of free holiday at the Black Sea at the expense 
of the Romanian government. Wakefield was invited to return to Romania later in the 
summer to spend a holiday as a guest of the government ‘and is, I believe, seriously 
considering doing so’, Mac Dermot noted. ‘The Romanians are experts at this sort of 
                                                 
18
 Invitations were issued by the Committee ‘Fight for Peace,’ the Institute for Cultural Relations 
with Foreign Countries or the General Confederation of Labour. “Foreign Visitors in Our Country,” 
“Rumania’s capital prepares for the Youth Festival,” New Life in Rumania, Bucharest, no. 2-3, July – 
October 1952; New Life in Rumania, Bucharest,  no. 2, April-May 1953. 
19
 “Personalities from all over the world – guests of our country,” New Life in Rumania, Bucharest, 
no. 4, August- September 1953. 
20
 At a meeting organized by the British–Romanian Friendship association, Johnson declared that 
he intended to write a book on the new democracies based on his visit to the Eastern European countries. 
Rumanian News, no. 223, 19 September 1948, p. 1 and Rumanian News, no. 263, 31 October 1948, p. 1.  
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thing,’ the British Minister in Bucharest, admitted.21 Several years later Wakefield would 
become chairman of the British-Romanian parliamentary committee.22 
 
There were two classes of visitors the Romanians would particularly welcome – 
journalists and Members of Parliament - the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Preoteasa, had 
told MacDermot in February 1956. ‘In the present post-Congress atmosphere of having 
nothing to conceal and much to be proud of, a visiting British journalist would be given 
fairly wide (though obviously not complete) freedom of movement and of making 
contacts’, Mac Dermot believed. 23  
Expanding on his favourite theme of misrepresentation by the capitalist press and 
radio of the facts of life in Eastern Europe, Preoteasa, expressed the hope that there would 
be an increase in the number of visits to Romania from Britain by persons concerned with 
the formation of public opinion. ‘I asked him whether journalists would not have 
difficulties about visas and he said absolutely none. As I looked a bit dubious, he repeated 
this with emphasis.’ MacDermot reported this change of attitude to the Foreign Office, 
suggesting that this be brought to the knowledge of ‘the more responsible newspapers’. 
The British representative indicated to his superiors that he would welcome a visit by a 
well qualified journalists – ‘ideally someone like Gordon Shepherd – who would be able to 
                                                 
21
 Wakefield was ‘enthusiastic about the prospects of increased trade which were held out to him 
(which, I think, include prospects for some of his companies in which he himself is interested) and will 
certainly press for the early conclusion of a trade agreement.’ He ‘felt that the Romanians were so pleasant, 
that there was a sporting chance of converting them to free enterprise. On the other hand, Mr. Mallalieu was, 
I think, also impressed, but particularly by the economic planning aspect.’ TNA, PRO, FO 371/122750, 
1801/14, MacDermot, British Embassy Bucharest to Hohler, FO, May 17, 1956. 
22
 The set up of the committee was suggested in 1956 by the Labour MP, John Baird, to the 
Romanian representatives in London. The committee was established on 30 March 1960. Vice-chairman the 
Labour MP Marcus Lipton. Treasurer was the Labour MP, W. Wilkins, and secretary the Conservative B. 
Drayson. Romanian legation in London, 5 March 1956. RNA, CC of RCP, Department of Foreign Relations, 
Dossier 54/1956, f. 6.  
23
 TNA, PRO, FO 371/122740, NR 1631/2. Mac Dermot, British Legation Bucharest to H.A.F. 
Hohler, CMG, Foreign Office, 29 February 1956. 
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obtain information ‘beyond the scope of the Legation’, information which ‘should be of 
great assistance to our appreciation of the Romanian scene’.24  
‘The Romanians would take great pains to obtain mainly favourable impressions 
but an astute observer should be able to penetrate the red carpet without difficulty,’ 
MacDermot believed.25 As seen, the MPs who travelled to Romania two months after Mac 
Dermot’s conversation with Preoteasa did not succeed in penetrating the façade built by 
the Romanian regime.  
On receiving the credentials of the new British Minister accredited in Bucharest, 
Allen Dudley, the president of the State Council, Chivu Stoica, 26 also maintained that the 
Romanians were happy to receive scientists, artists and writers as well as tourists. The 
exchange of scientists was brought up by the Romanians during Wakefield’s visit. The 
Foreign Office did not see however any advantage in this, either politically or scientifically 
since ‘officially sponsored exchanges would contribute to the prestige of this fraudulent 
regime and involve us in unnecessary expenditure.’ 27  
The British invited to Romania ‘would be free to travel throughout the country, 
visit anything they wished and talk with anyone they met’, Stoica told Dudley. 
                                                 
24
  Although The Times, Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph seemed disposed to take advantage of the 
opportunity, as indicated by MacDermot in his report, I did not find any evidence in the archives 
concerning any visit by British journalists to Romania that year. TNA, PRO, FO 371/122740, NR 1631/2. 
Mac Dermot, British Legation Bucharest to H.A.F. Hohler, CMG, Foreign Office, 29 February 1956. 
25
 TNA, PRO, FO 371/122740, NR 1631/2. Mac Dermot, British Legation Bucharest to H.A.F. 
Hohler, CMG, Foreign Office, 29 February 1956. 
26
 Chivu Stoica, a railway-worker like Gheorghiu Dej, joined the illegal Communist Party in the 
1930s and was imprisoned for taking part in the Grivita Rail Yards strike. Released after 23 August 1944, 
Stoica was elected in the Central Committee of the RCP. He achieved prominence in the state rather the party 
hierarchy. Stoica was propelled upwards by the political considerations of the moment and by his friendship 
with Gheorghiu-Dej. When Gheorghiu-Dej became Minister of Communications, Stoica was appointed 
general manager of the Railway administration and then he held the position of Minister of Railways. In 
1948, Stoica became Minister of Industry and deputy premier in March 1950.  
In April 1954, Gheorghiu-Dej handed over the position of first secretary to Gheorghe Apostol to 
resume it the following year; in 1955 he felt compelled to give up the premiership. This is how Stoica got it. 
During the big government reshuffle of March 1961, Stoica lost his premiership to Ion Gheorghe Maurer. 
Open Society Archives Budapest, 300/60/657, Romanian Unit, in Arhivele Totalitarismului, no. 3-4/2003, 
pp. 182-183. 
27
 Though, the FO did not stand in the way of exchanges of scientists arranged privately. TNA, 
PRO, FO 371/122750, N R 1801/15, FO Minute, H.A.F. Hohler to T.G. Ward, 24 May 1956.  
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Notwithstanding these assurances, he did not appear credible to Dudley. Good intentions 
and pleasant declarations meant little without removing obstacles impeding good relations. 
Exchanges of all sorts would be more valuable, Dudley assessed, if the Government would 
not interfere by controlling British subjects already residing in Romania. Restrictions on 
travel hampered British diplomats in performing their duties. The fact that Romanians 
might suffer the consequences of their friendship with the British subjects was also a 
matter of concern.28 
Stoica denied any intention to put the British under observation, claiming that the 
surveillance department was ‘new and inexperienced.’ (It was actually seven years old). 
The Romanian government was just concerned about offering protection to all diplomatic 
missions from ‘lawless elements which, unfortunately, still existed even in a socialist 
country.’ Surveillance had been necessary in the past because of ‘the incursion of foreign 
parachutists’ and the instigation of ‘certain foreign broadcasts,’ Stoica assessed, adding 
that the British staff should not to worry for their Romanian friends.29 
 
However laudable the initiative for resuming ties with the West might have been 
it was neither genuine nor independent. Peaceful co-existence proclaimed by Khrushchev 
was presumably behind the efforts towards the normalization of relations with the Western 
countries. ‘Romania has so little independence in matters of foreign affairs,’ the British 
                                                 
28
 ‘The chances the Romanian PM knew nothing about it [surveillance] were sufficient to make it 
worthwhile to let him know our feelings on the general subject.’ TNA, PRO, FO 371/122709, 1052/4, Alan 
Dudley to Selwyn Lloyd, 12 September 1956. 
29
 Stoica may have alluded to the incident which took place in July 1953, when thirteen British and 
American trained agents were parachuted into Romania to support the anti-Communist resistance. The 
Romanian authorities conducted a publicized trial and used it as evidence of Western espionage for 
propaganda purpose.  
The following year the Intelligence began questioning the wisdom of supporting resistance 
activities behind the Iron Curtain. Elizabeth W. Hazard, Cold War crucible: United States foreign policy and 
the conflict in Romania, 1943-1953, p. 232. 
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Minister in Bucharest remarked in May 1956.30 There were enough proofs to confirm this 
assertion. 
The Soviet leaders’ visit to Britain in April 1956 revealed the degree of 
Romania’s subservience to Moscow. The visit of N.A. Bulganin, the president of the 
Council of Ministers, and N.S. Khrushchev, member of the Presidium, was given full 
coverage by the party newspaper, Scanteia, which detailed the movements of the Soviet 
leaders in great length, and every day. From the correspondence transmitted by Scanteia’s 
reporter in London, the reader might have got the impression that the future fate of Britain 
was dependent upon the outcome of the visit. 31 More than simply providing details of the 
visit, Scanteia paid homage to the visitors. Praise was so effusive that one feels 
embarrassed reading it. Even the weather conspired to produce the correct tone for such a 
momentous occasion. After a gloomy morning, the moment the Soviet leaders arrived at 
Victoria station, ‘the sun, triumphing against the clouds, came into sight,’ a sign indicating 
that the visit would start ‘under good auspices.’32 The readers were reminded that the 
Soviets had already taken important steps to brighten the international situation. It was as if 
the sunny day was designed for a visit of such importance. ‘A human channel’ had been 
waiting for the arrival of the Soviet leaders on both sides of the street leading to Claridge 
                                                 
30
 TNA, PRO, FO 371/122750, NR 1801/13, MacDermot, British Legation, Bucharest to Selwyn 
Lloyd, 17 May 1956. 
31
 The new Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, hoped to increase his prestige as a result of the Soviet 
leaders’ visit. The fact that he failed in obtaining the Americans’ approval for British-Sino cooperation made 
his maintenance at power vulnerable, John Baird, a Labour MP, told a Romanian diplomat. Certain British 
MPs talked even about Eden stepping down. The fact that Butler and Macmillan who might have taken 
Eden’s place, did not get along, made possible Eden’s maintenance at power. RNA, CC of RCP, Department 
of Foreign Relations, Dossier 54/1956, ff. 11-12. 
Scanteia no. 3571, 15 April 1956, p. 1. 
32
 The Soviets reached London after a four-day trip. The visit took place between 18 and 28 April 
1956. They were received by the PM Anthony Eden and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Selwyn Lloyd, at 
Victoria station. 
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hotel where the Soviet guests were to be accommodated and some Londoners could be 
seen carrying short English-Russian conversation guides edited by the Daily Express. 33 
The visit went apparently smoothly. The Soviets had extensive meetings with the 
Premier and were received by Queen Elizabeth at Windsor Castle.34 A Joint Statement on 
the development of commercial and cultural relations was signed. The Soviets expressed 
interests in importing from Britain up to two hundred billion rubbles annually. Britain 
could not, however, export certain goods, restricted due their strategic importance. 
Cultural, scientific and technical exchanges were also expected to develop.35 
In contrast to the enthusiasm displayed by the press, there was despair in 
Romania’s prisons. And more than despair, ‘resentment appeared against all that was 
British.  
When the word went round that the Russians had gone to London and billion-
dollar contracts were in the making, people said: „Hypocritical Albion and nation 
of shopkeepers. Here they go again betraying the whole world.”36 
 
One incident had though disturbed the visit. Scanteia disclosed it to its Romanian 
readership two weeks later.  At a luncheon offered by the Labour Party, the Soviet leaders 
had to face a ‘slander’ when a list of two hundred forty five Social-Democrats imprisoned 
in the Soviet Union and the satellites’ prisons was handed over and the prisoners’ release 
was requested. The origin of the ‘horrible elicitation’ was traced, Scanteia announced. The 
list had been ‘concocted’ by a group of American journalists led by the Editor in Chief of 
the New Leader (a New York newspaper), Sol Levitas, and then sent to the British MPs, 
                                                 
33
 According to an official statement the Soviet Union was ready to collaborate with the United 
Nations in maintain peace in the Middle East. Scanteia, no. 3574/ 19 April 1956, p. 1. 
Scanteia, no. 3573/18 April 1956, p. 3. 
34
 Scanteia, no. 3575/ 20 April 1956, p. 4 and Scanteia no. 3578/ 23 April 1956, p 4. 
35
 Scanteia, no. 3581/ 28 April 1956, pp. 1-4, Scanteia, no. 3583/ 30 April 1956, p. 4. 
36
 Prisoners’ resentment towards duplicitous British foreign policy was expressed in an original 
way, by ceasing learning English. Learning foreign languages was one of the activities which, although not 
allowed by the guardians, was widespread among political detainees. ‘Everyone started learning French, 
Spanish, Italian and Portuguese, anything but English. But of course there was still Uncle Sam and his bag of 
dollars so English classes began again in order to speak American.’ Leonard Kirschen, Prisoner of Red 
Justice. An account of Ten Years’ Captivity in Communist Romania, Barker, London, 1963, p. 167. 
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among them Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell. The ‘calumniators’ of the New Leader aimed at 
‘poisoning the international climate, hindering detente and preventing Anglo-Soviet 
friendship’.37 
From within the Labour Party, some MPs, with communist affinities, were almost 
as critical as were the Romanians. A member of the Executive Committee of the Labour 
Party, Edith Summerskill, praised Communism as a society directed to ensuring working 
class well-being and maintained in a speech to the Labour students at the University of 
Liverpool that Soviet domestic policy should not have been an issue of the Labour leaders’ 
concern.38 Konni Zilliacus also admonished the Labour Party leadership. The Soviet 
leaders should not be made responsible for the internal affairs of other countries, Zilliacus 
maintained in a letter to the weekly New Statesmen and Nation. He pointed to one of the 
‘instigators,’ Morgan Philips, who, Zilliacus claimed, was in the habit of insulting Eastern 
European countries. Zilliacus reminded Philips that East Bloc nations were members of the 
United Nations. Philips refused to admit that the Baltic countries had become ‘many years 
ago’ Soviet republics. Was Philips in favour of peaceful coexistence and the United 
Nations Charter or was he on the side of John Foster Dulles and some disgruntled 
immigrants? 39 Tom Driberg imagined a hypothetic situation in an article published by the 
Reynold's News. What if Dulles and Stassen were invited to Moscow and their hosts said, 
                                                 
37
 “Cand joci cum iti canta altii”[Dancing on songs played by others] Scanteia, no. 3587, 5 May 
1956, p 4, article first published by Pravda no. 125 (13.788). 
38
 Since she had advocated passionately the benefits of Communism, Summerskill accepted to visit 
Romania the following year at the invitation of the government. Upon her return to Britain, Summerskill 
agreed to be interviewed on her impression of Romania. The interview was supposed to take place on Radio 
Free Europe. The first thing she asked for was to convey a message to the Romanian Minister in London, a 
request which astonished Ion Ratiu, the chair of the Association of Romanian exiles. ‘Don’t you realize that 
this is an anti-Communist transmitter?’ ‘You mean that you want me to attack Romania?’ Summerskill 
replied, panicked and confused.. While Ratiu indicated that he would permit her to proceed, while reserving 
the right to challenge objectionable statements, Summerskill refused to listen and left the studio in such a 
hurry that she forgot her gloves there. “With and without gloves,” Free Rumanian Press, no. 46 (II), 4 
December 1957.  The incident was also described by Daily Mail, 5 November 1957. Scanteia devoted a long 
and spirited defence of Summerskill on 5 November 1957 for refusing to attack ‘a government in power’ and 
uttered accusations against Ratiu, ‘paid by Henry Ford’. 
39
 Zilliacus’s letter to the New Statesmen and Nation. “Distinguished Labours condemn Labour 
Party leaders’ reactionary behaviour” - news passed by Moscow through Agerpress on 9 May – with 
reference to an article edited by Pravda and republished by Scanteia no. 3591, 10 May 1956, p. 3. 
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‘We have lists of our communists imprisoned by Britons in Cyprus, Malaya and British 
Guyana. Please release them!’ John Baird, a Labour MP, also criticized the Labour leaders’ 
action, while Emmanuel Shinwell, a former Minister in Attlee’s government, asked the 
party to apologize. Although Socialists and Communists had different opinions concerning 
the means to fight Capitalism the Social Democrats had to reach an agreement with the 
Communists, the Labour Party ideologue, G.D.H. Coll, resolved.40 
Any attempt to examine publicly the topics dealt with during the Soviet leaders’ 
visit would not lead to the desired results, the British Prime Minister stated in the House of 
Commons on 3 May 1956. Nevertheless, the intervention of the Labour leaders was not in 
vain. 41 The Romanian Social-Democrats were released under the Decree no. 206 of 24 
April 1956.’42 They attributed their release to Gaitskell’s representation to Bulganin and 
Khrushchev.43  
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 “Distinguished Labours condemn Labour Party leaders’ reactionary behaviour” - news passed 
by Moscow through Agerpress on 9 May – with reference to an article edited by Pravda and republished by 
Scanteia no. 3591, 10 May 1956, p. 3. 
41
 TNA, PRO, FO 371/122694, NR 1015/3, FO to J. S. Somers Cocks, British Consulate in 
Munich, 12 May 1956. 
The Social democrats were included in the list handed by Sir William Hayter to Gromyko and that 
handed by the British Prime Minister to Bulganin and Khrushchev, TNA, PRO, FO 371/122694, NR 
1015/12. 
42
 The Decree may have been consonant with the directives issued by Khrushchev. Ana-Maria 
Lascu, “Eliberarea Social-Democratilor din inchisorile comuniste, 1956,” [The Release of Social-Democrats 
from Communist prisons], Arhivele Totalitarismului 3-4/2003, pp. 94-95. 
43
 A Romanian member of the Legation staff in Bucharest met by chance a leading Social-
Democrat, Professor Motas, imprisoned since 1948. He and six other Social Democrats had been released on 
the same day at the beginning of May. 
The Observer also brought up the release of other Socialists, Petre Mihaila, a former president of 
the Romanian Miners’ Union, sentenced to 20 years hard labour in a secret trial in November 1954, and 
Simion Garbovan. TNA, PRO, FO 371/122694, NR 1015/15, E.G. Willan, Bucharest to E.F. Given, 17 May 
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Another amnesty took place the previous year, in September 1955, one month 
before Romania’s admission to the United Nations. 44 The amnesty had been however very 
selective and shattered utterly the morale of those who continued to be imprisoned:  
....[t]he Roumanian amnesty in September which released all the war criminals 
and those with sentences up to five years, as well as groups of other small 
offenders. There was still no hope in sight for us with heavy sentences . . . It was 
awful to see foreigners being released and those who had been locked up on the 
merest suspicion of having had dealings with them, still being kept in prison. 
Nothing seemed to make sense, absolutely nothing.45 
  
Most political prisoners hoped that Romania would not be received into the United 
Nations, until, among other points, they had been granted freedom. ‘We felt deeply 
deceived and hope in the Western Allies began to fade.’ 46 In article 4 of the Peace Treaty 
signed in 1947, Romania accepted the obligation to set free all persons held in 
confinement on account on their activities in favour of the United Nations, and not to take 
any future measures incompatible with this purpose. Although Britain had previously 
protested against the Romanian Government’s disregard of articles of the Peace Treaty 
guaranteeing for instance freedom of political opinion, it was by then ‘not clear to the 
HMG that it would be helpful to the persons concerned to raise this matter in the United 
Nations’.47 
 
 
Romanians and British envisioned the resumption of bilateral relations quite 
differently in 1956. While the Romanians were adamant about initiating cultural contacts 
and trade, the British referred to the failure of the Romanian government to bring up the 
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issue of the outstanding financial debt.48 Without having the issue of the debt service 
resolved, it would be difficult for the British government to give any encouragement to 
cultural exchanges.49  
British claims against Romania had been the subject of negotiation with the 
Romanian Government since the Second World War. The British authorities refused to 
unlock the Romanian funds located in Britain until an agreement on debt service could be 
reached. They intended to use the blocked funds, worth about 10 million pounds, to cover 
existing Romanian loans then unserviced. Debt service was also understood to include 
money owed to Britons following the nationalisation of what had been private companies. 
An important part of the Romanian funds was used to compensate the British shareholders 
through the nationalization of their assets in Romania.50 Some explanation is required.  
At the end of 1947, the Romanian government had appointed administrators to 
take charge of two large British-owned oil companies ‘Astra Romana’ and ‘Unirea.’ The 
action was launched under the pretext that the two companies had not met the production 
quotas accorded to them in the Romanian four years plan, although the quotas being set at 
an impossibly high figure, the companies protested against that imposition. 51 
Shortly thereafter, in June 1948, a sweeping decree completed the nationalization 
of all enterprises, including the foreign-owned oil companies, metallurgical establishments, 
mines, banks, and insurance companies. The situation in the Romanian oil industry 
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deteriorated in the years that followed. Despite boasts in the local press regarding the 
successful introduction of ‘socialist competitions’ in the oil industry and the surpassing of 
targets, production was maintained at round 11,800 tons per day, running behind the 
programme. “Sovrompetrol” enjoyed a privileged position occupied like the other Sovrom 
companies.52 According to a press article published by Scanteia on 4 November 1949,  
Sovrompetrol has an enormous role to play in reclaiming and developing our oil 
industry which suffered so much from the sabotage of the Anglo-American 
companies. Sovrompetrol brings from the Soviet Union the necessary technical 
equipment for drilling and production –draw works, drill pipe, pipelines, tractors 
etc; it has introduced and continuing to introduce into our oil industry advanced 
working methods – the movement of a drilling rig in two days instead of 30; it has 
put into application a perfect system of organization of work. At the beginning of 
the month of October Sovrompetrol had fulfilled the drilling plan by 125% and 
the production plan by 101%. 53 
 
The claims on behalf of British oil companies for oil supplied to Russia as 
reparations at the end of the war had been rejected by the Romanian government. In 1951 
the British were considering invoking a special disputes procedure within the framework of 
the United Nations. Article thirty-three of the Romanian Peace Treaty  
laid down that if agreement cannot be reached with the Romanian government the 
claims shall be referred to the three heads of mission in Bucharest. If the Soviet 
minister refused to co-operate, we could, under the Treaty, invite the Secretary-
General of the UN to appoint an arbitrator and would probably obtain a 
favourable judgement. But without Soviet cooperation we should receive no 
satisfaction, whatever the UN arbitrator might decide.54 
This mechanism, therefore, did not seem likely to work. Reprisal remained an option. 
 
In reprisal, therefore, Romanian assets in Britain were seized in accordance with 
Article twenty-seven of the Peace Treaty with Romania concluded in 1947 and were 
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distributed to certain British claimants between 1955 and 1957. The total amount 
distributed came to 7.6 million pounds.55 
When Anglo-Rumanian negotiations opened in February 1955, the British claims 
presented to the Romanians were for 180 million pounds, of which 112 million pounds 
represented the nationalisation and Peace Treaty claims of the British oil companies, and 
thirty-seven million represented bonded debt. The British agreed to accept two million 
pounds in respect of the miscellaneous claims worth thirty million pounds, to leave bonded 
debts to the side, and defer settlement of the oil companies’ claims until the two million 
pounds had been paid. Negotiations were adjourned because the Romanian Government 
insisted that the oil companies’ Peace Treaty claims should be covered by the global 
settlement of two million pounds, and that nationalisation claims should not be raised for 
twenty years. 56 
The date set for resumption of talks on the critical financial issues was set for 16 
April 1956.57 A Romanian delegation left Bucharest in the morning of 14 April with the 
purpose of concluding a commercial agreement and solving financial problems.58 The 
Romanian position was that the debt issue could be settled within the scope of an overall-
all trade agreement. Essentially, Romania would pay off its debt in kind, and in oil. The 
British intention was to assess compensation on a monetary basis and not in the form of oil 
delivered over a period of years.  
British intransigence probably owed something to the discovery that the 
Romanians were also coquetting with the Americans. London was not simply shocked, but 
angry. ‘We might surely have expected that the Americans would have informed us of this 
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when we consulted them about our own negotiation. We should be glad to learn what line 
the Americans intend to take.’59 The American Legation admitted that the Romanians put 
forward a proposal on 7 March in a note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the State 
Department: the discussion on Romanian assets in the United States, the claims on 
Romania and possible means of improving trade relations were mentioned. Although 
suggesting discussion in Bucharest on outstanding financial and economic questions 
including trade, debts and oil and other claims,60 the Romanian note of 7 March was very 
guarded, in that it stated that Romania was prepared to discuss ‘some American claims,’ 
without being more specific. There was no specific reference to the claims of the United 
States oil companies on Romania.61 The State Department was ‘very sympathetic’ with 
efforts to work out a trade agreement, which included a settlement of oil claims and hoped 
that an agreement could be reached ‘on a reasonable monetary value’ to be placed on 
expropriated property.62 About half of the US claims estimated at 88,000,000 American 
dollars had been filled by Standard Oil of New Jersey and other American companies that 
had large stakes in the Ploiesti oilfields.63 Although inclined to reply favourably, the 
American Government opposed payment of the claims in oil since such payment may have 
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offered encouragement to other countries contemplating nationalization of oil industries.’64 
The fact that ‘not a single word’ of this impending negotiation had been mentioned to them 
made the British indignant. 65 They considered 
. . . whether to make a shindy with the State Department and we did in fact, see 
them again today. They were red-faced and apologetic but it transpired, in 
discussion, that there is really nothing in the latest US/Romanian exchange which 
affects the oil debts position... now that we have the full story, it is clear that 
nothing has been done which would prejudice our current negotiations and, more 
especially, the oil aspect. The State Department, in an endeavour to dispose of 
public misapprehension, will be issuing a press statement probably tonight or 
tomorrow, summarising the terms of the US reply to the Romanians. 66 
 
The United States had not entered into trade agreements for exchange of specific 
commodities as the European nations frequently did, the Americans maintained. Normal 
commercial exchanges were freely carried out by American commercial interests without 
government intervention. ‘This was really put in more as a piece of propaganda than 
anything else,’ the British Ambassador to Washington commented. 67 
The State Department informed the Petroleum Attaché that no Government 
official was planning any trip to Bucharest and they ‘would certainly not do so without 
consulting the State Department’.68 The British and the American oil companies ‘did not 
see eye to eye in that the amounts at stake were different. Shell’s interest in the acquisition 
of crude was greater than Jersey’s and the latter had already written off most of their 
Romanian assets.’69 
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When negotiations with the Romanians were resumed on April 18, 1956, the 
British miscellaneous claims had risen to about thirty-five million pounds, as a result of the 
completion by the Foreign Compensation Commission of their registration; a figure of 
eight million pounds was placed on the non-oil nationalisation claims and a figure of 4.2 
million pounds on the non-oil Peace treaty claims.70 The FO list of nationalisation claims 
included private shareholdings in Romanian oil companies and outstanding oil royalties 
amounting to about one million pounds.71  
While the Romanian delegation was dissatisfied with the pace of the negotiations, 
the British view was that the Romanians were not prepared for a settlement of debts, 
especially for compensation for the nationalisation of the oil industry. ‘No progress was 
made in the trade negotiations because the Romanians mainly wanted to sell us oil and the 
oil companies would not buy it without some agreement about compensation for 
nationalisation.’ 72 
Negotiations were adjourned in August 1956 without any offer made by the 
Romanian delegation.73 Failure arose also from British insistence that any trade 
arrangement was contingent on a satisfactory settlement of the debts.74 
Failure of economic negotiations, notwithstanding, the British admitted that the 
Romanians had been ‘less disagreeable in the past two years in their treatment of the 
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British Legation at Bucharest’.75 As well, a number of ‘minor but unprecedented civilities’ 
such as the celebration of the anniversary of William Shakespeare, the laying of wreaths at 
the British Cemetery at Snagov and the extremely friendly reception given to the two 
British MPs accompanying the ‘Harlequins’ Rugby Team attested to the change in 
attitude.76 The thaw ceased however towards the end of the year. 
During the opening phase of the Hungarian uprising the Romanian press 
attempted to ignore what was going on in the neighbouring country. When events had 
developed to the point that it could no longer be ignored, the Romanian press and radio 
reproduced Soviet contentions about the ‘reactionary’ Hungarian movement and the 
‘Imperialists spies’ parachuted into Hungary. 77 The Government’s messages and speeches 
also took the Soviet line that a movement by Hungarian workers had been exploited by 
‘fascist reactionary elements encouraged by Western Powers’.78  
Concerned about the effect of Western broadcasts, both in revealing inconvenient 
facts about the internal situation and in telling the Romanians the truth about the events in 
Hungary, the Romanian authorities condemned Western ‘slanders.’79 Statements reported 
by Radio Free Europe and other broadcasts were extracted and protested. Romanian 
protests, however, served mainly to confirm accounts of significant unrest. ‘By protesting 
so much and so elaborately the Romanian authorities had in effect helped to confirm the 
stories of unrest amongst students and others. It was also clear that arrests of students have 
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been taking place, and that the whole repressive machinery of the State is being turned 
upon them.’80 
In Timisoara, a city close to the Hungarian border, students succeeded in 
organizing a meeting during which a list of requests similar to that of the Hungarian 
students was read.81 Romanian authorities arrested the students taking part in the meeting. 
The following day, students gathered in the centre of the city, asking for the release of their 
colleagues. The demonstration was brutally repressed: the students were loaded into trucks 
and taken to unused military barracks. There they were required to sign ‘declarations of 
desolidarisation’ to be allowed to continue their studies.82 
At this juncture, Romanian counter-propaganda revived all the old catch phrases 
and allegations of the early Cold-War period. The slight thaw vanished as the Romanian 
media relapsed into the previous familiar routine.83 Western press and radio, particularly 
‘the hated Radio Free Europe, ’ were reviled as ‘the agents of the Imperialists and fascist 
warmongers, responsible for inciting reactionary elements in Hungary to commit excesses 
against the true sons of the people and for attempting to divert attention from Western 
aggression in the Middle East.’ The disproportion between the news published by the 
Western newspapers or broadcast by Western radio stations, and the offence taken by the 
Romanians was remarkable.84 The authorities organized meetings by students, workers and 
intellectuals during which, speeches and resolutions condemned the ‘slanders of the 
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Western press and radio’ and expressed their support to the Hungarian Government and the 
Soviets in suppressing the ‘counter-revolutionary’ forces.85 The on-going debacle of the 
Suez intervention provided an opportunity to attempt to deflect criticism.  
Taken aback by the virulence of the Romanian reaction, the BBC assured British 
diplomats in Bucharest of the accuracy of its reports and instanced its reputation for 
integrity. It was not its intention to provoke the Romanian regime or encourage the 
Romanians ‘into a revolt we cannot support.’ In commenting on Romania, they had tried to 
give as honest a picture as they could, without encouraging wild optimism. At the same 
time, it was not the BBC’s intention to suggest that nothing in the Communist world could 
ever change. The BBC felt it better to stress ‘the concessions or expedients forced upon the 
Communist rulers by their subjects’ than to paint a picture of ‘Communist regimes 
ruthlessly efficient and masters of every possible situation.’ 86   
Meanwhile, while it protested, the Romanian authorities were also vigorous in 
taking steps to ensure that what had happened in Hungary was not repeated in Romania. 
Guards were established on public buildings and policemen patrolled the streets. 
Opposition to the regime continued to be dealt with in the usual way by arrests and internal 
deportations. A new wave of imprisonments followed the uprisings at the end of October 
when students from major universities were involved in actions which challenged the 
Communist regime.87 There were also disturbances among peasants but no coordination 
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between the various social strata so the authorities succeeded in repressing quickly all 
unrests. As well, the government took steps to meet the most pressing popular economic 
grievances. To appease the population a series of decrees increasing wages and pensions 
were published. 88 
What is very striking about this passage is that the British representatives in 
Bucharest tended to disbelieve the Western press reports, BBC assurances notwithstanding. 
This was just another proof of how isolated they had become, without reliable contacts and 
with limited ability to travel within the country.  ‘Inaccurate or unconvincing news’, they 
suggested, was ‘liable to discourage those Romanians who were relying on Western 
broadcasts to keep them in touch with world events and to maintain their hope for the 
future.’89 The British Minister, Dudley, doubted reports that the Army was ‘on the verge of 
revolt.’ The reports, of course, were accurate. He cannot be blamed for his ignorance, since 
he encountered difficulties getting answers from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs even to 
the simplest questions and had no other means of ascertaining what was going on. Dudley 
himself observed that it was no coincidence that the institutions and cities where official 
meetings had been organised to protest against the ‘hostile broadcasts’ had for the most 
part been those where unrest had been reported. Most of them took place in the region 
adjoining the Hungarian border, where the local population was most aware of, and 
inspired by, the Hungarian example.90 
British diplomats also tended to regard anti-Communist risings behind the Iron 
Curtain as futile. The process of detente and of the ‘liberalisation’ of the Soviet bloc were 
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considered to be mutually supporting, and ‘the long-term result would be the erosion of the 
Communist dogma and the relaxation of Cold War tensions’.91 
The thaw was most surely over. ‘Whatever the far-reaching political implications 
of the Hungarian coup, our immediate reaction was an unbearable bitter-sweetness,’ the 
correspondent of the Associated Press, by then a detainee for seven years, recalled. 
‘Hearing of Suez and that Hungary was an open issue at UNO we joyfully assumed that a 
hypocritical compromise between East and West would not be possible. But this could 
only mean more tension and for us directly, a further decrease of our already remote 
chance of freedom. Undoubtedly, all of this was related to our catastrophic re-isolation.’92 
Hopes for more extensive contacts were, for the moment, placed on hold.  Travel 
relaxations ended and all applications made by Western diplomats for travel were now 
turned down. Even ordinary representations on consular matters were now received in a 
very cool and non-committal way. 93 The nadir was reached as the Egyptian crisis unfolded 
and as Soviet troops moved to crush what was now the Hungarian revolution.94 Romania’s 
rulers did not permit anything to happen ‘which might embarrass their Soviet masters’.95 
‘Circumstances had become abnormal again in all the Satellites,’ the Foreign Office noted, 
and ‘whatever turn political events may take now and whatever may be the solution of the 
Egyptian crisis,’ the brief relaxation of tension was over and there was nothing the British 
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could do about.96 Romania continued to remain ‘as amenable a Soviet satellite as ever and . 
. . there is very little risk of serious opposition to the regime developing.’97   
For the remainder of the decade, relations remained uncomfortably frigid. 
Surveillance of diplomatic missions continued. The visit of the British Minister, Scott Fox 
to Transylvania was ‘facilitated’ by a clerk of the Ministry of Interior who accompanied 
him at all times, pretending to be a representative of the People’s Council.98 Occasional or 
cultural contacts were, once again, almost unknown, and Romania seemed once more a 
strange, hostile and unknown land. ‘How is the weather like in Sofia?’ a Romanian student 
was asked during his visit in Britain in 1957. Stefan Barlea, a student representing the 
Romanian students’ association, took the question first as a premeditated offence. He then 
realized ‘how little the British knew about Romania.’ 99 
Very few Westerners ventured to travel to Romania. Why should they? Getting a 
visa to enter the country was an adventure itself. In 1959, a Canadian businessman 
complained that he was subjected to a ‘long and exhausting interrogation’ at the Romanian 
legation in London before being granted a Romanian visa. He was lucky to have obtained 
one. Many journalists who wished to travel to Romania for tasks related to their profession 
were refused. The Canadian succeed only because he was a businessman with high 
connections and experience in dealing with Communists.100 
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After many years of embargoes and other political barriers to trade, British 
businessmen as well as travellers only gradually began to rediscover Romania. Some few 
western firms were given leave to open offices in Romania.101 Travel to Romania, 
however, remained unusual. The principal impediment was probably not just the difficulty 
in obtaining permission, but the fact that in its communist configuration Romania had lost 
whatever attractiveness it might have once enjoyed. Arriving in Bucharest in the summer 
of 1967, A British writer noted enchanted that Britain had no bad association for 
Romanians. ‘It had very few associations at all.’102 Two decades of isolation did not leave 
their mark: they erased whatever mark there might have once been. 
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Divergent aims: detainees’ release versus cultural exchanges 
 
 
‘It is impossible to bring to Mr. Bulganin’s notice every 
unfortunate victim of Communism who had previously deserved 
well of the Allied cause’. (T. G. Ward, Permanent Undersecretary at 
the Foreign Office). 103  
   
  ‘This business of the detainees in Romania is simply 
becoming a ritual of question and answer between the Legation 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Meanwhile, we go ahead with 
encouragement to the Roumanian authorities to take up 
scholarships and otherwise engage in cultural relations.’104  
 
 
 
  
Although the Romanians’ insistence on cultural contacts with the West appeared to 
the British as being ‘a manifestation of the policy crystallised at the 20th Party Congress in 
Moscow,’ 105 the Soviets had in fact advised the Romanians ‘not to go too far’ in their 
relations with the West for this could provoke damage to the entire Socialist camp. The 
opening of reading rooms in Bucharest would only serve French and American interests, 
‘especially if they are going to be served by American and French personnel.’ Perceived 
enemies would take advantage of the entry to place their agents there. The Americans were 
interested in propagating ‘the American way of life in order to win public opinion,’ the 
Soviets warned.106 
                                                 
103
 TNA, PRO, FO 371/122694, N R 1015/ 8, FO minute, 23 April 1956, T. G. Ward, Permanent 
Undersecretary, to the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Reading. ‘We have, it is true, proposed to 
put in a word for the imprisoned leaders of the Polish Home (Underground) army,’ Ward admitted, adding 
‘but they were our allies,’ implying that the question of the Romanians who served the Allies’ cause during 
the Second World War was given probably to much importance. 
104
 TNA, PRO, BW 53/17, CF/RU/680/1, DDG to Controller Overseas ‘C’, British Council, 31 
August 1960. 
105
 TNA, PRO, FO 371/122750, NR 1801/13, MacDermot, British Embassy Bucharest, to the 
Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, 17 May 1956. 
106
 The Soviets also expressed concern at the printing plan for Soviet literature which was reduced 
to half compared to the previous year. The Romanians replied to the Soviet Minister in Bucharest referring to 
the ‘enormous number of translations from Russian literature.’ RNA, Department of Foreign Relations, 
Dossier 73/1957, ff. 1-2; 5-11. 
134 
 
The Romanian regime combined openness with caution. From the time of his 
installation, on 7 March 1956, the new Romanian Minister in London, N. Korcinschi, was 
very active in contacting the local authorities. At his insistence the Lord Mayors of 
Birmingham and Leeds and the Mayor of Kensington visited Romania. He advocated 
fervently cultural exchanges and promoted ‘major cultural manifestations’ and exchanges 
of delegations but the moment the British mentioned re-opening of the British Council 
Office in Bucharest, he adopted a ‘completely Molotov-like attitude’.107 
A British Council Institute functioned in Bucharest before the Second World War 
for a short period; opened in 1938, it closed down in the autumn of 1939 when the Council 
staff was ordered to leave the country. 108 New political circumstances after the Second 
World War made the reopening uncertain; although the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Pauker, did not object in the first instance to the opening of a British Council in Bucharest, 
her reply was evasive and non-committal’.109 Britain, however, pushed the resumption of 
Council activity, and a Representative, T. E. Morray, was sent to Bucharest in October 
1947. He began to hire local staff. A single thing had yet to be obtained: the Romanian 
authorities’ agreement. Negotiations for the establishment of the Council in Bucharest 
seemed to be prolonged indefinitely. London advised Morray to ‘restrain his impatience at 
the absence of any evidence of his mission being successful,’ stay on in Romania ‘as long 
as he is tolerated’ and do ‘what useful work he can in patience.’ If it became necessary 
under pressure from the Romanian Government to withdraw him, ‘then we should come 
out altogether, as in Russia’.110 
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 When the blunt answer denying permission came in December 1947, 111 Morray 
suggested that he commence cultural work under diplomatic cover as an adjunct to the 
Information Office of the Legation.112 Another option was to work through a Professor 
appointed to the University of Bucharest.113 The search for ‘a suitable incumbent’ for the 
Chair of English began 114 but soon the Romanian Ministry of Education informed the 
Embassy that the vacancy at the University was suspended making any search for a 
Professor futile. 115 
Morray’s proposal for handing the Council affairs over to the Information Office 
or to other part of the Legation was initially deprecated, and for good reason.116 ‘We 
maintain in our relations with all the Soviet-dominated countries that we are a separate 
entity from the Embassy.’117 However, after Morray’s recall on 23 February 1948, his 
functions were transferred to the Information Officer, John Bennet, ‘prepared to act as our 
agent.’118 This decision was based on the fact that ‘the Division attached great importance 
to keeping one foot in Romania so that we can move in there as soon as there is the 
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slightest opportunity to do so.’119 The fact that Pauker stated in March that ‘the possibility 
of a British Council Centre being set up was not definitely excluded for all time,’ may have 
also contributed to this compromise. 120 
When the appointment of a British lecturer at the University of Bucharest was 
broached, the Romanian Foreign Minister replied that the Government was reconsidering 
the whole educational system. Romania needed ‘technical professors,’ lecturers on 
engineering, agriculture, medicine, not ‘experts in philosophy’.121 However, when the 
Council’s proposed the visit by an expert on malariology to Bucharest and offered to pay 
for the expenses for a member of the Cantacuzino Institute to visit Britain during the 
summer of 1948, the Romanian government refused them both. The refusal closed the door 
on any sort of cultural or scientific exchanges or visits between Britain and Romania.122 
In 1956 while the Romanians were enthusiastic about resuming cultural relations, 
the British reminded them of a barrier to the establishment of friendlier relations: their 
former employees, who had worked to facilitate cultural exchange, were still 
imprisoned.123 Although the Foreign Office could not use any leverage to obtain the release 
of these unfortunates, it was not just that the Romanians showed little interest in any 
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agreement, the Treasury and the Board of Trade opposed any attempt to use commercial 
and financial discussions as a lever to obtain concessions in certain cases.124 
The announcement of the Soviet leaders’ visit to London, at the height of the 
thaw, generated an avalanche of letters addressed to the Foreign Office, asking for 
intervention on behalf of certain individuals; among them, one from Karl Viktor of Wied, 
indicating the situation of his sister, Eleonora Bunea. She had worked in the Press Office 
of the British Legation for four years. When she realized that she could not legally leave 
Romania, Bunea attempted, together with her husband and other colleagues, to flee. The 
group was caught immediately and its members were probably the victims of a trap. 
Arrested in July 1949, Bunea was tried the following year together with the group and 
found guilty of high treason and espionage. She received one of the most severe sentences: 
fifteen years imprisonment. 125 At the time Viktor’s letter was received by the Foreign 
Office, therefore, Bunea had spent over seven years in gaol and was ill with tuberculosis. 
Her brother asked for her release on humanitarian grounds.126 Her name was included in 
the list handed by Sir William Hayter, the British Ambassador to Moscow, to Andrei 
Gromyko,127 and the case was brought to the notice of Bulganin and Khrushchev. Princess 
Alice, countess of Athlone, also appealed to the Foreign Office for Bunea’s release. 
Eleonore was a princess herself, related to the Romanian Royal family through her father, 
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Prince Wilhelm of Wied, the former King of Albania. All the endeavours for her release 
were in vain: ill, Eleonore died in prison in 1957 when she was only 47 years old.128 
Another member of the group was a journalist, Liviu Nasta, correspondent of the 
New York Times.129 Nasta was also accused of espionage, and figured in a list of agents and 
traitors as the main collaborator of the British in Romania in the early days of the war,130 a 
circumstance which brought him a harsh sentence: 25 years imprisonment. His health got 
worse in prison. ‘[H]e suffered intense pain from an untreated stomach ulcer and in the 
filthy, crowded conditions his resistance was slowly ground away. Six months before he 
died in a state of utter exhaustion, he would wake and tell everyone in the cell: “You know, 
Churchill has asked for me, I shall be freed in a day or two.” In the end he could neither 
walk nor keep his food down nor recognize the people around him. 131 
Churchill had indeed written a letter to Gheorghiu-Dej asking for Nasta’s release 
on humanitarian grounds. Nasta’s daughter was married in Britain to William Deakin, 
Warden at Oxford College, and a former counsellor to Churchill. The family tried other 
channels to encourage clemency, including the Red Cross132 and Tito whom Gheorghiu-
Dej visited in October 1956.133 For several months, despatches from London to the British 
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Legation in Bucharest and further to the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs routinely 
enquired about the chance of Nasta’s amnesty. None of the interventions spurred any 
reaction from the Romanian authorities, except for the information that Churchill’s letter 
had been received and read by Gheorghiu-Dej.134 
Such occurrences made the British question the ‘false bonhomie’ of the Romanian 
officials. There was little chance that Britain would respond positively to proposals for 
cultural exchanges no matter how eagerly advocated by Romanian officials, while previous 
employees remained in prison. Although a ‘somewhat different line’ had been adopted 
towards the Soviet Union, there was no reason for letting the Romanians ‘have what they 
want on their own terms.’135   
In 1959 the Romanian Institute for Cultural Affairs with Foreign Countries 
[IRRCS]136 submitted to the British Council a request for collaboration, following an 
invitation coming from the British Minister in Bucharest.137 The Romanians formerly 
working for the British Council were still in gaol. ‘Since they can have worked for the 
Council only for a few weeks in 1948 the disproportionate nature of the punishment is only 
too clear.’138  
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‘This introduces a new major factor in our relations with the Satellites’, J. 
Graham, Director of the East Europe Department of the British Council maintained. He 
suggested that the British Council should send ‘an interim reply stating that the problems 
raised by their letter are being studied. We should at the same time inform the Foreign 
Office of our difficulty.’...139 
For quite apart from moral aspects, there are clear public relations implications – 
the public, the press and Parliament would be incensed if it were known that in 
our eagerness to obtain a cultural foothold in Satellite countries we were prepared 
to ignore all reference to present victimization of ex employees whose only fault 
was that they had served us well for a few weeks nearly eleven years ago.140 
 
Why was the Romanian regime adamant about development of cultural contacts? 
Was it because the leadership wanted to obtain even ‘minimum possible dividend’ from 
any superficial cultural exchanges? Did they suppose that they would gain ‘additional 
respectability’ both in the eyes of the Romanians and foreigners? 141  
While the French concluded in 1959 a cultural agreement with the Romanians, the 
British were not interested in signing Cultural Conventions with any of the Soviet Bloc 
countries. London considered such agreements to be ‘a sort of meaningless window-
dressing that appeals to Communist regimes’.142 ‘We see no reason to indulge them in this 
respect unless we get some worthwhile quid-pro-quo,’ it was resolved within the Cultural 
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Relations Department of the Foreign Office.143 The Legation was instructed to take the line 
that any such things were premature. ‘Our present view is that, quite apart from the serious 
practical and financial difficulties, this is better left over until the Romanians have begun 
to show greater goodwill in cultural matters.’144 
Although insisting at every opportunity on improved cultural relations, the 
Romanians failed to put forward suggestions for cultural exchanges. ‘[R]unning true to 
form by taking their cue from the Russians’ on wider contacts with the Western countries,’ 
they did not translate this aspiration ‘into something more tangible, particularly in cultural 
and economic matters’.145 They may have been inhibited by the dusty answer to their 
proposals for the resumption of trade and financial negotiations. Romanian inertia made 
the Foreign Office decide to take the initiative in discussing the general question of cultural 
relations ‘before the atmosphere deteriorated further’.146 While the British Council resolved 
that it was unable to collaborate with an agency of the Romanian Government while ex-
employees were still incarcerated, the Foreign Office tended to view this argument as 
irrelevant. 147 Apparently, ‘Foreign Office policy considerations’ were allowed to override 
the British Council arguments.148 
According to the British Council, establishing relations without overt reference to 
imprisoned ex-employees was like proclaiming to the Romanians ‘that we are prepared to 
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swallow anything.’ Two factors prohibited any direct cultural contacts between the British 
Council and the Romanian Institute for Cultural Affairs: ‘the nature of our expulsion from 
Romania in 1949’ and the fact that Romanians working for the British Council were still in 
gaol after nearly ten years.149 While agreeing to indirect cultural exchanges which were 
subject to changes, the British Council asked the British Minister in Bucharest to underline 
for the Romanians the importance it ascribed to the release of its ex-employees. 150  
When Ambassador Scott Fox raised the issue, he was assured that the Romanian 
Ministry of the Interior would be reviewing the cases in which the British were interested. 
Although the amnesty decreed on 23 August 1959 did not apply to the sort of offences with 
which the British Council’s former employees were charged, he might consider releases on 
other grounds such as individual good behaviour. ‘This may or may not lead to the release 
of one or two of the Council’s former employees; but, however it goes, I shall keep up the 
pressure here for a clean sweep of all these cases,’ Scott Fox reported.151 Clemency for the 
detainees who had worked for the British and Americans was mentioned in a note of the 
Ministry of the Interior as likely to encourage an ‘atmosphere propitious for the 
improvement of relations with the Capitalist countries’. 152 
One hundred and nineteen persons indicted for their connection with Britain 
remained imprisoned in 1959, according to Romanian statistics.153 Some of them had been 
released in 1955 just to be re-incarcerated shortly thereafter for spreading prohibited 
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publications or carrying on clandestine trade.154 Such was the case of Rose Frances 
Sussman. Arrested in February 1954 and condemned for espionage, she was released in 
October 1955 -- probably during the amnesty preceding Romania’s admission into the 
United Nations – and was re-arrested three years later for having sold items on the black-
market..155 Gheorghe Balica and Anna Borbath were also condemned in 1958 for 
clandestine trade.156 Commonly, the new indictment was related to selling personal goods 
to survive.  These individuals were caught up during a wave of persecution directed against 
the former bourgeoisie. By prohibiting the sale of any items on the so-called ‘black 
market’, the authorities denied any means of survival to the members of the bourgeoisie 
not already imprisoned.157 One victim of the regime later recalled: ‘[o]ur class of people 
was never forgiven and any releases were only temporary. They were inevitably hauled 
back even though years after. During that twenty-two months in my first cell eight hundred 
people went home and about half of these returned again.158 
Until the end of 1954 and the signing of the Vienna State Treaty, terror continued 
inside the prisons as outside them. Kirschen, the Associated Press correspondent recalled: 
There was a distinct revolutionary period which differed from the blood bath of 
the Russian revolution only in the methods of extermination . . . We were 
encouraged to die of our own free will although we were not allowed to commit 
suicide or die from hunger-striking . . . the order had been to kill us off as quickly 
as possible but without marks of physical cruelty. Starving or working to death 
was the general directive. The inhumanity in Roumanian prisons and working 
colonies reached extremes in the winters of 1951 to 1952 and 1952 to 1953 . . . 
The warders were told that we were bandits, the dregs of society and that we had 
been trying to steal those good things from them which the new regime was now 
providing. They were told to shout at us, to swear at us, to use the stick whenever 
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possible and to give us days of solitary confinement for nothing whatever, in order 
to enforce discipline and prevent any possibility of our gaining courage.159 
 
In November 1959 the British Minister reported that the Romanians were about to 
approach the British Council for a settlement of past differences.160 Though, there was no 
clear answer coming from the Romanians on the issue of detainees. In March 1960 the 
British Council resolved that the time had come for an approach on the detainee problem 
considerably more explicit than previously.161 They were determined not go further in their 
modest programme for Romania until an explicit request was made by the Legation on 
their behalf.162 The issue of the former employees detained had become just ‘a ritual of 
question and answer between the Legation and the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’, 
whereas it remained an issue of great importance for the British Council.  
Either we must take this controversy seriously or we must realistically call it a day 
and decide to proceed with the development of cultural relations as if this obstacle 
did not exist. . . . If the Foreign Office think that we are making too much fuss and 
wish us to get on with cultural relations they must tell us so, and we must consider 
whether or not we are going to adopt their view.    .  . .163 
  
The view of the Foreign Office remained that ‘immediate ends are more important 
than the misfortunes of ex British Council staff. In a way they are right in the same way 
that a general should not be turned from an important objective by the thought of the 
hardship to be borne by the troops taking part.’ What made the British Council indignant 
however was its conviction that the position of its former staff was treated ‘as a routine 
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hoary representation that has from time to time to be made by the Legation, but without 
any real conviction behind it’.164 
In March 1960 the correspondent of the Associated Press Agency, Leonard 
Kirschen, and a Romanian citizen of British nationality, Valentin Sarry were released. 
Sarry had been arrested in 1949 for espionage and condemned to fifteen years 
imprisonment.165 Kirschen was accused by the Romanian authorities of espionage. He had 
been allegedly recruited by Colonel Harold Gibson and was accused of having provided 
military and economic information to Robinson from the British legation and of having 
recommended individuals to be recruited as agents. The accusations brought him a harsh 
sentence: twenty five years imprisonment.166 The Foreign Office and the Associated Press 
Agency intervened repeatedly for Kirschen’s release. The latter refused to appoint a new 
correspondent in Bucharest or make public any news concerning Romania until he was 
released.167 Kirschen’s uncle appealed to the Great Men of the days, Eisenhower and 
Churchill. Learning about the Soviet leaders’ visit in Britain in 1956, he lobbied the 
Foreign Office on the assumption that the Romanians would act on the Soviet leaders’ 
orders whose intervention the British would be able to obtain.168 After being released both 
men left Romania for Britain immediately.169 
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Although it represented a ‘stumbling-block’ to a limited resumption of cultural 
relations with Romania, the new Director of the East Europe Department was not sure that 
locally-employed Council staffs were arrested and still in prison. She was determined to 
establish whether that ‘oral tradition’ was based ‘on fact or fantasy’. 170 Since many files 
had been destroyed when the Information Section was removed from Bucharest nobody 
could provide a full list of former employees.171 
 
The British Minister in Bucharest announced on 2 December 1960 the release of 
‘a considerable number of political detainees’ meanwhile indicating that the Romanian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was on the point of submitting proposals for increasing cultural 
exchanges. Reports of recent releases ‘might portend some good news for the detainees in 
whom we had a special interest,’ the British Ambassador told to a Romanian official. The 
latter replied however that he not heard anything about a special measure of clemency, 
although, the Ministry of Interior was authorised to examine individual cases and to remit 
sentences where appropriate. ‘He promised to enquire again how matters were progressing 
and to inform me on the result of his enquiries in due course. I have since heard a rumour 
which I shall endeavour to confirm that two sisters formerly employed by the United States 
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legation and ourselves are among those who have now been released.’172 This was however 
just a rumour.  
Although the British Council postponed the offer of scholarships for which 
provision had already been made in the budget, the British Ambassador continued to make 
efforts to persuade the Romanians to agree to cooperate in arranging short visits and to 
allow one or two people to take up the offer of scholarships. He recommended to London 
that a similar provision be included in the future.173 For 1961, the British Council allocated 
a budget of 1,300 pounds to Romania. Of this, 580 pounds was set aside for two 
scholarships; the remaining amount remained unallocated. Expenditure depended to a large 
extent ‘on whether the problem of the alleged imprisonment of Council local staff could be 
solved in the near future’.174 
In February 1961, the Foreign Office decided to step up cultural contacts with all 
the Soviet Satellites as ‘one of the few ways in which we can make our influence felt’.  
We no longer insist on linking a cultural exchange programme with the cessation 
of jamming since it is clear that that would be an effective bar to progress. Nor do 
we consider it in our best interests to postpone further developments with 
Romania until all the former British employees are again at liberty. 175  
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The fact that some people had been released was considered enough for ‘making a 
start’. Accordingly, the British Ambassador submitted to the Romanian Foreign Ministry 
an unofficial note of British Council undertakings for 1961/2 and invited the Romanians to 
submit to him a note of their own proposals for cultural exchanges. The British Council 
had at their disposal 20,000 pounds for all four Satellites in 1961. Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia came first on the list, followed by Bulgaria, ‘where the authorities have 
proved unexpectedly cooperative’. The Romanians came last. 176 The programme of 
cultural exchanges included two scholarships offered to post-graduate students, summer 
courses and visits of specialists. The British Council was still reluctant to admit a regular 
cultural agreement in treaty form or through an exchange of letters. 177 
Until we are able to develop cultural exchanges on a wider scale, we are not 
prepared to conclude such agreements with any of the Satellites. Nor can we 
accept an exchange programme on a basis of reciprocity as the Romanians 
contemplate. It is one thing to do this with a country of equal stature like the 
Soviet Union, but quite unrealistic to expect us to deal on equal cultural terms 
with a country like Romania whose cultural, scientific and intellectual 
achievements evoke very limited interest in Britain and whose academic 
institutions have little appeal for British students. 178   
  
The issue of the former employees imprisoned was approached by the new 
Minister in Bucharest, J. Dalton Murray, on the occasion of presenting his credentials to 
Gheorghiu-Dej in October 1961. A release would contribute to the further improvement of 
relations between the two countries, Murray pointed out.179 In a letter to the Minister of 
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Foreign Affairs, Corneliu Manescu, Murray referred to the promises made in June 1961 to 
his predecessor, Scott Fox, concerning the former employees of the legation, and 
mentioned Constantin Mugur, Paul Bandu, Annie Samuelli, Gheorghe Gelu Balica, Ion 
Vorvoreanu, Ludwig Parvu, Sergiu Godeanu180 and Maria Golescu as individuals in whom 
the British retained particular interest.181 
Annie Samuelly and her sister, Nora, who worked for the British Press Office and 
the American Press Office respectively condemned to twenty years imprisonment for 
espionage, were released during the year 1961.182 At the end of 1961 Constantin Mugur,183 
one time chief of the Romanian staff of the British library, and sentenced to life 
imprisonment was also released.184 Paul Bandu was released in 1962, as were Balica, 
Parvu, Gheorghe Radulescu, Radu Florescu185 and Elvira Olteanu.186 Bandu, a student at 
the time he served as a courier between the British Consul in Constanta and the legation in 
Bucharest, was arrested in 1949 and charged with espionage.187 Maria Golescu, Director of 
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the British Council library in Bucharest, and transferred to the Information Office in 
1948,188 was released ‘with four some others’ on 19 June 1962 after thirteen years of 
imprisonment. She was arrested in 1949 and condemned to twenty years forced labour for 
high treason.189 A few months after being released she was allowed to leave Romania 
together with her mother. By the time Golescu arrived in Britain she was sixty four and her 
aged mother ninety three; all the files concerning her employment had been destroyed and 
the Foreign Office bound by Treasury regulations could do nothing more than pay her a 
small lump sum.190 Among the last political prisoners released in 1964 were the former 
employees of the oil companies. They would not be prevented from leaving Romania, 
Gheorghiu-Dej told Murray.191 
By 1963, the newly appointed British Ambassador to Bucharest, J.D. Murray, 
judged that the issue of the former employees had been essentially resolved.192 He advised 
London not to encourage anti-Romanian publicity at a time when ‘we have, for good 
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reasons, adopted a forward policy towards all the satellites, including Romania’.193 
Indicating the efforts of the Romanian regime to obtain independence from Moscow, 
Murray suggested patience ‘in the hope that, as they achieve more self-confidence, they 
will begin to behave less brutally towards opponents among their own people. They are in 
an extremely sensitive mood at the moment, looking for signs of encouragement from the 
West and perhaps from us in particular, and are unduly upset by adverse publicity.’194 The 
1961 policy paper envisaged a dual approach to the Satellites. ‘While we would try to 
increase contacts of all kinds, this would not preclude us from continuing to expose those 
factors of Satellite policy which were directed against our interests or which we found 
particularly objectionable.’ The point should be made clear in the new Satellite policy 
paper, Murray maintained, suggesting that IRD should take ‘a new look’ at its general 
terms of operation.195 The Ambassador considered that ‘[a] number of things’ which 
happened in Eastern Europe were ‘good in themselves and good from the point of view of 
Britain’s interests’.196  
During the visit of a Romanian delegation to London in 1963, the British avoided 
bringing up sensitive issues. The friendly attitude of the British MPs they met enchanted 
the Romanians. At a reception given by the Romanian Ambassador in London almost 
every speaker mentioned the further development of relations between Britain and 
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Romania, avoiding any controversial ideological issues.197 Privately the MP Gilbert 
Longden mentioned the issue of political prisoners. Their release ‘would not present any 
danger to the regime,’ he assessed since it was firmly established signs of clemency would 
contribute to the improvement of relations between the two countries. Handing the 
Romanians a list of people who had requested visas to leave Romania for Britain, Sir 
Herbert Butcher underlined that the request was grounded not on their disapproval of the 
regime but family reunification.’ 198 
Cultural relations had improved steadily since 1962 when the Cultural Exchange 
Programme was signed. The work of the British Council was supplemented by the East 
Europe Committee with the official aim of developing cultural relations with Eastern 
Europe outside the official programmes. The committee was created in early 1963 under 
the chairmanship of Christopher Mayhew.199 
Application of the exchange agreement was dependent upon the regime’s 
tolerance of the activities of the British Council, which hoped to function with the same 
degree of freedom achieved in Yugoslavia and Poland.200 Apparently the Romanian 
authorities accepted that the Cultural Attaché of the Embassy, David Williams, was a 
Council Officer.201 Williams arrived in Bucharest on 12 September 1964 to take up his 
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appointment. His connections with the British Council were not concealed since the 
Romanian authorities were aware that ‘the Council was the instrument for carrying out 
most of the executive work under the Anglo-Romanians Cultural Agreement.’ 202 That the 
Cultural Attaché was in fact a British Council Officer was ‘entirely familiar to and 
accepted by the Romanian authorities’ who were looking forward to more effective 
cultural cooperation. 
“You are the British Council Representative, aren’t you?,” the Head of the 
Cultural Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked Williams. The 
British Ambassador explained that while Williams was a British Council 
employee seconded to work on cultural matters on the Embassy staff, he should 
not be thought of as the British Council Representative in Bucharest.’203 
 
The Foreign Office seemed to agree to go ‘one further than in Budapest and 
Prague and call him a representative with a capital ‘R’- if the Romanians really do not 
object. It would establish a valuable precedent’.204 There was hope that in the course of 
time it might be possible to negotiate for the establishment of a British Office Council in 
Bucharest ‘separate from and independent of the Embassy’.205 
Although cultural exchanges developed providing for exchanges of postgraduates, 
research workers and specialists of various sorts, 206 the meagre imports of British books 
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and periodicals was a disappointment.207 More vexing were the bureaucratic obstacles that 
impeded the work of the Cultural Attaché.  All his contact with Romanians had to be 
orchestrated through the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.208 ‘In this respect Romania 
is behind all the rest of Eastern Europe with the possible exception of Bulgaria. Not only in 
Budapest and Prague, but also in Moscow members of the Embassy can and do invite 
locals direct to parties. No doubt, the locals have to get permission before accepting, but 
this is their own affair.’ 209 Despite the administrative inefficiency impeding on cultural 
contacts210 the exchange programme was ‘reasonably active’211 and a British lecturer was 
accepted at the Bucharest University.212 
After a decade of isolation the Romanian government approached the West to 
resume cultural ties. That the French and the Americans proved to be more amenable to 
signing formal cultural agreements than the British reluctance stemmed from two issues: 
unwillingness to proceed on an issue of consequence to Romania (culture) before some 
headway had been made in the commercial and financial negotiations important to Britain; 
and a disinclination to create new cultural links while employees associated with previous 
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initiatives remained imprisoned. A compromise emerged in the early 1960s when the 
Foreign Office, brushing aside the British Council whose stance was that the imprisonment 
of their former employees prohibited any direct cultural liaison with Romania, decided on 
the resumption of limited cultural relations with Romania. The Romanians responded by 
releasing, in stages, those individuals in which the British were primarily interested. 
Although the process was slow, by the time most of detainees were released, cultural 
relations were established on solid ground. 
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Looking at Romania through the wrong end of the telescope 
 
 
‘The time for Romania being a hinterland [of 
the Soviet Union] has gone. Romania is now an 
independent and sovereign country which takes 
decisions according to its own interests.’ (Gheorghiu-Dej, 
1963)1 
 
 
Nothing in the political evolution of Romania in the 1950s could have surprised 
the British representatives in Bucharest who wrote their reports without much trouble since 
the Romanian leaders consented to all Soviet policies, following a predictable line.2 In 
London, Romania was perceived as the most subservient of all satellites. No evidence was 
found to contradict this assessment.3 At the beginning of the 1960s the situation changed 
since Romanian leaders were constantly challenging the Soviets. Patrick Gordon Walker, 
the Labour Shadow Foreign Minister, remarked in 1964 that the Sino-Soviet conflict 
enabled other Communist countries to assert their own independence.4  
Romania’s idiosyncratic stance during the long Sino-Soviet dispute was one way 
in which a new desire for independence was asserted. From 1960 Romanians had refused 
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to be drawn into public ostracism of the Chinese.5 Three years later, the Sino-Soviet issue 
had not been resolved and both parties remained intransigent. 
 
In July 1960 the Soviets recalled all their experts from China. The withdrawal of 
the Soviet councillors and the cancellation of economic agreements which resulted in about 
200 enterprises being abandoned was perceived to be a punishment, an economic sanction. 
‘Is this consistent with international socialism?’ the Chinese asked the Romanian 
delegation a few years later. When the Romanians repeated the Soviets’ version that the 
Chinese councillors were put in a delicate situation, the Chinese ‘jumped up and shouted at 
us as if we were Soviets, saying “That is not true... Not even a bourgeois state would do 
what the Soviet Union did to us!”’ 6 
At the beginning of their dispute with the Soviets, the Chinese did not intend to 
make the controversy public. Khrushchev, however, stated that exposing disagreements 
was the Leninist way to clarify any divergence. The Chinese quickly went public 
thereafter.7 The Soviets appear to have believed themselves to be on the defensive and 
assessed that it was the Chinese who refused all compromise. On only two issues did the 
Soviet leadership believe themselves to have no room for manoeuvre: they would never 
give the Chinese the atomic bomb, on the grounds that this would start a world war; and 
they would never abandon the principles of Marxist-Leninism in the face of Maoist 
revisionism. On these issues, likewise, the Chinese were unwilling to compromise, and 
quickly added to the list of disputed items. ‘If others would agree, that’s ok; if not, so be it, 
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the sky won’t fall! Women will continue to give birth to children, birds will fly and fish 
will continue to swim.’8 On 14 June 1963 the Chinese addressed an open letter to the 
Soviets, entitled ‘Proposals concerning the general line of the international communist 
movement,’ It contained twenty five items; the twenty first issue criticized Soviet Bloc 
economic integration. The Chinese intention, very probably, was to fish for support within 
COMECON.9 
From the perspective of Bucharest, Moscow’s position seemed to be a repetition 
of previous acts of bullying. The Sino-Soviet conflict made Gheorghiu-Dej recall the 
earlier split with Yugoslavia, and the ferocious anti-Tito propaganda emanating from 
Moscow at that time. He recalled, as well, the improvement of Romania’s relations with 
the Yugoslavs occasioned by the split. ‘I don’t even remember what we said to the 
Yugoslavs and now we kiss them.’10 He admitted that Romania’s leadership had also 
‘thrown rocks in the Yugoslavians’ heads,’ as required by Moscow, and believed that the 
time of slavish compliance with Soviet demands was over.11 Labels such as ‘Trotskyism,’ 
‘renegade,’ ‘deviationist’ should not be applied to any Communist Party founded on 
Marxism-Leninism principles. A Communist Party should not be excommunicated ‘just 
like that’. ‘Even the Pope does not work this way.’12 There had been a time when Soviet 
requirements were received with great respect’ by the Chinese, the Romanians recalled. 
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How had this ‘love’ turned into hatred?13 Gradually the Soviet and the Chinese positions 
had become irreconcilable. 
It is hardly surprising that the Romanian leadership tended to sympathize with the 
plight of the Peoples’ Republic of China. ‘Our heart shrunk from pain for the leaders of the 
Soviet Communist Party do not behave responsibly’, Gheorghiu-Dej told the Chinese 
Ambassador recalling Khrushchev’s assessments that Mao-Tze-dun’s theories counted as 
much as a broken shoe. Statements like that were made only because a brother party had 
sought to make an independent contribution to socialist theory? ‘Who gave them [the 
Soviets] the monopoly on enriching the Marxism-Leninism?’ Gheorghiu-Dej wondered.14 
The Romanians publicly announced their willingness to mediate the Sino-Soviet 
dispute in 1963. However, understanding Maoist rhetoric proved to be no easy task. How 
should statements like ‘Let all the flowers bloom, all schools compete’ be interpreted? 15 It 
was equally critical to the Romanian leadership that it manoeuvre in such a manner as to 
gain increased independence, rather than a new vassalage. ‘We will not allow in the future 
any backstage talks . . .  we will not accept chewed things, we will chew them ourselves.’16 
The West had to know this. The rumour that Romania now followed the Chinese line was 
just ‘a contrivance of the bourgeois journalists.’ Romania’s leadership acted solely ‘for the 
unity of the socialist camp’ as stated in the Declarations of the Conferences of Communist 
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Parties held in Moscow in 1957 and 1960. 17 To what extent the Romanian delegation’s 
trip to Peking had to do with the unity of the international workers’ movement was another 
issue. 
‘We don’t tell either one or the other to give up their stance,’ Gheorghiu-Dej 
maintained, expanding on the idea of reconcilement. We just say “Let’s create an 
atmosphere for a calm and serious discussion of the divergent issues, so that controversy 
would cease.”18 A party delegation was instructed ‘not to approach the divergent problems, 
but to tell the Chinese leaders that one can discuss within an acceptable framework, 
without invectives, without qualifications that one does not know later how to remove,’ 
went to Peking in March 1964.19 ‘This was the mission of our delegation: the end of public 
polemic’, Gheorghiu-Dej asserted.20 Party documentation, however, is contradicted by 
later accounts. Asked about his mediation in the Sino-Soviet conflict thirty years after the 
visit, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, by then Prime Minister, replied, ‘I did not mediate any 
conflict. Who said that?’ The purpose of his visit was to make the Chinese aware of the 
Romanian policy of getting out of the Soviet hegemony. And even more than that, ‘to 
obtain Chinese support.’ 21  
The strategy of the Romanian leadership in getting closer to the Chinese was 
independence. The Chinese, without knowing that, supposed that the Romanians came to 
convince them about the rightful stance of the Soviets.22 The Romanians were also hesitant 
since Mao received them with aloofness. At the beginning of the visit, the Romanians 
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maintained that they ‘did not want to be superficial and did not come to look for negative 
issues, shortcomings or mistakes, but to see new and interesting things.’ The Chinese 
reacted to such equivocal assurances with curiosity. ‘What do you want from us, Comrade 
Romanians? On what side are you?’ The Romanians had their answer prepared: ‘On the 
side of Marxism.’ 23‘It was easy to make them think that we were closer to their approach 
of Marxism than to the Soviet one,’ the former Romanian Premier, Maurer, assessed. 
According to Maurer there was no great ideological difference between the Chinese and 
the Russians, but a struggle for hegemony.24 His lengthy talks with Zhou Enlai, the 
Chinese prime-minister, allowed him to explain Romanian policy. Yet, the communiqué 
issued by the Chinese at the end of the talks was quite cold, ‘no more than two lines,’ in 
which it was mentioned that discussions took place in a friendly atmosphere.25 
Certainly, the Chinese did not trust the Romanians from the very beginning, 
although they seemed to have understood Romania’s isolations within the Communist 
camp. But the Chinese too needed allies. In the aftermath of the Romanian visit to China, 
the American ambassador in Moscow assessed that Romania had become the most 
important country between Moscow and Peking: the Romanians had accumulated the 
‘richest experience and knowledge’ in approaching China.26 After an unsuccessful attempt 
to approach the Chinese in Warsaw, the Americans were in search of intermediaries to 
elaborate an updated policy concerning China.27 Although Romanians were not China’s 
envoys, the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Corneliu Manescu, suggested that the 
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Americans should appreciate China at fair value and grant it the status it deserved of a 
great power.28  
While involving themselves in the Sino-Soviet conflict, the Romanians were 
careful to maintain neutrality. Relations of the father-son type should not exist between 
parties, Gheorghiu-Dej contended, but mutual respect, rigorous equality and non-
interference in domestic affairs.’ ‘Each party should establish its own line according to the 
country’s interest.’29 While proclaiming the same principles as the Chinese, the Romanians 
were resolute in rejecting both the Soviet or Chinese hegemony. Stalin’s death and 
Khrushchev’s exposure of Stalin’s excesses had destroyed the possibility that Moscow’s 
line would henceforward be followed without hesitation. 
Good Communists as they were, the Romanians continued to pursue friendly 
relations with the Soviet Union30 and despite opposing the establishment of supranational 
bodies, Romania would continue to cooperate within CMEA.31 Nevertheless, pursuit of 
good relations did not mean that differences were not aired. The Romanians’ divergences 
from the Soviets had as source the disagreement aired within CMEA. In 1961, a proposal, 
called the ‘Valev’s proposal’ for a lower Danubian economic complex outraged the 
Romanians. In his speech of 17 January 1961 to the plenary session of the Central 
Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, Khrushchev spoke about irrigation, mentioning 
the work recently completed for the Volga and Nipru deltas. He also mentioned the 
Danube Delta where the work had to be done in agreement with the Romanians for the 
advantage of both the Russians and the Romanians.32 In 1948 Stalin had broached the issue 
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with a Romanian delegation then in Moscow. He was particularly interested in an old 
British project for a canal linking the Danube to the Black Sea. Declaring that the Soviet 
Union would provide Romanians with the equipment for digging the canal, Stalin rejected 
any argument that Gheorghiu-Dej attempted to bring up to oppose the project. Romanian 
media presented the project without mentioning whose idea it was.33 The Canal was also 
an area of contention. Not only did it absorbed a great part of Romania’s revenues, it was 
also a place where many political detainees lost their lives while working in inhumane 
conditions. 
Proposals for greater economic integration and for the institutional articulation of 
CMEA were also troubling Romania’s leaders. Moreover, they were upset for being 
criticized for their determination to industrialize the country. Instead receiving 
encouragement, they had to face unfair comments such as that they would create trucks for 
museums. ‘What then are we allowed to produce?’ Gheorghiu-Dej asked rhetorically.34 
The answer was obvious: everything except industrial products since the Soviets had 
designated for Romania the role of supplier of raw materials and agricultural products for 
the industrialized CMEA economies. 35  
The idea of common enterprises and branch unions was presented as following 
from the perception that the socialist camp lagged behind the Common Market which had 
obtained impressive achievements. A 1962 Polish proposal to establish a single economic 
market in the Eastern Bloc was welcomed by the Soviet leadership and every other 
member of the Eastern Bloc except Romania. The Soviet Union was once again at 
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loggerheads with Romania.36 ‘Do the Romanians still agree with the principle of 
international division of labour adopted by the First Secretaries of the CMEA member 
countries in June 1962’, Andropov wondered? “We do not just agree, but made active 
contribution to their improvement, Gheorghiu-Dej replied.” He reminded Andropov that 
although the Romanians opposed the creation of a Common Market, they were fully 
supportive of cooperation and joint endeavours when these were consistent with the 
interests of the parties involved.37 Such cooperation, however, could never be universal 
and mandatory.38 Both ideas failed due to Romanian obstruction. 
Seeking to override obstruction, Khrushchev argued from the rostrum of the 
plenary of Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party for the creation of an overall 
planning body for the CMEA, similar to the institutions being established in the Common 
Market.39 Although rejected by the CMEA in June, Khrushchev revisited the proposal in 
the autumn of 1962, when he thought events had ‘ripened’ such that CMEA members 
might now be ready for a higher level of economic and political co-operation.40 The 
Romanians were outraged.  While they admitted that  ‘the forces of production increase 
very fast in a socialist society,’ they confessed that they found it hard to believe that in just 
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few months – from June to September -- systemic growth had necessitated a new, multi-
national co-ordination plan.41  
In 1963, the Romanians further vetoed the creation of a Council of Ministers, a 
centralised structure within the CMEA, invoking the infringement of the principle of 
sovereignty. Under the proposed system common policies for all member nations were to 
be adopted following a two-thirds majority in the Council of Ministers, rather than by 
unanimous decision as provided by the existing arrangement. In addition to the council, a 
directorate was to have been created with the task of coordinating and regulating 
investments, prices and economic processes. ‘One can put the question, what would the 
Romanian party, the government and comrade Maurer do in this case?’ Gheorghiu-Dej 
asked. He added maliciously that the Romanian Premier would have nothing else to do 
than hunting – Maurer’s hobby was hunting - if the proposal were accepted.42  
Once again the Romanians were alone in their obstruction. Elsewhere, “[a]n 
artillery fire of various calibres started’ as all the Eastern leaders rushed to support 
Khrushchev and ‘an avalanche of articles were written by economists, lawyers and 
journalists’ supportive of greater integration and centralized planning. ‘Please, believe us, 
this was not a conspiracy,’ claimed Andropov. The support had not been orchestrated. The 
Romanian leadership remained unconvinced. ‘Why else had the Eastern leaders tried to 
include in the CMEA statute that once a new process had been adopted, all issues would 
become mandatory for all member states?’ If the Soviets would continue to insist on the 
idea of economic coordination, ‘there would be a brawl,’ Gheorghiu-Dej warned. This 
statement made Andropov declare that a meeting between the two leaders Gheorghiu-Dej 
and Khrushchev should not be delayed. With that parting shot, Andropov departed from 
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Bucharest directly to Pitunda, where Khrushchev was on vacation, to consult with him 
concerning the impasse.43 
Rumours about Khrushchev’s secret hunting trip to Romania in October 1963 
reached British diplomats.44 It was probably Khrushchev who ‘dictated’ that his visit was 
to be unofficial and secret. The Soviet leader might have hoped to persuade the Romanians 
‘either to adopt a more forthright attitude in support of the Soviet line in the Sino-Soviet 
conflict or to take a less intransigent line in CMEA or perhaps both. If those were his 
motives, he did not succeed,’ Khrushchev would not have wished the world to know that 
‘Big Brother had been paying court to Romania.’  He seemingly insisted and obtained 
Gheorghiu-Dej’s agreement for keeping the visit secret. The secrecy lasted as long as 
Khrushchev. 
During a long talk in Bucharest with Gordon Walker, Maurer confirmed that there 
had indeed been a meeting between Gheorghiu-Dej and Khrushchev. The Romanians 
refused to yield to the renewed Russian pressure for a supra-national planning organisation 
in which the decisions were to be taken by majority and not by unanimity. Khrushchev 
accepted the Romanian position but asked them to maintain silence over the subject. The 
Russian economic publications and the debates in the other CMEA countries favoured 
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however the surrender of national sovereignty for economic planning, determining the 
Romanians to state publicly their position.45  
Later, Gheorghiu-Dej discussed Romania’s own problems with Moscow’s 
domineering ways with more sympathetic Chinese leaders. ‘We had also problems,’ 
Gheorghiu-Dej had told the Chinese ambassador in Bucharest, ‘but we stood firmly against 
any forms which infringe sovereignty, independence, equality and draw upon interference 
in domestic affairs.46 You already know about the economic cooperation; we stood against 
this decision and they had to withdraw it. Although I cannot say that we persuaded them. 
We were alone: all the others acted in coordination and began to exert big pressures. We 
considered every our step and acted only when the matter was clearly established and we 
had identified our adversaries’ weak points. The Soviets, in response, repeatedly accused 
the Romanian leadership of ‘narrowness and nationalism’.47  
 
The following year, the Soviets announced that a delegation led by N. Podgorny, 
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, would visit Romania. 
They were expected to arrive in July 1964. Anticipating that Podgorny would renew the 
attack, the Romanian leadership decided in advance not to compromise since the ‘the 
smallest compromise could entail further concessions.’ Podgorny would be told flat out 
that Romanians did not share the Soviet view on the value of greater integration.48 The 
Podgorny visit took place soon after Maurer's return from the Soviet Union, and once again 
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whatever the intention might have been, the only agreement that could be reached was that 
the divergence should not be made public.49 Even on this issue, ‘success’ was modest.  
The purpose of Podgorny’s visit was to dissuade the Romanians from circulating a 
memorandum detailing their differences with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It 
was not clear whether the proposed statement was to deal primarily with CMEA affairs or 
with the Sino-Soviet dispute. According to the Americans the Poles had seen a draft and 
the Russians, ‘getting wind of what was brewing, despatched Podgorny to nip it in the 
bud.’50 By the time of his intervention, the Romanians had already circulated their 
statement inside the Communist Party with copies on the way to other fraternal, national 
parties.51  
While in May 1963 the outcome of Romania’s defiant stand against the Soviet 
economic dictation through the CMEA was uncertain, by July 1964 it was evident that 
Romania had won the battle. 52 In the longer term the loosening of the economic bond 
between Romania and the Soviet Union ‘should be of political as well as economic 
importance for the further diversification of Eastern European relations,’ the Foreign 
Office asserted. ‘It confirms our view of the way which Eastern Europe is going and will 
continue to go.’ 53  
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While the Chinese had been kept informed concerning the evolution of the 
disagreement,54 a diplomatic offensive towards the West had also started. The Romanians 
were persuasive. A West German trade mission was sent to Bucharest in October 1963. 
The same year, the British Legation in Bucharest was upgraded to the level of embassy. 55 
The issue of raising the level of diplomatic missions and lifting travel restrictions for 
diplomats was also broached by the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs during visits to 
the US and France. Although at first the French Foreign Minister, Couve de Murville, 
replied hesitantly, when Manescu clearly asserted Romania’s determination to develop its 
relations with all countries, France included, de Murville intervened, ‘mainly with France, 
this is our desire.’56 Agreeing to the development of commercial relations, the French 
insisted as well on cultural exchanges. 57 Of particular interest was French language taught 
in schools and a wider distribution for French books in Romania. Better relations of this 
nature were not just desirable, but possible, the French Foreign Minister pointed out, 
referring to the affinities of languages and the long cultural connection between the two 
countries. Adamant for the dissemination of French literature in Romania -- ‘books not 
translated in Romanian’ -- the French were careful to stress that ‘the content of these books 
would not embarrass the Romanian government.’ Both parties agreed, ultimately, to work 
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to foster improved cultural relations and to encourage cultural exchanges; the Comédie 
Française was booked to tour Romania in 1964.58 
Britain was also in the game of stepping up contact with the Romanians, reversing 
its previously tentative approach. Receiving James Dalton Murray in his new capacity as 
Ambassador, on February 18, 1964, the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs pointed out 
the continued development of economic and cultural relations between the two countries.59 
In 1964 the British Council organized an Exhibition of Contemporary British Painting in 
Bucharest and Iasi and the Royal Shakespeare Company played “King Lear” and the 
“Comedy of Errors” before a Romanian audience in Bucharest.60  
By 1964, English had already replaced French as the most important foreign 
language at the principal universities, with an increase in the number of first-year students 
in the English Faculty at the University of Bucharest to 257. Another forty-three students 
were studying it as a subsidiary subject. Previously less than twenty-five students were 
studying English. 61 Asked what foreign language they wanted to study, twenty-seven 
students at a secondary school in Bucharest chose English and three French. ‘A single boy, 
regarded as quite foolish, chose Russian.’62  
Russian ceased to be a compulsory language in Romanian secondary schools from 
the educational year 1963-4. A redirection of educational policy away from Russification 
was evident. Russian language instruction had been compulsory since the war. Now, the 
study of Russian became optional in elementary and secondary schools and pupils were 
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offered opportunity to choose the foreign language they wanted to study.63 Just as fifteen 
years before it had been difficult to find teachers able to teach Russian, so now teacher 
shortages of new languages were apparent.64 Teachers of English were in particularly short 
supply. While four thousand teachers had been trained to teach Russian, there were only 
eighty capable of providing English instruction. French was in a better position. The 
Ministry of Education had at its disposal eight hundred teachers able to teach French, so at 
least initially French became the Western language of default for many students.65 English 
caught up quickly. In an attempt to satiate public demand for Western language instruction, 
English lessons were extensively broadcast on the radio while programs such as ‘Learn 
Russian singing’ or songs like ‘I love you, Moscow’ vanished from Romanian air waves.66 
The ‘twist’ and the latest pop records from France, the United States and Britain could be 
heard over the radio and at the Bucharest night clubs.67 
The new cultural redirection taken by the Romanians was evident. One by one the 
institutions stressing the connection with Russia were shutdown, replaced, or merged into 
other institutions with broader mandates. The ‘Russian Bookstore’ located in Bucharest 
vanished overnight and was replaced by the ‘Universal Bookstore.’ The Romanian edition 
of the Soviet review of international affairs, Timpuri Noi [New Times] ceased its 
appearance and a Romanian weekly political magazine, Lumea [The World] appeared 
instead.68 The Museum of Romanian-Soviet Brotherhood and the Institute for Literature, 
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‘Maxim Gorki’ simply vanished.’69 The Institute for Russian Studies in Bucharest was 
absorbed by the new Institute for Foreign Languages. There were also rumours that the 
Soviet-Romanian Friendship Society (ARLUS) ‘is to be disbanded’ or ‘allowed to fade 
quietly away’.70 Cautious to make sure that the decision concerning ARLUS proposed by 
Gheorghiu-Dej would not be ‘misinterpreted,’ the party claimed that the ‘reorganization’ 
of ARLUS was determined by the need to reduce expenses. All these institutions 
established in the late 1940s had pursued a veritable campaign of Russification.71  
What did the Soviet leadership think of the changes occurring in Romania? 
Murray was frustrated that his French and American counterparts in Bucharest got ‘a 
running stream of comments from Moscow which assists them considerably in forming 
their views about Romanian policies and actions’. In contrast, he received ‘virtually 
nothing’ from ‘the generously staffed Moscow Embassy’ on ‘the sort of development 
about which we might reasonably expect some comments’.72 Although the developments 
in Romania ‘may not make much difference to the way the people in the Kremlin behave 
or what they think,’ Murray was convinced that the adjustment of Romanian policy would 
eventually lead to an alteration of its relationship with the Soviet Union. Even though 
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Romania was a minor concern for British foreign policy, and this seemed unlikely to 
change much, the British Embassy in Moscow should not look at Romania from ‘the 
wrong end of their telescope.’ Murray was convinced that Romania would make 
remarkable progress towards greater independence.73    
We shall see further evidence of Romanian independent mindedness this year and 
it will be interesting to hear how the Russians react or if they do not react to hear 
what the Embassy think about their failure to do so. 74 
 
In his report to the Foreign office, the British Ambassador in Moscow, T. 
Brimelow, found not a word in the Russian press about de-Russification process that took 
place in Romania. This did not mean that the Soviets had not noticed, or approved the 
change in direction. The Soviets, in fact, were very proud both of the Russian tradition and 
the Soviet contribution.75 They were, in fact, highly offended, as they made clear during a 
meeting with a Romanian delegation to Moscow in 1964.  
In March 1964, a delegation led by the Prime Minister Maurer passed through the 
Soviet Union on the way back from a visit to Peking. London, becoming aware of the 
gravity of the Sino-Soviet split, wondered if the Soviets had been consulted about the 
delegation’s visit to China. ‘They had been informed’, the Romanians indicated, but had 
not been asked for permission.76. On their way back from Peking, the Romanians went to 
Gagra to meet Khrushchev, Mikoyan and Andropov. Izvestiya published a brief 
announcement: the two parties exchanged opinions on questions of mutual interest. ‘In the 
course of discussions particular attention was given to questions connected with the 
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struggle for the strengthening of the unity and solidarity of the Socialist countries.’77 It was 
in fact a quarrel during which Andropov, responsible for relations with other socialist 
countries, reproached the Romanians their ‘adversarial stance’ as proved by the closure of 
the bookstore ‘The Russian Book’ and of the Institute ‘Maxim Gorki.’78  
In opposing the economic integration within the CMEA, the hitherto unpopular 
and feared Romania’s leaders looked for support to nationalist and anti-Russian feeling. 
The Romanian Communist Party publicized a resolution pointing out the right to develop a 
national policy in light of Romania’s interests. The document formally entitled ‘The 
Declaration on the Stance of the Romanian Workers Party Concerning Questions related to 
the Communist and Workers movement’ (known as Romania’s ‘Declaration of 
Independence’) marked Romania’s foreign policy The ‘declaration’ was read in the 
plenary of the Central Committee held between 15 and 22 April 1964.79 It provided that the 
principles of independence of national sovereignty, equality, mutual advantage, non-
interference in domestic affair and respect for territorial integrity should provide the basis 
for relations between Communist and Workers Parties. It stated that ‘as long as there are 
national and state distinctions among peoples and countries – and such distinctions will 
continue for a very long time even after the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship on 
a world scale – the unity of the communist movement does not require the elimination of 
diversities or the abolition of national distinctions.’ It asserted Romania’s ideological 
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sovereignty, claiming that ‘nobody can decide what is and what is not correct for other 
parties.’80 ‘We had long talks about it,’ Maurer, by then Prime Minister, recalled.  
All communist parties are equal, we stated, no matter how big or small is the 
country. . . Such things, after being heard so many times, seem without 
importance, but during Dej times, when we made them public they meant 
something! It took a great courage to tell the Soviets that you consider yourself 
their equal!’ 81  
After being adopted by the Central Committee, the statement was broadcast to the 
population.82 Although they needed the support of the people, economic issues were too 
pressing to allow the leadership to be content with simple popularity. At party meetings, 
participants were told the truth about the unjust relations between Romania and the Soviet 
Union and the destructive role played by Sovroms for the Romanian economy. 83   
The long dissimulation game played during the period of unfair trade with the 
Soviet Union was now recalled. No less than sixteen Sovroms were set up in the aftermath 
of the Second World War in oil industry, coal, tractor-building, banking, chemistry, 
transportation, navy, film production and other industrial enterprises.84 Practically 
‘everything except the Patriarchate [the highest Orthodox institution] was Sovrom!’ 
Gheorghiu-Dej admitted that when he took power he did not care much about Romanian 
enterprises, ‘I told myself: The Devil take them! Why should I trouble my head about 
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them?’ Iatrov, one of the Soviet representatives in Romania, ‘looked on the country as if he 
was its governor. If he saw a company he liked, he used to say, “You cannot manage it, but 
we can. This must become Sovrom!” He demanded in fact that all profitable enterprises 
become Sovroms. 85 Although initially disinterested in the management of the economy, 
Gheorghiu-Dej had in fact raised the issue of Sovroms during a meeting with Stalin. He 
claimed to have been outspoken about the question. What Stalin replied him remains 
however a mystery. Gheorghiu-Dej confessed though that he was asked questions as he 
was ‘under investigation’, as the Soviet representatives Iatrov and Merkurov tried to 
intimidate him. 86 
Gheorghiu-Dej ‘could not adopt a policy [of independence] from the beginning,’ 
Alexandru Barladeanu, Romania’s representative to CMEA, later asserted. He ‘understood 
very well the Soviet reality, and did not want to copy it. He had been waiting for a 
propitious time to start on this path.’87 Maurer concurred with this assessment. Gheorghiu-
Dej could do nothing at the beginning but carry out Soviet dictates. 88 Most of the changes 
introduced in political and economic life were copies of the Stalinist models, for example 
the collectivization of agriculture. The fact that serious accusations against Gheorghiu-Dej 
were aired in June 1947 seems to confirm Maurer’s assessment. Gheorghiu-Dej’s 
discontent with the establishment of Sovroms and the Red Army’s presence brought 
against him the accusation of anti-Sovietism.89 
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Previously acquiesced in as a ‘powerful factor’ in the development of Romanian 
economy, 90 the Sovroms were now expounded as means of damaging it. Although 
officially the Sovroms were abolished in 1954, certain of them continued to drain 
Romania’s resources even afterwards. In June 1962, during his visit to Romania, 
Khrushchev admitted that creation of Sovroms was ‘a stupid thing that Mikoyan had fed 
Stalin’.91 Nonetheless, Khrushchev did not agree with the closure of Sovrom Quartz which 
extracted and delivered uranium to the Soviet Union.92   
The nationalist campaign which followed the Declaration of Independence 
staggered the public by its unprecedented intensity.93 A nationwide series of meetings was 
held to expound the new independent policy laid down in the Declaration of April 22.94 
The Party leadership was praised for using ‘scientific arguments’ in expressing their 
disagreements with the Soviets. That was why, the leadership concluded, the ‘party’s 
prestige has grown and will grow.’95 The meetings were not confined to party members but 
aimed at the whole population. Sessions were held throughout the country, in institutions 
and enterprises, schools and universities, and people were encouraged to express their 
enthusiasm.96 Speeches took a more strongly anti-Soviet tone than the declaration itself.97  
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For the first time Khrushchev was roundly attacked for attempting to interfere in 
Romanian affairs and for having shown scant respect for Romanian interests, causing a stir 
among the population.98 An informant of the British Minister in Bucharest described the 
astonished audience as being like a man sitting in the dentist’s chair, rigidly with his mouth 
open.99 The general theme of the meetings appeared to have been opposition to Soviet 
economic exploitation of the country, as exemplified by the facts that Romania paid three 
times as much as it should have in reparations; it sent food to the Soviet Union although 
short itself; and its uranium deposits were exploited solely for Soviet benefit.100 The 
dispute within CMEA was also detailed.  
Critical party cadres received fuller information still. In addition to the April 
Declaration, the transcripts of the talks between the Romanian delegation and the Chinese, 
Koreans and Soviets delegations concerning the Sino-Soviet polemic, along with a number 
of letters exchanged between the Central Committee of CPSU and the Romanian Party and 
certain issues raised in CMEA were tabled. For fifteen hours, on the 19 and 20 of May 
1964, all of these things were read. The audience was advised not to take notes but listen to 
the materials presented.101 We might imagine that the material presented constituted 
several bombshells. 
Gheorghiu-Dej was emerging as the most serious challenge to Moscow’s 
domination of Eastern Europe since Marshal Tito’s revolt. Hardly surprisingly there were 
reports that Khrushchev had tried to oust the Romanian leader. When the attempt failed, 
what had become a nasty squabble quickly went public. According to the Daily Mail,   
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Khrushchev is said to be increasingly disturbed by Romania’s show of 
independence, and to have been angered particularly by Gheorghiu-Dej decision 
to send a top-level delegation to Washington to seek closer ties with the United 
States. Experts on Communist affairs here are convinced that Romania is now 
well on the road to becoming as independent as Marshal Tito’s Yugoslavia.... 
Charges of a Soviet conspiracy to overthrow the party leader are being made at 
meetings organised by the Communist party throughout Romania... Party 
spokesmen asserted the Russians had tried to enlist another prominent Communist 
leader, the Defence Minister, Emil Bodnaras, to lead a revolt against Gheorghiu-
Dej. Instead, Bodnaras had appraised Gheorghiu-Dej of the Kremlin plot.102 
  
While Romanian foreign policy was in the midst of a remarkable change, there 
were no signs of liberalization of the regime’s internal policies, even though large 
numbers of political prisoners had been released from prisons, labour camps, and house 
arrest and internal exile had been allowed to return home or otherwise freed.103 Asked 
about Romania’s internal and foreign policies in those years, Maurer answered like an 
astute politician, ‘It is difficult to determine what is the optimal ratio between the internal 
and foreign policy of a country since foreign policy is determined by the politics pursued 
by the neighbouring countries, world politics and, of course, by what happens in the 
country. A state must start in its foreign policy from the premise that its interests are met. 
The focus on specific interests may change from time to time.’104  
In May 1964, seeking to capitalize on their newly recovered autonomy, Romania 
despatched a high-level delegation to the United States. The visit was well-publicised in 
the press.105 Meanwhile, only a short press notice indicated the visit to Moscow of a 
delegation led by Chivu Stoica. Soviet concern at recent developments was almost 
certainly behind Stoica’s visit whose purpose was declared as being economic, with 
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special reference to the petro-chemical industry. The fact that the Romanian delegation 
met the top-ranking Soviet leaders Brezhnev, Podgorny and Suslov led the British to infer 
that the talks did not actually focus on petrochemicals. ‘It is not an unreasonable guess 
that the Russians have asked the Romanians to come to Moscow for a talk and that the 
current anti-Soviet campaign would be on the agenda’, read a minute of Foreign 
Office.106 To dampen speculation, it was simply announced that visits like this one were 
part of the constant exchanges of views between the two parties on agriculture, industry 
and other fields. This visit was not the first and would not be the last. Stoica’s visit 
followed from an invitation of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. 107 
Whatever the truth, the Romanian leadership appears to have cared far more about 
what was happening in Washington than in Moscow. It was most important that the visit 
of the delegation led by Gaston Marin appear a success. However, while giving plenty of 
publicity to the visit, the Romanians confess that they did not want a great deal of 
propaganda about moving out of the Soviet orbit. The Romanian delegation was 
interested in concluding a Consular convention and in the development of trade and 
tourism between the two countries. In coulisses the Romanian delegation made it clear 
that they were going to move further towards independence. ‘They are saying that they 
have always aspired to political independence of the Soviet Union but that their strategy 
has been to wait until their economy is on firm foundation before attempting to assert it.’ 
Washington shared this assessment. The Romanians ‘had consistently gone further than 
they need have in asserting their independence of the Russians,’ William Crawford, the 
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American Minister in Bucharest, maintained.108 The British Embassy in the United States 
also stated their view on the Romanians’ visit to Washington: 
After their refusal to accept the Soviet plan as put forward under the auspices of 
CMEA for the integration of Eastern European economies, the Romanians might 
have been expected to mark time. But this was not at all what happened: they kept 
raising the ante. Their expedition to Peking, their declaration of  April 22, the 
despatch of Gaston Marin to Washington and the anti-Soviet or, if you prefer it, 
the Romanian nationalist agitation which is now going on in Romania are all 
examples of this.’109 
The Romanian position was somewhat more tentative, and it was understood in 
Bucharest that something more forthright would have been preferred in the West. The 
Declaration of Independence might not have given full satisfaction to everyone, the 
Romanians admitted. Some might have desired something sensational or looked for a 
total change of the party line. The declaration was actually a restatement, of the political 
standpoint expressed in the article signed by Maurer and published in Problems of Peace 
and Socialism on 4 November 1963 and not a break with the other socialist countries.110 
Even so, the importance of the shift could not be under-estimated and fellow renegades in 
both Blocs understood what had transpired. 
The French were enthusiastic about the evolution of Romania’s foreign policy. 
This development should not be surprising. French ties with Bucharest were old and 
integral. Moreover, under De Gaulle France was seeking to assert its own position in the 
West – looking, as was Romania, for some middle ground. ‘For the first time in its 
history, Romania enters its destiny, becoming a nation in the true sense of the word,’ De 
Gaulle stated, adding that ‘the Romanian phenomenon… cannot be ignored. Romania is 
no longer a satellite, but an independent country.’ ‘The theses on independence and 
sovereignty are important not only for Romania but also for other countries,’ De Gaulle 
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contended.111 In a speech in Strasbourg, De Gaulle mentioned the necessity of developing 
relations with socialist countries within the framework of ‘the European idea.’ Western 
European countries should contribute to the development of Eastern European without 
interfering in their political system, De Gaulle believed, establishing for Europe a 
position between the superpowers.112 The French seem to have found similarities between 
their ‘dissidence’ in the West and the Romanian desire for great independence within the 
Eastern Bloc. 
Britain’s reaction to the Romanian demarche was less full-blooded, but then 
again, the United Kingdom was no renegade.113 Although full of subtleties, the 
Declaration of Independence ‘comes to the aid of many parties outside of the communist 
camp that could not decide over their perspective between the two points of view, Soviet 
and Chinese,’ J. McGhie, the British Charge d’ Affairs, asserted. The Romanian 
leadership had expressed clearly a policy which stressed nation first, over ideological 
considerations. 114 It was recognized in London, as well, that in taking this position the 
Romanians were also motivated by domestic considerations. ‘It will be interesting to see 
how far the Romanians will go, the Foreign Office wondered, to secure their home base 
by appeal to nationalist sentiments. They must also be interested in safeguarding 
themselves from economic pressure by reassurance in the West.’115 
Were the Romanian leaders foreseeing a dramatic reorientation towards the West? 
Had the campaign foreshadowed further estrangement from the Soviet bloc?116 Nothing 
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of the kind was in the mind of the Romanian leaders. Although the Romanian Foreign 
Minister emphasized ‘earnestly and emphatically’ Romania’s position as a country which 
stands ‘on her feet, shored up by no-one and beholden to no-one,’ he also declared that 
the divergences with the Soviets did not extend beyond economic issues.117 The 
Romanian leaders did not intend ‘to precipitate a break’ with the Soviet Union. If they 
broke with the Soviets ‘they may end up inside rather than on the nationalist tiger.’118  
Romania was not going redirect its policy away from the European Communist 
Bloc towards the West. To attempt to do so would risk reprisal from Moscow while there 
was no guarantee that any ‘free’ Romania would continue to follow a Communist 
leadership. The leadership sought freedom of action while remaining a member of the 
Warsaw Pact and of CMEA. The freedom of action Romania wanted was primarily 
economic. This was of the origin of its divergence from the Soviet Union, the Romanian 
Prime Minister told Gordon Walker.119 However, the struggle for economic freedom could 
take on a political complexion, the Head of the Northern Department in the Foreign Office, 
Howard Smith, believed. Although it was too soon to anticipate the outcome of the friction 
between Moscow and Bucharest, it was quite likely that the Russians and the Romanians 
‘will come to an understanding by which polemics are avoided and Romania follows a 
fairly independent line economically.’   
In the shorter term, therefore, we are unlikely to see anything very dramatic. But 
in the longer term this loosening of the economic bond should be of political as 
well as economic importance for the further diversification of Eastern European 
relations. It confirms our view of the way which Eastern Europe is going and will 
continue to go.120  
 
The evaluation proved to be correct.  
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In the aftermath of the Washington visit, and in an effort to re-establish relations 
with the Soviets on new footings, a high level delegation led by Maurer went to Moscow 
on July 6, 1964. It aimed to achieve a readjustment of Soviet-Romanian relations on a 
lasting basis.121 Maurer’s party included politicians with strong ties to the Soviet 
leadership: Emil Bodnaras, Leonte Rautu, a former member of the Comintern, and 
Alexandru Barladeanu, who had spent the Second World War in the Soviet Union. The 
point of including these men was to demonstrate to Moscow uniformity of purpose, and to 
indicate that the relationship offered was the best that could be arranged. The intention was 
to signal to the Soviets that the Romanians desired, in the future, to play their own hand, 
Barladeanu would later recall. They took the occasion to tell the Soviets ‘certain truths.’ 
Among them, was an indication of how much Romania had lost as a result of the imposed 
economic ‘collaboration’ under Sovrom regime.122 The British Embassy assessed:  
[t]hese exchanges were said to have been ‘useful’ and to have proceeded in a 
comradely and frank atmosphere which had assisted better mutual understanding 
and the strengthening of friendship between the two countries and parties. This 
rather tepid statement – by Soviet inter-bloc standards, suggest that there are still 
plenty of unresolved differences.123  
 
Upon return, the Minister for Foreign Affairs described the results of the Moscow talks as 
being satisfactory. The Romanian desiderata included better treatment for the Romanian 
minorities in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina124 but the main object was simply to 
secure the Soviet acceptance of Romania's desire for economic independence.125  
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The Russians made some concessions and promised not to press the Romanians 
further on co-ordination.126 There may have been a deal in which the Soviet Union offered 
to reduce pressure on Romania over CMEA policy in return for a cessation of anti-Soviet 
propaganda in Romania. It looked however as if the Romanians had once again won their 
point.’127 In exchange for the withdrawal of the Valev plan the Romanians committed to 
cooperate more fully in the CMEA.128 Izvestia mentioned that Valev was a purely 
academic figure and his proposal for a lower Danubian economic complex did not enjoy 
the official backing of the Soviet government. Although presumably delighted by the 
gesture, 129 the Romanians seem to have known that the Russians were going to publish a 
disavowal of the Valev’s proposal.130  
Shortly thereafter, on 27 September 1964, a party and government delegation led 
by Maurer departed for Peking to participate in the festivities occasioned by the fifteenth 
anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party. The delegation stopped for talks with 
Khrushchev in Moscow before proceeding on to Peking.131 ‘Sincere and friendly exchange 
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of views took place on problems of common interest’ Scanteia indicated. 132 The 
Romanian press reported prominently the enthusiastic welcome given to the delegation on 
its arrival in Peking. The Chinese must by now have realized that the Romanians were not 
‘Soviet stooges’. 133 
The Romanians continued their skilful balancing between the Soviets and the 
Chinese. Romania’s position suggested that the Romanian leaders wished to appear 
devoted to a policy of ‘honest broker’ between the two disputants. However, 
notwithstanding delegations, press reports and propaganda, Soviet-Romanian relations 
remained chilly.134 Marx’s manuscript “Notes about the Romanians”, in which he 
criticized the Russians for helping to crush the Romanian revolutionary movements in the 
nineteenth century and for seizing Bessarabia in 1812, was printed by Bucharest in 
December 1964.135 It could add only a frost on already chill relations. 
Although the slow movement toward de-Sovietisation was obvious, Romanian 
officials continued to deny that they were moving out of the Soviet orbit. The British 
particularly noted signs of caution.136 
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The Romanian leadership shifted in 1960 from conformity within the CMEA to a 
more independent course generally. These developments originated in the decision of the 
Romanian leadership to resist the programme of economic integration adopted by CMEA 
in 1962, which assigned to Romania the function of a primarily agrarian country, 
supplying food and raw materials to her industrially more advanced partners. Romania’s 
motivation, therefore, was primarily economic. Although relations between Romania and 
the Soviet Union deteriorated they were not critically bad. The Romanian leaders 
continued to support the Soviets on major ideological issues, especially on the importance 
of averting nuclear war. While pursuing a new policy based on an independent economic 
policy within Comecon, 60% of Romania’s trade in mid-1960s continued with the Eastern 
European allies, especially the Soviet Union.137  
Romania’s ‘Declaration of Independence” asserted the right to develop a national 
policy consistent with its own interests and domestic requirements. With its emphasis on 
the equality and independence on all Communist Parties, the document was a manifesto of 
national Communism.138 The Soviet Union could crush signs of divergence, as it had in 
Hungary in 1956, or it could tolerate difference up to the point where actual treachery to 
socialism was apprehended. The Soviets appear to have determined to tolerate the 
endurable. Abandonment of socialism, in any case, would have left the Romanian 
leadership, in potential, without a constituency. They would never dare to go so far.  
Although interested in developing contacts with the West, the Romanians avoided 
tacking too close to the West. De Gaulle’s France might have welcomed a more overt 
move. In London’s view, while the Romanians ‘do not wish to be openly regarded by the 
West as the favourite child of Eastern Europe,’ they did not like any more being included 
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in the category of the Soviet Bloc countries either as a manner of speech or where that term 
suggested that they were given the same treatment as other East European countries.139 The 
Romanians thereafter focused on an improvement of relations with the Western 
democracies, particularly with Britain, France, and the United States. 
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Romania singled out   
 
In 1964 the Labour Party won the general elections by a majority of four seats. 
Harold Wilson became Prime Minister on 16 October and formed his first government. 1 
One year after the Labour Government took power, the Foreign Minister, George 
Thomson, went to Romania and Bulgaria. Thomson’s visit to Romania which took place 
between 2 and 7 October 1965 was the first by a Foreign Office Minister since the War. 
The purpose of the visit was to maintain the momentum of ministerial visits before the 
Secretary of State’s projected visit. In fact, the British wanted to ‘avoid disappointing the 
Romanians, who ascribe great importance to ministerial exchanges, and would look for 
political significance in the absence of a visit from a British Minister for so long after the 
change of Government in Britain’.2 Thomson’s visit was a ‘primarily goodwill visit’ to 
please the Romanians who did not get ‘much ministerial attention’ that year.3 
A positive trend was evident in British-Romanian relations in the first half of the 
1960s. Both parties hoped that bilateral relations would become closer and more cordial. 
Exchanges in cultural, artistic and scientific fields had got off to a good start. Diplomatic 
relations had improved and trade between the two countries had increased steadily. The 
main point of difference in bilateral relations was over outstanding financial claims and 
trade. However, negotiations which began in Bucharest in April 1960 continued in 
London, leading to the conclusion of a financial and a trade agreement on 10 November 
1960.4 The financial agreement covered the following claims: nationalization (the oil 
                                                 
1
 The Romanian Ambassador in London conveyed the Prime Minister’s Maurer congratulations to 
the Wilson on assuming his high office. TNA, PRO, PREM 13/3461, 6 November, 1964, T.E. Bridges. 
2
 TNA, PRO, FO 371/182503, N 1054/32, Complete set of Briefs for Thomson’s visit. Brief no. R 
1----Visit of the Minister of State to Romania, 2-7 October 1965. Steering Brief---Background and Aim of 
Visit; TNA, PRO, FO 371/182502, N 1054/3 c- Secretary of State, Visits to Eastern Europe, 24 May 1965. 
3
 TNA, PRO, FO 371/182503, N 1054/28, FO Minute, H. F. T. Smith to Greenhil, 25 March 1965. 
4
 RNA, CC of RCP, Department of Foreign Relations, Dossier 84/1960, f. 1. 
190 
 
companies excluded); reparation payments according to the Treaty of 1947 (the oil 
companies excluded); and compensations for personal injury. The agreement provided for 
the payment of 1.25 million in settlement of claims. Payment of the sum had to be 
completed by January 1967. The agreement did not cover a number of substantial claims in 
respect of some of which Romanian offer in earlier negotiations had been regarded as 
derisory. Other negotiations were scheduled for 1966 for hard cases, like the 
nationalisation of the oil industry.5 The follow-on commercial agreement, signed on 28 
September, would be valid for three years. According to the later, Romania would export 
to Britain fresh and frozen vegetables and fruit, timber and furniture, clothing, shoes, 
cement, carpets, and would import machinery and equipment, rolled products, chemicals, 
wool and wool yarn. 6 
Outstanding claims included the oil companies claims (value sixty eight million 
pounds of which Shell was the main claimant), bonded debt claims of fifteen million 
pounds plus accrued and unpaid interest7 and certain other commercial and contractual 
debts. The British were aware that any settlement they were able to reach would certainly 
be for a far lower sum. The Romanians had persistently tried to link the British claims with 
the import of Romanian oil and suggested on numerous occasions that the atmosphere for 
the negotiation would be greatly improved if the British could agree to take oil in advance 
of the start of the negotiations. The 1960 Agreement was however concluded on the 
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understanding with the oil companies that the British Government would not consider 
Romanian oil imports until their claims were settled.  
Although trade between Britain and Romania had increased steadily it remained 
small.8 Any substantial increase in Anglo-Romanian trade was unlikely unless the British 
decided to import oil products from Romania. The British government stood firm however 
on the policy of not accepting oil from the Communist countries, particularly ones that 
owed it money. A breach in this policy was made in 1963 when the British considered a 
Soviet proposal to buy ships from Britain which may have involved accepting oil from the 
Soviet Union.9 ‘The principle that we should be prepared in certain circumstances to take 
Soviet oil might eventually be extended to Romania.’ The first step was conditioned 
however by the settlement of oil claims. Another difficulty was represented by the fact that 
the Romanians who had a considerable refining capacity of their own wished to export oil 
products and not crude oil.10   
The Romanians had shown interest in industrial cooperation, which, based on 
their expanding productive capacity and cheap labour, was supposed to lead to an increase 
in their exports. The Romanians were not however prepared to consider anything involving 
shared capital and management between themselves and Western firms; instead, they 
bought several complete plants from Britain, projects which were to be financed partly by 
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the disposal of some of their products in Western markets.11 The firms Rustyfa Ltd,12 
Consolidated Foundry Plant Ltd.13 and Petrocarbon Development Ltd.14 had supplied 
machinery and equipment for several Romanian plants totalling several million pounds.15 
Although small, trade agreement was important for it could lead to the growth of 
contacts in other fields.16 Inter-parliamentary exchanges continued to be encouraged. A 
British parliamentary delegation, headed by Ian Mikardo, comprising three Labour and 
three Conservatives (Mikardo, N.G. Carmichael and A.E. Hunter from the Labour Party 
and J. Brewis, Rear Admiral Morgan Giles and Sir Eric Errington from the Conservative) 
visited Romania in November 1965 in return for a Romanian delegation visiting Britain in 
1963.17 Accompanied by two members of the Grand National Assembly, the delegation 
was given a tour of Brasov, Sibiu and Cluj, taken to the Brazi refinery and the Babes-
Bolyai University. Mikardo gave an interview to the Romanian political review ‘Lumea’ in 
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which he underlined along with his impressions on Romania how the British were 
surprised at the intensive industrialisation of Romania. 18  
Not only did the Romanians ascribe great importance to ministerial exchanges 
with Western countries,19 they wanted ‘to discuss and to be seen to have discussed the 
main international issues’.20 This was part of their purpose in participating so energetically 
in the exceptional level of diplomatic exchange evident by the mid-1960s. The purpose of 
all the activity, of course, was to underline the fact of Romania’s new found independence. 
At the ninth party congress, in July 1965, Romania was declared a socialist state rather 
than a People’s democracy, emphasizing the transition to a new era and stressing 
Romania’s status as a sovereign state without previous effusive references to the Soviet 
Union and the new ideological status – the same stage of development as the Soviet Union, 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. 
The Romanians, while trying to get recognition throughout the world as an 
independent nation, had developed a ‘nationalist sensitivity’, the British Ambassador 
noted.21 ‘They have,’ he thought, ‘a considerable chip on their shoulder about how 
unaware we are of the significance of Romania’s role in the Communist world,’ the British 
Minister of State mentioned in his report on his visit. The Romanians cultivated ‘a 
deliberate detachment, and were at pains to show that they had not taken sides in the Sino-
Soviet split.22 The Romanians had done their best to avoid being drawn into the divergence 
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between the Soviet Union and China, the First Deputy Prime Minister, Alexandru 
Barladeanu, also pointed out to Harold Wilson during a meeting in London. 23 
Britain had no such interest in seeking increased contact with Romania, but did 
find the Romanians to be unusually helpful collaborators. Diplomatic contact established 
that London shared more common ground with the Romanians than with other East 
Europeans.24 The Romanian leaders were the most receptive to Western diplomatic 
overtures. On the Middle East, the Romanians did not follow the Warsaw Pact line. They 
maintained relations with Israel and argued for a settlement reached through direct 
contacts.25 Similarly, the Romanians were ‘realistic’ in their approach to relations with the 
Federal Republic of Germany. Romania was the only East European country to recognise 
the FRG (in January 1967) and the West German government established trade missions 
with the Romanian government. Romania was the only Warsaw Pact state to respond to the 
FRG’s early attempts at Ostpolitik.26 The Romanians also had an interest in détente which 
was ‘more enlightened than that of other members of the Warsaw Pact’. At the same time 
they held certain views such as the desirability of dismantling the blocs in Europe which 
the British regarded as unrealistic at that time.27 
British policy-makers portrayed themselves as being among the pioneers of a 
policy of fairly frequent exchanges of ministerial visits with the Soviet Union and East 
Europe.28 However, British diplomats underestimated the degree to which a one-party state 
could stifle dissent without resorting to Stalinist-style police terror. The nomenklatura 
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system within the USSR and East European country made ideological orthodoxy the 
prerequisite for advancement in the party and government hierarchies, industrial 
management, the armed forces, academia and throughout ‘socialist’ society, thereby 
inhibiting the growth of a more independent-minded, technocratic elite upon which British 
government officials had placed their hopes for reform within Eastern Europe. 29 
Foreign Office officials hoped that Eastern bloc states would assert their 
independence and lose their economic and military ties to the USSR, but also wished this 
process to be a gradual one, controlled by the East European regimes rather than being 
driven by popular protest. By common consent Western countries opted for a policy of 
‘collective inaction’ over Czechoslovakia in order not to exacerbate East-West tensions; 
this approach was reflected in the decision not to raise alert levels for the Alliance forces in 
the summer of 1968. 30 
The British decided that their interests would not be furthered by any 
revolutionary upheavals, as any uprising similar to that in Hungary in 1956 would 
undermine the ‘evolution of effective co-existence’. 31 Romania and Yugoslavia were of 
particular concern to NATO officials since Nicolae Ceausescu and Tito condemned the 
Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia.  
Nicolae Ceausescu was elected General Secretary of the Romanian Communist 
Party after the sudden death of Gheorghiu-Dej, in March 1965. Gheorghiu-Dej brought 
Ceausescu onto the Central Committee in 1952. In 1954, he became a full member of the 
Politburo and eventually rose to occupy the second-highest position in the party hierarchy. 
Ceausescu became soon a popular figure in Romania and also in the Western 
World, because of his independent foreign policy. In the 1960s, he eased press censorship 
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and ended Romania's active participation in the Warsaw Pact (though Romania formally 
remained a member).  
In July 1968, when the leaders of the Soviet Union and its allies issued the 
‘Warsaw Letter’ which called for the preservation of one-party rule, Romania abstained.32 
Ceausescu's denunciation of the invasion marked the apogee of Romanian defiance of the 
Soviet Union. He publicly branded the occupation as a ‘shameful event in the history of the 
revolutionary movements’.33 Romanian support for Czechoslovakia in the context of 
invasion of this country by the forces of the Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany, Hungary 
and Bulgaria led to a serious worsening of relations with the Soviet Union to a point at 
which it seemed possible that the Russians might invade Romania.34 It was at this juncture 
that the British Foreign Minister visited the country. 
The Secretary of State’s visit took place in circumstances in which Romania 
demonstrated once again that it was not subservient to the will of the Soviet Union, while 
indicating also that it had greatly come up in the world. Romania was now a single 
destination instead of being included in a group of two or three countries of Eastern Europe 
to be visited.35 All were aware, of course, that the Brezhnev doctrine might equally be 
applied to Ceausescu as to Alexander Dubcek. It was not unlikely that the Russians would 
have liked to see Ceausescu replaced by ‘someone more pliant to their wishes’. At a 
NATO meeting several members speculated about the possibility that the Russians might 
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engineer a coup against Ceausescu.36 The Russians were determined to get rid of the 
Romanian regime by force if necessary, the French Permanent Representative to the 
United Nations maintained, notwithstanding the fact that it would have been difficult for 
the Soviets to remove Ceausescu since he had a strong Security apparatus at his command 
and had gained popularity in the country for his stance during the Czechoslovak crisis.37 
Perhaps, the Russians could have sought to prepare the way for such a development 
through propaganda and by employing other pressures such that discontent against 
Ceausescu developed.38 
At his meeting with the British Foreign Minister, and thereafter, Ceausescu 
showed great skill in making out a reasoned case for Romania’s policies, calling for world 
peace, self-determination, non-interference, and friendship with all.39 Although a 
convinced Communist, he shared the view that the Communist party had constantly to 
adapt itself to change, ‘subject to keeping ideological essentials intact.’40 Ceausescu set out 
to distance Romania from the Soviet Union and himself from Gheorghiu-Dej and gave 
reason to hope that the new regime, though equally nationalist, would be more relaxed and 
permissive than its predecessor. In essence, he continued the balancing act: seeking 
distance from the Soviet Union, while maintaining control domestically, looking to a 
nationalist constituency to support continued autocracy; justifying all through continued 
economic development and by reference to foreign policy successes and prestige. 
Ceausescu took advantage of Gheorghiu-Dej’s policy and of the risks his 
predecessor had assumed, the Prime Minister Maurer believed. “Ceausescu never 
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mentioned Gheorghiu-Dej since April 1964, so sorry he was that it was not him who have 
proclaimed the ‘Declaration of Independence’. He never talked about it publicly.”41 
Ceausescu had however referred to the independence of Romania on every occasion such 
as the anniversaries of the Romanian Communist Party, underlining that Romania placed 
its own national interests above the international one, an interesting shift implying the 
rejection of the communist past policy.42 
Ceausescu struck ‘a risky but brilliant note when he condemned the Soviet led 
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. He could have done nothing better calculated to rally 
national support.43 In 1968 the Romanian Communist Party policy was popular particularly 
for its policy of independence from the Soviet Union and defiance on behalf of another 
errant and independence minded Bloc member.44 Probably responding to the people’s 
expectation but more likely inspired by events in Czechoslovakia, the Romanian leadership 
even took cautious steps towards modest liberalization. 
Much stress is put on the development of socialist democracy that is the free 
exchange of views among Party members about questions still open to discussion 
and socialism humanism which appears to mean the free expression of 
Communist personality. There seems to be a growing confidence in the possibility 
of expressing opinions, as long as they are not anti-Communist. 45 
 
A programme of limited decentralization of local government and of industry was 
set up. This was combined with the maintenance of Party control over the councils and 
boards on whom powers were being devolved. Efforts were made to prove that the 
Romanian Communist Party was free of dogmatism and devoted to the good of all the 
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people. Doubts were cast on the integrity of the Party hero, Gheorghiu-Dej, although the 
view among the Party members was that ‘his sins were committed at the behest of the 
Russians’.46 
Western approval notwithstanding, Ceausescu had gone about as far as possible, 
and risked over-tipping. By 1971, he was given significant reason to believe that he would 
be next after Dubcek. The Soviet Union sent military signals to Bucharest that the Red 
Army would mount a major exercise on its southern border with Romania. During “South-
71”, as the exercise was called, the Soviet Union mobilized twelve ground forces 
Divisions, and the Soviet Black Sea Fleet operated off the Romanian coast. It requested, 
but Romania denied, permission to transport three Divisions across Romania to Bulgaria 
for the manoeuvres. “South-71” was an indication of Soviet displeasure with Ceausescu for 
making his first visit to China and for maintaining good relations with that communist 
rival, capping his previous deviations and defiance. Another military manoeuvre, the 
“Opal-71,” followed in August 1971 during which Soviet, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian 
units included military exercises along Hungary's border with Romania.47 
 
In short order, however, Ceausescu’s popularity resulting from his firm and 
courageous opposition to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia had dimmed and a muted 
criticism replaced it. Meanwhile, the danger from within the Warsaw Pact continued. 
There was a paradox in Ceausescu’s status. While enjoying the support of his people, he 
was almost completely isolated within the Socialist Bloc, which was hardly surprisingly. 
He received a deliberately chilly reception from the Soviet leaders at Moscow on his way 
back from China in June 1971. In August of that year he was excluded from the summit 
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conference in Crimea. In September 1971 Brezhnev made a tour of Yugoslavia, Hungary 
and Bulgaria, pointedly leaving out Romania.48  
Romania responded with diplomacy. A series of high-level exchanges produced 
an improvement of Ceausescu’s relations with the leaders of the Communist Bloc during 
1972.  In February Janos Kadar led a Hungarian Party and Governmental delegation to 
Romania – a notable change from the anxious days in 1971 when the Hungarians were 
used by the Soviets as the principal critics of Romanian policy. In May Eric Honecker 
brought an East German Government delegation to Romania. And in August Ceausescu 
was invited to that year’s summit conference in the Crimea and had private talks with 
Brezhnev as well. Later in August he also had talks with Todor Zhivkov, both in Bulgaria 
and in Romania. 49   
Meanwhile, there continued to be little change domestically. Although there was 
some liberalisation in 1968, the regime was conservative by nature and the Communist 
party remained in total control of the country. This did not change. Ceausescu’s status was 
unique in post-war Romania. Meanwhile, a cult of personality was emerging unique in 
Eastern Europe since the death of Stalin, and more obvious than anything Stalin attempted. 
As Secretary General of the Communist Party and President of the Council of State, posts 
held since 1965 and 1967 respectively, Ceausescu had absolute executive power. He was 
also President of the Socialist Unity Front and had himself named President of the 
Supreme Council of Economic and Social Development. Ceausescu was also Supreme 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and had assumed direct control of the State 
Security organs. Essentially he was a little Stalin, although Stalin was satisfied with the 
fact of power without so obviously accumulating, advertising and enjoying it.  
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A peasant’s son from the straggling village of Scornicesti in the county of Olt, 
with little formal education, Ceausescu succeeded in controlling the Communist Party.50 A 
British diplomat was struck by the way in which he dominated his colleagues and they 
deferred to him, drawing an analogy with Henry VIII and his advisers. Displaying an air of 
‘supreme self-confidence and joviality,’ Ceausescu gave ‘the impression of being in 
complete control.’ He had also the ability to switch from banter to something a good deal 
tougher at a moment’s notice.51 
Within a few years of taking power Ceausescu was proclaimed ‘the most dear and 
beloved son of the Romanian people’. In January 1973, the University of Bucharest 
awarded him an honorary doctorate for his work in internal and foreign policy and for 
modernising the education system.’ ‘Torrents of flowery phrases’ could be heard at the 
ceremony occasioned by Ceausescu’s fifty-fifth birthday celebrated on 26 January 1973 
with extraordinary pomp.52 ‘Letters from Romanians’ congratulated the ‘beloved 
Ceausescu’ on his birthday. ‘Perhaps these early expressions of congratulation and the 
doctorate are intended as gentle encouragement to others, including foreign countries, to 
make their contribution on the day,’ the British Embassy considered.53  
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Seeking to perform as expected, Ceausescu’s birthday was also given 
extraordinary international recognition. ‘For a fortnight before the Birthday, international 
salutations were solicited by Romanian officials at all levels, and in particular by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, the Polish Ambassador, 
was approached by the Chief of Protocol for assistance and enrolled two or three other 
Ambassadors as whippers-in. The Deputy Foreign Ministers and other senior officials 
helped with the canvassing.54 In the event, a large number of enthusiastic telegrams suited 
the Romanians ‘requests’. The Soviet, East German, Czechoslovak, Hungarian and 
Mongolian leaders sent fraternal greetings through their Ambassadors. Some few provided 
sarcastic comments in protest at being forced into the Romanians’ personality cult. Two 
senior Soviet diplomats went so far as to compare Ceausescu’s personality cult with 
Stalinism.55 While virtually all diplomats were approached by the Romanians, the British 
Ambassador received no request. The omission was deliberate, the British believed, and 
was ‘intended to rub in the absence of high-level contacts in our case.’ 
Mr. Harold Wilson [leader of the opposition] too sent a message, thus focusing 
attention on Her Majesty’s Government’s silence. ‘However, we were not 
isolated. The French (surprisingly), Danish, Norwegian, Belgian and Spanish 
Governments apparently kept their heads, and like us contented themselves with a 
personal message from their respective Ambassadors. But in the French case, Mr. 
Schuman may well be bringing a special message with him when he arrives today 
for an official visit. 56  
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Were there any reasons for mounting the ‘gargantuan manifestations of adoration 
and adulation,’ including mass demonstrations, festive reunions, banquets, receptions and 
congratulatory resolutions and messages? Why had the Romanian leaders decided that 
such a manifestation was desirable at that particular time? 
Externally, the Romanians were not under pressure from the Russians or anyone 
else, so there was ‘no impelling need for the nation to rally round its leader and raise him 
on high.’ Internally there were no signs of opposition serious enough to call forth an 
overwhelming demonstration of support. A likely explanation was that the Romanians 
wanted to play a leading role in the negotiations for a new system of security and 
cooperation in Europe and a reduction in military confrontation. Demonstrating 
Ceausescu’s stature was a means of reinforcing national influence. Thus, there may have 
been a deliberate intention of demonstrating Ceausescu’s unquestioned position as the 
leader of modern Romania, supported by the entire nation, in order to make his authority 
indisputably clear to the Russians and to any dissidents at home. 57  
Dynastic socialism became a reality with the appointment of Elena Ceausescu 
member of the Political Bureau in 1973. In 1974 Ceausescu was finally ‘elected’ president 
of the republic. By then, Prime Minister Maurer had lost his state and party positions, as 
had the most of the technocrats who were replaced by Ceausescu loyalists. The eleventh 
Congress of the RCP in 1974 marked the beginning of a presidential regime based on 
dynastic socialism and a personality cult.58 
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Meanwhile, Ceausescu’s Romania continued to prove anxious for political 
consultation at all levels with the British and the development of cultural, scientific and 
technical relations.59 A sudden visit to London in May 1974 by two of Ceausescu’s 
confidants and subsequent visits by other Romanian representatives to Geneva and 
Brussels indicated that a ‘diplomatic offensive’ was underway.60 Ceausescu gradually 
came to rely on a court of intelligent but sycophantic advisers loyal to him.61 Two of them, 
Stefan Andrei, Secretary of the Central Committee responsible for foreign relations62 and 
Vasile Pungan, formerly Ambassador in London,63 were entrusted with the mission of 
developing Romania’s links with the West. Besides establishing political contact with the 
new Labour Government at the highest level, their visit seemed to have the purpose of 
promoting Romania’s views on the CSCE (The Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe) and concerning the enabling machinery.64 The two emissaries announced that they 
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were carrying a personal message from Ceausescu to Prime Minister Harold Wilson, and 
invited him to visit Romania.65 
CSCE was by then at its crucial phase. The Romanians, in marked contrast to 
other members of the Warsaw Pact, refused to toe the Soviet line. ‘They may have made 
great play with this show of independence,’ the British believed. ‘Their initiatives have not 
necessarily been of help to the West and, while we have maintained friendly contact with 
the Romanian delegation in Helsinki and Geneva, we have on occasion had to disagree...’66 
The Romanians were in favour of the establishment of a working body which would 
facilitate participation by all interested in European security. That way ‘the danger that the 
solution of European problems would be reserved for the two big powers’ would be 
avoided. The British and Romanians were thinking alike on this point, the Prime Minister 
assessed. But the task remitted to a permanent body depended on a considerable extent on 
the success of the conference.67 
In London, Ceausescu’s men moved quickly to do their master’s bidding. Andrei 
congratulated James Callaghan on his new appointment.68 As Foreign Secretary and 
chairman of the Labour Party, he could do much to improve Anglo-Romanian relations. 
Callaghan assured Andrei that ‘the exchange of the shadow for the substance in his office 
would make no difference to his outlook or his approach to political problems. Recalling 
the conversation he had with Ceausescu in Bucharest in 1973, Callaghan maintained that 
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‘some things the President had said had been borne out by events. The British government 
was also interested in developing bilateral relations further, Callaghan assured the 
envoys.69 
On the CSCE Callaghan realised that the exchanges in the field of human 
relationship presented a special problem for some members of the Warsaw Pact. Callaghan 
recalled that “one East European leader had said to him last year ‘We encourage our 
people to visit the West because, until they do, they are under illusion that even the fences 
there are made of ‘sausages.’” The Conference would have greater value if it could 
produce something more tangible. Human as well as organisational exchanges were in the 
interest of Britain, Romania and indeed the whole Warsaw Pact and NATO. The 
inviolability of frontiers was a step. If progress on other items could be achieved, then it 
could be very appropriate to draw the Conference to a conclusion in July.  
Romania was in favour of encouraging both human and organisational contacts, 
traffic of ideas and information, Andrei replied. The Romanians rejected racism, fascism, 
violence and hatred among nations. They considered that it was the responsibility of each 
state not to allow such ideas to be disseminated at home or exported abroad. Romania also 
put great emphasis on the need to reach some decision about the institutional follow-up to 
the CSCE. In this too he was instructed by President Ceausescu to seek the support of 
Britain. Exchanges of persons and ideas would not solve all the problems. Inviolability of 
frontiers needed to be solved also, Andrei pointed out. Romania was seeking a strong 
European security system and considered it necessary to ensure that a framework should be 
set for participation by all European states. Britain did wish to see a follow-up to the 
                                                 
69
 TNA, PRO, FCO 28/2553, f. 10. A. F. Green, East European & Soviet Department, to Mac A. 
Shea, Bucharest, 10 May 1974. Record of a meeting between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and 
Stefan Andrei, Secretary of the CC of the RCP and Vasile Pungan, personal adviser of President Ceausescu 
on economic relations with Western countries, held on 3 May1974 at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 
James Callaghan, J.L. Bullard, M.O’D. B. Alexander, T, McNally (for part of the time), Andrei, Pungan, 
Popa. 
207 
 
CSCE, Callaghan maintained. It was only a question of what kind of follow-up it should 
be.70 
In the 1970s British policy-makers considered themselves among the ‘pioneers of 
a policy of fairly frequent exchanges of ministerial visits with the Soviet Union and East 
Europe’.71 This was the rationale behind Britain’s own Ostpolitik. After the Second World 
War Britain had lost its position in the world, Julian Amery, Minister of State of FCO, 
admitted during his meeting with Ceausescu in Bucharest in 1973. Dean Acheson’s 
assertion was however no longer valid. Acheson had died before seeing that Britain had 
found its place by joining the Common Market, and working there energetically to lay out 
the lines of a new Europe.72 Britain’s entry into the European Community in 1973 
represented an example of Britain’s adjustment to the new realities.73  
Within this new reality, it was clear, economic interests were paramount. The fact 
of economic weakness outweighed any fear of foreign encroachments on British 
sovereignty. Trade balance was a matter of concern for the British decision makers and 
increasing exports to the Soviet Bloc was a means of boosting sales of products leading to 
an improvement of trade and protection of jobs. Eastern Europe provided an area for 
rebuilding the foundation of a more active British role in international politics. 
Ceausescu however remained dissatisfied with the pace of the development of 
economic relations with Britain. 74 Romania’s trade with the Federal Republic of Germany 
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was four times bigger than that between Romania and Britain.75 Trade imbalance, 
moreover, was an increasing concern. Imports from Britain were approximately twice in 
value to exports to Britain. Foodstuffs, the products of light industry and wood products 
were the main exports, and these needed to grow and diversify. Romanians wanted 
especially to enlarge their export of manufactured goods.76 The British had supported a 
generalised custom preference of the European Community for trade with Romania.77 
The Romanian regime demonstrated a continued commitment to improved 
relations and more integral ties with Western Europe. ‘The Romanians had developed a 
hyper-active foreign policy,’ the British Ambassador, J.C. Petersen, considered in his 
annual review for 1975.78 Ceausescu’s incessant travels to the West provoked a crescendo 
of return visits to Romania. Visits to Bucharest by President Ford,79 the Prime Minister of 
France, Ministers of Defence from Britain,80 Italy, France and Greece and the American 
Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stood out from a long list. All these indicated an 
increased readiness of the Western leaders to single out Romania as a special case worth 
courting.  
Ceausescu had an uncanny ability to get close to American and British politicians 
such as Richard Nixon81 and Harold Wilson. Learning about Ceausescu’s desire to meet 
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him at the London airport, on 12 June 1975, in a transit stop on his way back from a tour of 
Mexico and Brazil, Wilson was prepared to go to Heathrow against the objections of his 
staff in order to meet his friend.82 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office indicated that 
such a meeting would be a grave breach of protocol. ‘Such a visit to the Airport by the 
Prime Minister, and everyone knows they are very rare, is in no way commensurate with 
the state of our relations with Romania’. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office also 
believed that since Ceausescu was ‘apparently engaged in a personality cult in his country’ 
he was ‘sticking out for a visit by the Prime Minister to the Airport,’ as ‘part of his 
personal self-aggrandizement’. Wilson was prepared in turn to make an exception in this 
case, ‘in view of his personal acquaintance of President Ceausescu and their previous 
meeting in Romania.’83 
In fact, Wilson did rather better than travel to suburban London. He invited 
Ceausescu for breakfast at Chequers, the country residence of the British Prime Minister, 
and met with him there. British officials did all they could ‘to make the visit a success and 
an event of political significance.’ Ceausescu and his large senior entourage were regarded 
as official state guests and the Lord-in-Waiting had called in at the breakfast to greet the 
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Romanian delegation on behalf of HM The Queen.84 The hastily contrived arrangements 
actually worked quite smoothly. Given Ceausescu’s susceptibilities, the British paid extra 
special attention to presentation and protocol.85 
 Within the space of four hours the Prime Minister and the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Secretary talked with Ceausescu and some of his most senior advisers. 
The ‘breakfast’ at Chequers was a quite remarkable success within obvious limitations. It 
was a foreign policy conclave of considerable consequence. Ceausescu had a substantial 
and wide ranging discussion with Wilson, demonstrating his grasp of international issues 
such as the CSCE and the Middle East and the independence of Romanian thinking on 
these matters.86 
A large number of senior business executives were invited (‘corralled’ might be a 
more accurate term) by the Romanian Embassy for discussions after breakfast. Ceausescu 
addressed the assembled gathering with a few generalities on Anglo-Romanian trade. 
Approximately fifty high ranking British businessmen joined in the discussions and were 
able to register at least an ‘acte de presence’ and to hear the President’s address, a fact 
which they would be able to quote to their own advantage in the future. Nevertheless, 
Romania was still ‘far from being an important market for Britain even in comparison to 
the other CMEA countries’. Both sides in the discussion hoped to change that. They would 
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have the opportunity to continue the discussion during the projected Wilson’s visit to 
Romania that autumn. 87  
Prime Minister Wilson’s visit to Romania together with his wife marked a new 
foreign policy departure for Britain.88 It was the first visit by a British Prime Minister to an 
Eastern European state other than the Soviet Union since the Second World War. 89 An 
important factor in the Prime Minister’s decision to visit Romania was its independent 
foreign policy.90 Indicating the ‘energetic and imaginative efforts’ of Ceausescu and the 
Romanian ministers to build an ‘increasingly close, fruitful and mutually profitable 
relationship’, Wilson underlined the importance of exchanging views on almost any 
subject of international importance. The Prime Minister was particularly interested in 
Ceausescu’s view on Soviet policies and concerning Sino-Soviet relations.  
While Wilson talked with Ceausescu high politics mostly in restricted session, the 
Under-Secretaries of the Department of Trade, Deakins, and Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food, Strang, held separate talks with their opposite numbers. An agreement 
on financial issues was also reached, and from the British perspective this was probably the 
most important results of the visit since the Romanian debt had remained a bone of 
contention between the two sides for thirty years. Although he gave specific instructions to 
the Romanian negotiators that they should agree to the British formulation, Ceausescu 
claimed subsequently that the financial arrangements proved to be very disadvantageous 
for Romania. The Romanians ‘had perhaps been too generous over the financial claims 
issue,’ Ceausescu assessed. Wilson replied that the British had been equally generous so 
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the both sides might therefore burry the problem as being solved to the ‘mutual 
disadvantage of both sides.’ 91 Ceausescu may have expected to obtain in exchange credits 
with a lower interest rate than that generally permissible, since Romania was still classified 
as a developing country. ‘Britain too was a developing country as far as the exploitation of 
oil was concerned’, Wilson replied. He added that that was a field in which cooperation 
with Romania could be mutually advantageous. British businessmen were especially aware 
of the possibilities of mutual cooperation in the petrochemical field.92 
In the end, Wilson and Ceausescu signed a Long Term Cooperation Agreement, 
which was a ten-year agreement on economic, industrial, and technical cooperation. The 
two sides expected a growth in trade over the duration of the agreement of two and half 
times. There was a vast scope for profitable economic collaboration for both sides: the 
production of aero engines for civilian purposes, equipment for nuclear power station, 
machine tool industry, heavy machinery, coal. Joint Ventures based both in Romania and 
in Britain and operating in third markets could also lead to mutual advantages. 93 
 
Many Briton still remained distrustful of the Romanian regime. Objections were 
not economic, but political. However much it might have wanted more trade with Britain, 
and however much British businessmen and politicians might have liked to increase the 
value of British exports, it was not clear that the Ceausescu regime was any more willing 
than its East Bloc neighbours to abide by the Helsinki agreements which provided for free 
movement of people, information and ideas. Ceausescu’s authority had increased to the 
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level that he was the only person who could make ‘an instant decision’ in any matter of 
bilateral concern, including debts and marriage cases.’94 
Before Wilson reached Romania, the British press questioned the results of such a 
visit when it came to free movement of people.95   
. . . Wilson on his forthcoming visit will presumably press for the release of four 
men, even five. The fate of her four people was seen by Thatcher as a test case of 
how Romania will carry out the Helsinki agreements. It is hard to see how the 
release of four, eight or even nine fortunate people, however welcome in itself, 
could test anything much.96 
  
Apparently Margaret Thatcher used a 1975 visit to Bucharest to press successfully 
for the release of four dissidents, as the Daily Telegraph claimed. Before her visit, 
Thatcher had been reminded that her hosts were engaged in a ruthless campaign, not for 
free movement of ideas, but to subordinate all cultural and artistic activity to party 
ideology, and to eliminate from the creative life all writers and artists who did not directly 
serve this end. She might have found candour from the men in power, but she was dealing 
with doctrinaire communists, and these she could not abide. ‘We need not presumably 
expect to find in Romanian literature or journalism much of that openness and candour 
which Thatcher apparently found in discussions with her host’, even the safely Tory Daily 
Telegraph editorialized.’97 
Indeed, following Ceausescu’s announcement in July 1971 of the ‘cultural 
revolution’ the party was ordered to take direct control of cultural policy. The right of the 
state to interfere with artists and writers was clearly stated. ‘It was admitted that, in part, 
the new cultural policy was designed to reassure the Soviet Union by demonstrating 
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continuing vigilance and orthodoxy,’ the Director General of the British Council asserted 
in his report following his visit to Romania at the end of September 1971.98 
While Thatcher praised the regime’s openness to the external world, internally, if 
anything, greater controls were in place. Despite the openness claimed by Ceausescu no 
other Warsaw Pact state member had such harsh rules for travel outside its frontiers. 
Romania regarded emigration not as a civil right but as a concession granted to a limited 
number of individuals, mainly on the grounds of family reunification or following 
significant foreign pressure and even then only when a suitable quid pro quo had been 
identified. In order to keep the number of emigrants as low as possible, the regime erected 
a series of politically motivated, bureaucratic and financial burdens. In principle citizens 
had the choice of applying for emigration as a Romanian citizen wishing to take up 
residence abroad (blue passport) or for an emigration that entailed renouncing one’s 
Romanian citizenship (brown passport). In practice the latter entailed the loss of one’s 
legal, social and economic rights as a citizen. Once the application had been filled, the 
applicant lost his or her existing job and was transferred to manual work.99  
It appears, however, to have been external perceptions which mattered. The 
Telegraph might chide, but the Wilson Government concluded that ‘[a]lthough Romania 
was a communist country it sought to increase and diversify its contacts with all other 
countries’. There were reasons to believe that the new policy would lead to ‘a freer flow of 
people, information and ideas between Romania and the outside world’.100  
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Generally speaking, 1975 was an excellent year for British-Romanian relations 
with a highly successful exchange of visits between the Prime Minister Wilson and 
President Ceausescu providing top cover for many useful governmental and commercial 
contacts. Commercial relations benefited from the warmth of political climate. The 
mainspring of Romanian policy continued to be the consolidation of a rigid but 
recognisably national brand of Communist orthodoxy at home, in firm control of a nation 
growing economically and in international presence. There was however a quest of for 
latitude in the scope and handling foreign affairs.  
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Britain’s interests in Ceausescu’s Romania 
 
 
 
‘For many years the regime contrived 
to pursue at the same time the most flexible 
foreign policy and the most stifling internal 
regime within the Warsaw Pact.’ (FO Minute 
I.J.M. Sutherland )1  
 
‘Britain’s relations with Romania 
would be deeper and more substantial than with 
some of the Socialist countries.’ (James 
Callaghan)2 
 
 
 
There was an obvious and striking dichotomy between Ceausescu’s quasi Stalinist 
internal policies and his ‘eclectic search for foreign friends and influence, in which 
ideology appeared as only a marginal consideration,’ the British Ambassador Petersen 
noted.3 The face the regime showed abroad was not at all what looked down at common 
Romanians. For the British as for other Western leaders it was a matter of ‘continuing 
puzzlement that the internal constraints are so severe’ while Romania’s external policies 
displayed a considerable measure of independence, and while the regime leaned as far 
toward the West as was possible. ‘For many years the regime contrived to pursue at the 
same time the most flexible foreign policy and the most stifling internal regime within the 
Warsaw Pact.’4 This was called by the British an ‘idiosyncratic brand of communism’5 
By the end of 1977 Ceausescu was at the peak of his power. He had achieved a 
measure of success in three important respects: consolidating the independence of the state 
and the sovereignty of the Romanian Communist Party, reconciling his policies of 
                                                 
1
 FCO 28/3084, f. 6, FO Minute I.J.M. Sutherland, 14 February 1977. 
2
 16/1838.  From the Private Secretary, 16 June 1978, The Prime Minister’s Discussions with 
President Ceausescu of Romania on 14 and 15 June 1978.  
3
 FCO 28/2911, ENR 014/1, J.C. Petersen, British Embassy Bucharest, to the Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, Annual Review for Romania, 1 January 1976, f. 1. 
4
 FCO 28/3084, f. 6, FO Minute I.J.M. Sutherland, 14 February 1977. 
5
 FCO 28/3084, f. 6, B.G. Cartledge to Lord Goronwy-Roberts, 7 February 1977. 
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developing contacts with the West and the Third World with the immediate requirements 
of alliance with the Soviet Union; and in weathering the effects of the world economic 
recession. He had managed to do all of these things both while increasing his apparent 
domestic popularity, and without loosening the Party’s stranglehold on national life. 
Ceausescu remained a ‘complete’ dictator, but he was also shrewd and playing a very 
complicated game. By courting Romanian nationalism he secured a measure of popular 
support which enabled him to maintain himself and his regime in power without Russian 
assistance. The illiberal nature of the regime in turn served the purpose of showing the 
Soviet Union that he was not a Dubcek and helped to allay misgivings about his overtures 
to Russia’s enemies. 6 
By this juncture, Romania’s relative independence was remarkable, and certainly 
unique in the Eastern Bloc. Ceausescu was still given wide credit internationally for having 
condemned the Soviet led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and for his continuing 
assertion of Romania’s political independence. He and had cordial relations with China, 
Yugoslavia and other ‘renegades’. He cultivated warm relations with the West and the 
European Community. He took an irritatingly independent and non-conformist line at 
international Communist Party meetings. All these intrigued the British Ambassadors. 
Are Ceausescu’s international activities designed mainly to protect his country 
against Big Brother Russia or are they a means of keeping himself in power? Is he 
basically a patriot or is he seeking, in traditional Romanian fashion, to found a 
new dynasty? With his personal style of living and the way in which he is settling 
his family in positions of power, there is some evidence for the latter thought. 7  
 
 
Britain was increasingly intrigued by the possibility of ‘exploiting Romania’s 
independent attitude within the Eastern Bloc, although there was no chance of our 
persuading Ceausescu to ‘stray widely and become a Tito.’ ‘Yet it occurs to me,’ the 
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7
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British Ambassador believed, that we should perhaps try from time to time to turn to our 
advantage Romania’s readiness to twist the tails of her Warsaw Pact allies: there could be 
opportunities at the forthcoming CSCE Review Conference in Belgrade. The process 
would be assisted if we could offer, in exchange, the occasional titbit not give to the other 
Eastern Europeans. 8 
Arriving in Bucharest at the beginning of 1977, the new British Ambassador, 
Reginald Seconde, was struck by the ‘depressing air’ of Bucharest,  
there is something depressing about it which is hard to define. It is not entirely the 
monumental heaviness of the new buildings or the glimpses one gets of the 
tattered finery of the past or the wide acres of identical blocks of workers’ flats – 
or even the pathetic displays of consumer goods in the shops (all State-owned). I 
think it is rather in the look of the people. 9 
 
Seconde would soon found out that a ‘pervading State control’ affected the daily lives of 
‘the humblest citizens’. Even Party activists were looking over their shoulders since 
someone belonging to security apparatus ‘could be there to control’. ‘Living here, one is 
too conscious of the numbing influence of a one-man directed Communism which flows 
through every vein of society and every branch of activity.’ The simple freedoms of being 
able to air their views, to do what they want with their lives or to leave the country when 
they wish, did not exist. ‘Everything and everybody must conform to the wishes of the all-
powerful Party and State, in which President Ceausescu is the deity.’ 10  
 
The Ceausescu regime was aware that significant cognitive dissonance was apt to 
be produced when foreigners compared what they were told by the regime with what they 
could see for themselves. Part of the answer remained to restrict contact between 
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Romanians and foreigners. The regime did what it could to insulate Romanians from 
foreigners in general and diplomats in particular.11  
Meanwhile the Securitate was publically urged to concentrate more on the threat 
from outside, specifically from foreign agents since the actual power of any domestic 
opposition was judged to be small.12 However, British diplomats believed that the primary 
focus of the organization remained a potential internal threat. They considered that the 
regime was using the excuse provided by a supposed outside threat to justify the intrusive 
activities and large size of the Securitate. As well, to work efficiently the Securitate needed 
to be able to count upon the active collaboration of working people. Spies were a more 
satisfying enemy, for this constituency, than dissidents. In the spring of 1973, Ceausescu 
decided that Party control over the Ministry of Interior had to be tightened up. He arranged 
for direct Party supervision of State Security. Ceausescu reminded those who might have 
forgotten that ‘the whole activity of the Securitate and Militia bodies, of the other units in 
the Ministry of Home Affairs, are part of the activity carried on by our Party and State, by 
our entire people.’13 The abuses committed by the Securitate and the Militia in the past 
were to be checked by the Party. The Securitate, he promised, would be made to observe 
the laws. 
Measures must be taken against all those who transgressed laws or deviate from 
the norms of social cohabitation, who under one form or another damage socialist 
property, harm the property of citizens in one way or another, prejudice socialist 
construction, the consolidation of our State. But with the same firmness we must 
permit nobody –starting of course with the bodies of the Ministry of Home Affairs 
– any kind of abuses! Socialist legality has to work two ways and in full unity – 
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 TNA, PRO, FCO 28/3072, f. 1. “Ceausescu and the Securitate,” British Embassy Bucharest, 12 
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not to leave anybody unpunished who transgresses laws and not to permit that 
somebody be punished unjustly. Only in this way shall we make our society assert 
itself as the justness and most humane society in the world.’14 
 
The mood of the people might be best described as vigilant attentisme. 
‘Convinced ideological belief is rare, but blasphemy is a serious offence,’ the British 
Ambassador noted in 1977. Nepotism and networking produced whatever actual dynamism 
the regime possessed. Within the political structures networks of personal friendship and 
allegiance were ‘a vital element’. Connections were the only guarantee of respect of the 
forces of officialdom and minor authority. The security of possessions and individual 
rights were to a large extent dependent on having friends in high places.15 
 
The symbols of privilege conferred for status in Party and Government were 
obvious and impressive: villas, Mercedes cars, and exclusive access to luxury consumer 
goods. So complete was the association of wealth with political power, that signs of 
prosperity provided immunity from the sort of petty harassment endemic, and unavoidable 
for the rest of the population. A man in country clothes driving an old Moskvitch would be 
stopped by the Militia half a dozen times on various pretexts, even in the course of a short 
trip. Meanwhile, the driver of a black Mercedes sedan would sweep through every 
checkpoint unmolested. Even a new Dacia (the Romanian version of the Renault 12) 
commanded some respect as being likely to betoken the existence of friends in high 
places.16 ‘Nomenklatura could be recognized through the privileges they enjoyed. Its 
members and their families ‘never take the bus or tram. They used the government’s cars 
whose colour and the model indicated the owner’s status within hierarchy; the darker the 
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colour, the higher the status.’ 17 Ceausescu himself justified the striking differentials in 
prosperity and position existing in what still claimed to be a committed socialist society. 
‘In the context of the division of labour,’ he assessed, 
‘there exist in our society various social and professional categories who have 
their place and their importance, and working people are paid in conformity with 
the provisions of laws, with those which, at any given moment, are considered to 
correspond to the possibilities of society as well as to the importance of one sector 
or another. Certainly, the relative positions of the various categories are not fixed 
for all time; it may be that, during one Five Year Plan, one branch has a more 
important place in response to the technical requirements of development and, in 
another Five Year Plan, another one comes to the fore, whilst the others stay in 
their place.18 
 
The nomenklatura presided over a society, rigidly hierarchical and thoroughly 
bureaucratic to its narrow. Every bureaucratic act had to be justified by superior orders, 
preferably incorporated in a document. ‘In the conduct of Romanian Foreign Policy, the 
passion for signing protocols, agreements and communiqués stemmed from this in part. 
Ratified by the State Council or its appendages, all these documents became passports for 
action, tickets to ride. Without them there was no quotable authority for, or even legality of 
action.’ At the apex of the pyramid sat the President whose words were to all intents and 
purposes absolute laws. A summon from the President had to be instantly obeyed. 
Ministers were expected to be on call. ‘As soon as the President announced his first piece 
of business and sent for the responsible Minister word went quickly around the secretarial 
network and everyone else relaxed. Everything is dropped to concentrate on any task 
indicated by President Ceausescu.’ The 14-hour days worked by the heads of major 
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departments were attributable to the exhausting and time consuming requirement that they 
avoid or shift responsibility for all decisions.19  
The regime was also characterised by love of ritual, perhaps as demonstration of 
power. Important foreign visits could lead to near paralysis while they continued. 
 
When the President received a Head of State or Government the entire hierarchy 
goes to the airport for the arrival and departure ceremonies and may spend the better part 
of half a day mustered around the walls of a hall in the State Palace simply decorating the 
occasion. When Sir Harold Wilson, as Prime Minister, signed the agreed documents at the 
end of his visit in September 1975 virtually every senior Minister and Party official stood 
about with the Prime Minister’s party doing nothing for well over two hours. 20 
Ministers and senior Party officials spent an inordinate amount of time on purely 
ceremonial activities. Much time was dedicated to mere attendance at ceremonial 
functions. ‘Hence the odd impression that one sometimes gets that the entire senior staff of 
a particular Ministry bent on a single job to the apparent exclusion of everything else 
including its continuing responsibilities in other directions; and even on answering the 
telephone.’21  
 
Although the existing differentials within society were not denied, Ceausescu 
used to point out in his speeches the need to raise living standards, ‘material and spiritual,’ 
of the people generally. The slow improvement of conditions of life in Romania was 
attributed to the exceptional high rate of capital investment.22 If conditions remained poor 
today, then that was because a much better tomorrow was being prepared. The real reason, 
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British diplomats assessed, was inefficiency and particularly corruption which remained an 
important part of people’s life. Corruption was ‘universal’ and large amounts of cash ‘swill 
about in the system and find their way illegally abroad’. ‘I suspect that the large amounts 
of Romanian currency which find their way to exchange banks in neighbouring countries 
for sale at a heavy discount to tourists and others are simply carted out in the briefcases of 
travelling officials who otherwise can take abroad only an exiguous daily dollar allowance 
for current needs. Fear of the consequences of too much money openly chasing too few 
goods may well lie behind the draconian restrictions on all private trading including that in 
second-hand goods’, the British Ambassador Petersen asserted in his report to London. 23 
If, by the middle 1970s, Romania had adopted the domestic configuration it would 
have until the end of the regime, it had also assumed the Foreign Policy it would continue 
to follow while Ceausescu endured. There would be no radical departure from the already 
established lines of Romanian foreign policy henceforth. Ceausescu’s talks concerning 
foreign affairs usually contained ‘the well-established litany of Romania’s principles of 
foreign policy’. During the preparation for the East Berlin Conference of Communist 
Parties the Romanians together with the Yugoslavs and the Western Communist Parties 
succeeded in extracting from Moscow recognition, in theory at least, of the right of each 
Communist Party and country to determine its own policies in the light of its own national 
experience. At the same time, the Romanians seemed to have accepted the need to balance 
this recognition with a readiness to move towards the restoration of stable bilateral 
relations with the Russians and to the reaffirmation of their loyalty to the Warsaw Pact. 24 
Surface relations with the Soviet Union remained cool but correct, even though in 
a three-hour speech, on 18 December 1975, during which he reviewed major foreign 
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policy, Ceausescu failed to mention the Soviet Union by name once. When attending 
meetings of the Eastern Bloc, Romanians delegates were briefed to assume a 
predominantly defensive role. Warsaw Pact contacts remained cool although one staff 
exercise and a meeting of the Military Council of the Pact took place in Romania during 
Ceausescu’s reign. Romania’s lack of enthusiasm did not go unnoticed. The Romanian 
Government later came under fire at the annual Ministerial meeting of the Pact in 
November 1976 for its reluctance to meet its share of the organisation’s cost, its too 
evident lack of enthusiasm for Warsaw Pact activities and for its insistence on treating each 
request for movement of Warsaw Pact personnel across Romanian territory as a separate 
issue to be negotiated laboriously from scratch. 25 
The necessary formal submissions, however, continued to be offered. Toward the 
end of 1976, for example, a common declaration was signed in Bucharest to mark the first 
visit of Brezhnev to Bucharest in a decade. In his speech at the welcoming banquet on 22 
November 1976, Ceausescu assessed that ‘some differences of opinion on non-essential 
questions should not affect collaboration between our parties and states.’ Brezhnev, in his 
reply, remarked, ‘there are no important unsolved problems between our countries.’26 
The Romanians used diplomacy to defuse apparent differences with other Warsaw 
Pact allies.27 Inter-Pact relations improved in 1977 as testified by a series of high level 
exchanges and a substantial array of bilateral documents signed.28 Although the Western 
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leaders understood that there were limits within which the Romanians operated,29 the 
independent and nonconformist line seemed muted since Brezhnev’s visit to Bucharest and 
the Warsaw Pact meeting in November 1976. 30 
Since last autumn the cracking pace which the President sets in every field of 
national and international activity has been noticeably directed towards fence-
mending with his partners and neighbours. He exchanged an impressive series of 
visits with the Russians, the Poles, the East Germans and the Czechs while 
Bulgaria is to be added to the list next month. He also met Kadar on the border 
and had more constructive relations with the Hungarians than have been seen for 
many a year. 31 
 
The tempo of working-level visits on subjects ranging from economics to 
ideology with the Soviet Union increased dramatically about the same time, although 
Romania refused to reopen issues already settled to its satisfaction.32 While they continued 
to remain alive to issues of national sovereignty in CMEA, the Romanians agreed that their 
country, as a lesser developed member of the CMEA, could anticipate greater economic 
benefits from CMEA coordination.33 Part of the reason for Romania’s movement back 
toward the Soviet Union may have been disappointment at the unwillingness of the West 
and the EEC to recognise Romania as a developing country and to grant it the economic 
concessions commensurate with such status. If this was the case, disappointment did not 
prevent the Romanians from attempting continually to improve relations with the West and 
the European Economic Community in particular. The perceived desire remained to pursue 
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economic benefit while extracting maximum advantage from the unique position Romania 
had assumed between Eastern and Western Europe.34  
 
The Ceausescu regime remained attentive to signs of favour. The British 
Ambassador was repeatedly told of ‘Romania’s hurt feelings because the European 
Community generally, and Britain in particular, seem unappreciative of Romania’s special 
position in the Bloc.’ 35 London considered that perhaps the Romanians had a right to feel 
aggrieved. It was in the West’s and particularly Britain’s interest ‘to give further 
encouragement to Romanian efforts to follow an independent path in foreign affairs, 
particularly in the context of detente, at the CSCE, in the UN and in the deliberations of the 
Warsaw Pact,’ the Foreign and Commonwealth Office maintained 36 What Britain hoped to 
achieve was ‘the maximum benefit from information which Romania can provide on 
developments in the world communist movement,’ seemingly fracturing with some help 
from Bucharest.37 
By diminishing its dependence on the Soviet Union and developing closer 
political, economic and commercial contacts with the West, Romania produced difficulties 
within the CMEA and the Warsaw Pact and provided opportunities for Britain and the 
West generally. Romania’s contacts with the EEC, its distinctive stand at the CSCE and its 
independent role at the United Nations had been helpful to the West.38 Romania has 
achieved considerable success in pursuing an independent and flexible foreign policy 
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based on the territorial integrity of the state while maintaining internally the strictest 
communist regime in Eastern Europe. 39 
Britain could not exert any beneficial influence on human rights issue without 
damaging more important interests. Although certain efforts were made to meet Western 
criticism, Romania’s application of the Helsinki Basket three provisions had been far from 
satisfactory.40 When it came to the commitments to ensure full respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms and to promote the principles of democracy, Romania obvious 
failed. ‘We must chip away, but I doubt whether we shall have any spectacular results,’ the 
British Ambassador Seconde concluded. 41 Encouraging the Romanian regime to introduce 
a greater measure of individual freedom internally was important in as much as it could 
facilitate easier human contacts and allow British consular officials to deal promptly with 
bilateral cases concerning British nationals. Representations were frequently necessary to 
support applications for travel documents in favour of Romanians to visit or join relatives 
in Britain and concerning delays in allowing British and Romanian nationals to marry.42 
Even on these minor issues, however, Ceausescu would not budge. When the 
British Ambassador Petersen argued for a better mutual understanding which would have 
allow practical problems such as marriage cases, and visa problems to be solved,43 the 
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Romanians replied that many of the difficulties which arose over humanitarian problems 
stemmed from the Herculean efforts to modernise the economy. Before developing a 
‘really constructive and mutually beneficial free interchange of people and cultural ideas’ 
the Romanians had to create a better economic and social environment within the country. 
The cost in financial, material and human terms was high and ‘the West should be more 
patient’.44 
In 1977 the Romanian press suddenly acquired a strident anti-Western tone, 
directed at the internal readership, even while Ceausescu aimed to improve relations 
abroad. This was the more striking since Romanian newspapers were usually appallingly 
dull in their reporting, and strictly predictable in their editorial content.45 There was an 
intensive press campaign containing stories about the nastiness of life in the United States 
and Western Europe, polemical pieces about the fate of emigrants to Germany, about 
unemployment, drugs, racism and violence, about neo-Fascism and the miseries of 
immigrant workers, the iniquities of Radio Free Europe propaganda and the Western press 
for their accusations on the quality of life in Romania. Ceausescu himself spoke angrily 
about the ‘seduction’ of citizens and the activities carried on in ‘certain countries’ to 
encourage the Romanian citizens to emigrate which he described as a grave interference in 
Romania’s internal affairs. These acts constituted hostile acts against Romania, Ceausescu 
maintained.46 However he did allow a distinction between the issues of integrating families 
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towards which he showed understanding as ‘justified cases’47 and emigration of which he 
strongly disapproved.48 
The press campaign seemingly had the purpose of intimidating the Romanians 
who wanted to leave the country. Ceausescu’s strictures against those who wished to 
emigrate and those in foreign countries who enticed Romanians ‘to forsake their native 
land’ followed the Romanian doctrine that each state has the right to pursue its own 
policies and to control its own resources, including the vital one of manpower.49  
If the tactic of encouraging people to despise and fear the West and to value 
more highly the benefits of life in Romania did not have a serious impact on Romanian 
thinking, more serious were the decrees clamping down markedly upon the freedom of 
contacting the foreign Embassies. Two decrees signed by Ceausescu on 29 March 
concerning state secrets and the employment of Romanians by foreign Embassies and 
firms were implemented but not published. 50 Increased restriction on foreign travel and on 
contacts with foreigners reached an unprecedented level following the re-promulgation of 
the 1971 Law of State Secrets. Certain kinds of contact with foreigners were punished by 
fines and Romanian officials were again required to obtain advance permission to consort 
with foreigners socially. Thereafter they were required to report on conversations.51 
Journalists in particular were under strong instructions to stop gossiping with Westerners. 
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They particularly feared that anything they might say would be used against them once the 
state secrets decree was promulgated.52 
In addition, under the new dispensation, all visa applications had to be routed 
through official channels. Both the British and the French Embassy were told that all 
applications would in future be dealt through the Romanian Tourist Agency rather than 
applicants coming directly to Embassies. Romanians who violated the new regulations by 
attempting to visit the United States Embassy were arrested and interrogated, as were 
visitors to the West Germany Embassy. Not surprisingly, a sharp reduction in visa 
applications followed. To facilitate detection, taxi drivers were instructed to set down their 
passengers fifty yards short of the British Chancery entrance. Notwithstanding official 
discouragement, some students continued to go to the British and US libraries.53 If the 
regime could discourage contact with foreigners, it retained the power to prohibit and 
persecute. Few were as brave as the few students who refused to submit. 
Real persecution followed. On 1 April 1977 the dissident Paul Goma was arrested 
and a press campaign started against him. Ion Negoitescu, one of Goma’s allies, was 
arrested and interrogated one week later. Baptist leaders were released after being arrested 
for their denunciation of religious persecution but had to report to Securitate each day. A 
Belgrade correspondent of the New York Times, Malcolm Brown, was refused entry into 
Romania. 54  
                                                 
52
 I have been just totally unable to obtain any Romanian journalists to come to lunch with David 
Lascalles of the Financial Times. TNA, PRO, FCO 28/3072, f. 14. R.L. Seconde, British Embassy Bucharest, 
to B.G. Cartledge, Eastern European &Soviet Department, FCO, 13 April 1977, Anti-Westernism and Anti-
Emigration in Romania. 
53
 TNA, PRO, FCO 28/3072, f. 15. R.A. Burns, British Embassy Bucharest, to J.H. Figgis, Eastern 
European &Soviet Department, FCO, 20 April 1977, Anti Westernism and Anti-Emigration in Romania. 
54
 Chronology (supplements previous list attached to letter of 13 April to Cartledge (EESD). TNA, 
PRO, FCO 28/3072, f. 15. R.A. Burns, British Embassy Bucharest, to J.H. Figgis, Eastern European &Soviet 
Department, FCO, 20 April 1977. 
231 
 
The British speculated about the reason for the anti-foreign and anti-West 
campaign. The Foreign Office assessed that a combination of factors was in play. 55 
Motives behind the change of atmosphere could have implied the need to prevent a mass 
exodus of the German minority, anger against Radio Free Europe, President Carter’s 
announcement of increased funds for Radio Free Europe, or more probably perception of 
the grumbles of discontent emerging from the population. It could have been a little of all 
of these things, and it is difficult to be certain political motivations in a regime as total and 
personal as Ceausescu’s.  
On the whole, the British ambassador believed, it looked as if the campaign were 
primarily attended to scotch at the outset any potential emigration movement from 
Romania, following from the establishment of freer education as an item on the human 
rights agenda, slated for discussion at the upcoming conference in Belgrade.56 Polemics 
were building a new situation of bloc to bloc confrontation. The Romanians were worried 
by the hardening in East-West relations generally and the implicit American assumption 
that Romania would naturally fall into the Soviet sphere of influence. ‘Perhaps, once again 
they fear that President Carter’s attitude will have the effect of polarising East-West 
relations and making it more difficult for Romania to maintain her middle position.’57 
Revising estimates of what might be possible, given the sudden coolness, the 
principal task of Britain’s Embassy in Bucharest was re-established as the encouragement 
of British-Romanian commerce and especially export promotion.58 ‘We already have a 
healthy trade turnover of about 100 million pounds a year but the potential is much greater’ 
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the FCO considered. 59 There were excellent trade opportunities which the British were 
determined to pursue despite the ‘tiresome Romanian negotiating attitudes’.60 
The in-coming British Ambassador did not dissent from the reduction of the scope 
of his mandate. He believed that the Romania’s economy was ‘pretty soundly based.’ ‘If 
success is judged by purely economic results, then, despite the creaks and groans in 
machinery, the Romanians have been very successful indeed – and this faces us with 
important and challenging commercial task. Following classic Marxist doctrines, the 
Romanian government put all their economic effort into production and the encouragement 
of heavy industry. To this end the Romanian worker toils away at the Plan for a long 
working week, while the Romanian consumer goes without luxuries and much of what in 
the West would be regarded as necessities.’61 Nevertheless, the Romanian drive for 
extensive industrialization presented many opportunities for an increase of exports 
(particularly in the capital goods, metallurgy and chemical sectors). Romania’s desire to 
pay for foreign purchases through barter caused certain difficulties.62 Any deterioration in 
its foreign currency position could lead to increased economic dependence on CMEA and 
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slow down the drive towards industrial development, from which, of course, benefit to the 
UK could be anticipated.63 
Although ‘anxious to buy just the kind of things which Britain is best qualified to 
sell,’ exporting to Romania was not easy.  Romania represented an attractive growth 
opportunity not only for the British exporters but also for other Western countries and this 
led to a sharp commercial competition. The Romanians, renowned for being ‘intolerable 
negotiators,’ attempted to play one off against the other. They used as in their political 
dealings ‘every wile and devious trick’; they were ‘shameless hagglers’ who encouraged 
all comers from Western and Eastern Europe in order to play off one against the other and 
they exploited the slightest loophole in a contract. What the British traders had to do was to 
‘adjust themselves to Romanian methods.’ 64 
There was a steady improvement in bilateral relations after the announcement in 
October 1977 of Ceausescu’s state visit to Britain.65 From the British perspective, 
Romania’s interest in Britain was mainly political. The Romanians attached great 
importance to expanding their relations with the West, in order to obtain support and 
credibility for their independent policies. Britain had become a target because of its 
influence within the EEC, NATO and the UN Security Council on matters of trade, 
disarmament and the continued progress of détente. Fairly frequent visits by Ministers 
(three or four a year) in both directions were highly valued by the Romanians as 
demonstrating the continued commitment of the British Government to the maintenance of 
good relations.  
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The projected State visit of Ceausescu was especially valuable in this respect, the 
more-so because the Romanians appreciated Britain as an influential voice in the 
development of world economic and financial arrangements.66 Although a member of the 
CMEA, by the latter 1970s Romania conducted less than half of its trade with Communist 
countries. Its economic strategy was to attain the level of medium developed countries by 
the mid-1980s and to build up an industrial base in metallurgy, engineering and the 
chemical industry.67 The Romanians’ hope for stronger and beneficial economic ties with 
Britain remained strong. One of the main interests focused on getting British advanced 
technology especially aircraft engines. 
Ceausescu’s distinctive style of foreign policy had given Romania a special 
position in the international community and secured for him a reputation as a world 
statesman. Ceausescu’s Romania continued to be the least enthusiastic and effective 
member of the Warsaw Pact. Unlike the other members of the Pact, in addition to its 
contacts with the West and idiosyncratic position concerning the Sino-Soviet split, it made 
considerable effort to establish a special relationship with the non-aligned movement and 
maintains relations with both Israel and the Arab countries. In the world Communist 
movement the Romanians supported the principle of independence of the Communist 
Parties and deplored public polemics between parties. 68 Romania’s friendly relations with 
Yugoslavia and China and the non-aligned movement were designed to bolster its position. 
The departure of Ceausescu might prejudice the Romanians’ ability to continue their 
independent policies, the British believed. 69 
The main threat to Romania’s independence came from an over-mastering Soviet 
Union. The maintenance of friendly relations with Yugoslavia and China and the non-
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aligned movement were designed in large measure to ameliorate this problem. Some of 
Romania’s Warsaw Pact allies were also troublesome. Nevertheless, if some room for 
manoeuvre could be maintained, and if actual war were averted, some measure of 
independence would be possible, Britain’s mission in Bucharest assessed: 
Above all they fear the Russians. And their over-riding anxiety is to avoid giving 
the Soviet leaders an excuse for intervening in Romanian affairs, or still worse, 
for establishing control over the mouth of the Danube and thus obtaining a 
stranglehold over Romanian economic life.’ As long as the American and Soviet 
commitments to detente and the avoidance of nuclear war constraints the two 
Super Powers’ action, as long as the actions in the Middle East or elsewhere did 
not precipitate confrontation, the Romanians were reasonably sure that they could 
hold the line. 70 
 
Nevertheless, Ceausescu never forgot the Dubcek precedent; nor that the 
Romanian Party would not necessarily be the leader of choice for a Romania free to 
choose. These balls he juggled. The deliberate policy of normalising relations with its 
Warsaw Pact allies created a period of relative calm for pursuing Romania’s national 
interests. Romania’s interest in the maintenance of detente provided room for its economic 
development and to resist outside political interference. The Romanians remained obsessed 
by a fear of anything that might have increased the polarisation of Europe and hated, 
particularly, discussion of ‘provocative’ human rights policies. For this reason, the 
Government’s policies, internal or external, were never allowed to harden into any easily 
defined geo-political concept or nationalist determination. The party as well was in no 
hurry to abandon the position of power and privilege it had assumed for itself.
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The Queen’s Guests 
 
 
 
‘There is no evidence that denial of human rights and 
break-neck forced industrialization are the price Ceausescu must pay to 
maintain country’s independence.’ (Ion Ratiu)1 
 
An invitation to pay a State Visit does not, of course, 
imply approval of particular policies pursued by the Government of the 
visitor’s country. But it does suggest the existence of shared interests, 
to which a State Visit would give impetus. (Lord Goronwy-Roberts, 
Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs)2 
 
 
 
An invitation to come to London to President Ceausescu was issued by Harold 
Wilson during his visit to Bucharest in 1975 but the idea of such a visit was in fact first 
put forward earlier, in June 1973, during the Conservative administration, when 
Ceausescu was asked if he would like to come on Britain on either a State or a working 
visit.3 The Conservative Minister of State at the Foreign Office, Julian Amery, raised the 
idea in 1973. Ashe, the British Ambassador in Bucharest, on local leave in London until 
15 October 1974, argued for the State visit by Ceausescu. ‘We had given the Romanians 
strong reason to believe that this would be possible at a not-too-distant date,’ he assessed, 
adding that ‘the British interests in Romania would suffer if we did not make good this 
promise’. He certainly had in mind political and commercial considerations.4 The delay 
was however caused by Ceausescu’s refusal to accept anything else but a full state visit.5 
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State visits had to be planned two or three years ahead, James Callaghan told 
Ceausescu during their short meeting in London in 1975. The Queen’s Jubilee in 1977, 
when thirty-three Heads of Commonwealth countries were to be coming to London was a 
major preoccupation. Ceausescu replied that he did not wish to attach too much 
importance to the formality of State visits, as his own meeting with the Prime Minister 
that day showed. So far as a State visit was concerned he hoped that this could take place 
whenever possible, but there was no hurry about it, and he would be happy to wait for 
one, two or three years. He emphasized that he did not wish to create any precedents for 
other Heads of State.6 The British assured Ceausescu that they would make a formal 
announcement of the timing of the State visit. That should not however preclude him 
from coming to London on less formal visits meanwhile.7 
In part the invitation was intended to recognise the special position of Romania 
as a Communist country with an independent foreign policy and one which, by 
maintaining good relations with countries of all political persuasions, had a unique 
contribution to make to the solution of international problems (the Middle East, for 
instance). It was also hoped that the visit would encourage closer commercial relations 
between the two countries and thereby increase the opportunities for British exporters in 
Romania.8 The Government’s justification for inviting Ceausescu was that he alone in the 
Warsaw Pact bloc had consistently taken a foreign policy line independent of Moscow, 
and had therefore to be encouraged. He preached a policy of non-interference and he 
recognized Israel as well as the Arab states, China as well as the Soviet Union. It was 
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claimed that he persuaded President Sadat of Egypt to try to break the deadlock by 
offering to visit Israel.9 
The details of the visit were subject of prolonged and difficult negotiation 
between the two sides. The Romanians insisted on having the State visit publicized 
internationally.10 The Romanians involved in the preparation of the visit required from 
the British that four officers responsible for Ceausescu’s security be allowed to carry 
guns.  The British Special Branch would take all responsibility for Ceausescu’s security 
for the time of the state visit, the Minister of State, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, told the 
Romanian Ambassador, Pretor Popa. According to British law, the officers who were in 
charge with the President’s security should leave all the armaments in the plane or hand 
them the British police officers at the airport. The British regulations were strict and no 
exception had been made so far, Lord Goronwy-Roberts added.11 The Romanians also 
requested that the Bishop of London or the Bishop of Southwark be invited instead of the 
Archbishop of Canterbury since these two were believed to be more favourable to the 
Romanian regime than the later. The same applied to Conservative leaders such as W. 
Whitelaw, the vice-chief of the Conservatives or Lord Carrington, the chief of the 
Conservative opposition in the House of Lords preferred against Margaret Thatcher, a 
notorious anti-communist.12 Eventually J. Thorpe was invited instead of Thatcher. 
Whether she knew or not about the Romanians’ objections concerning her, Thatcher 
declared that when it came to the State Visit there were no divergences between the 
Conservatives and Labour. The Conservative Government was, however, the one that had 
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proposed that Ceausescu be invited to Britain. Julian Amery, as indicated, had conveyed 
the invitation in 1973 during his visit to Romania.13 
Ceausescu also proved difficult and demanding, as might have been foreseen. He 
was insistent he and his wife enjoy the highest honours while in British as were accorded 
to only certain other, particularly favoured leaders. To the Ceausescus’ great 
disappointment, the presidential plane was allowed to land not at Heathrow but at 
Gatwick airport. This had the disadvantage of being forty kilometres away from London. 
To make it more acceptable to the Romanians the British suggested that the guests be met 
by the Royal family at Victoria Station where the Ceausescus were supposed to come by 
train from Gatwick. The only residence acceptable for the three days of the visit was 
Buckingham Palace. Ceausescu expected to be transported there in an open carriage, 
accompanied by his hosts.14   
Further details were gradually hammered out. The program of the visit included 
a ceremony during which Ceausescu was to be awarded by the Queen Elizabeth II the 
Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath. The President’s wife, Elena 
Ceausescu, was to be granted a diploma for her research in Chemistry. Formerly in the 
background, Ceausescu’s wife had started performing the role of ‘first lady’ to the full. 
Having been made a full member of the Central Committee in July 1972, she was 
prominent in internal affairs and was assessed to have a great deal of influence.15 She 
was, therefore, to be obliged. ‘Many Romanians think that she played a major part (too 
major) in policy making’, Jeffrey Petersen, the British Ambassador reported to London. 
For her increasing pretentions to the honours of a Head of State’s consort and for her 
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‘drab, grim public appearances, she is not popular and, perhaps, more significantly, has 
become the butt of many popular jokes’. 16 
The couple’s demands had developed over time, reaching the level of conceding 
‘nothing to royalty in their personal exigencies.’ Their assumed isolation was just a 
reflection of the socialist society which, while presumably offering equal share of 
opportunities for everyone, was clearly stratified in offering privileges. During the visit of 
King Baudouin of Belgium to Romania, the King insisted on giving the token return 
hospitality of a glass of champagne. Ceausescu made it clear that those invited must be 
confined strictly to the royal party, himself and senior member of the Government. ‘All 
suggestions that the doors of the reception should be thrown open to a slightly wider 
selection of prominent Romanians were firmly turned down. Neither the President nor his 
wife at any time felt it necessary to engage in conversation with any members of the royal 
party except the King and Queen and when necessary the accompanying Belgian 
Minister.’17 
Ceausescu’s presidential style on visits abroad had developed progressively. 
Already in 1970, however, he expected to be received with the ceremony typically 
associated with royalty. During his state visit to Austria between 21 and 25 Sept 1970, for 
example, Ceausescu requested to be lodged at the castle of Klesheim, in Salzburg. The 
request was made, the Austrian believed, simply because he learnt that The Queen 
Elizabeth II had stayed there the year before. Apparently, Ceausescu wished to follow, as 
closely as possible, the pattern set by The Queen’s visit. 18 In time the Ceausescus got the 
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reputation as the world’s most capricious and difficult guests.19 To go to Britain as the 
Queen’s guest was a matter of political importance and personal prestige for Ceausescu. 
 
If Ceausescu’s motives in pressing for the visit were prestige and pride, Britain 
continued to be motivated primarily by economic considerations. It would be, London 
indicated, the first visit of the leader of a Socialist State, and a powerful recognition of 
Ceausescu’s contribution to the promotion of a new politics of cooperation between all 
world states. The framework created by the visit could have economic results that would 
give the visit the character of working trip. The Labour Party would do what it could to 
ensure that the visit was a success, Ian Mikardo, the President of the International 
committee of the Labour Party, assured.20 
The Romanian Government, as might have been expected given its love for 
formal paperwork, insisted that a Joint Declaration be signed during the visit. The British 
Ambassador to Bucharest, Seconde, was instructed to underline the difference between a 
state visit to Britain and those to other Western countries such as the United States where 
the Head of State is also the Head of Government. Seconde had to convince the adamant 
Romanians that it was a long established practice in Britain that the State visits were ‘not 
appropriate occasion for the issue of a solemn declaration of the kind which the 
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Romanian authorities have in mind’. If an actual diplomatic instrument could not be 
arranged, the British government did agree to make an exceptional concession to satisfy 
Romanian requirements:  the talks between Ceausescu and the British Prime Minister 
would lead to the issue of a Joint Communiqué, which would be referred to by both as a 
‘Joint Statement’.21 The Romanian’s were satisfied with this solution, but desired that the 
‘Joint Statement’ should be something of substance. It should be regarded, thereafter, as 
the authoritative basis for the development of bilateral relations. 22 
It was expected that Ceausescu’s visit to London finally scheduled for 13 to 16 
June 1978 would open up new prospects for economic, political and cultural relations.23 It 
was also likely that the visit would to be marked by protests since Ceausescu’s regime 
was one of the least democratic in Eastern Europe.24 Ceausescu had been upset by 
protests over the alleged unfair treatment of Hungarians during his previous visit to 
Washington; but also because of the great popular concern in the West concerning human 
rights abuses.  In the run up to the visit, Ceausescu’s repressive domestic policies were 
mentioned and publicized far less than his nationalistic foreign policy. Before visiting 
Britain, Ceausescu granted an interview to The Sunday Telegraph.25 He denied that 
Romania had encountered problems arising from rapid industrialization. He seemed to 
have forgotten entirely the Jiu Valley miners’ strike which had occurred one year before 
his visit in August 1977. About 35,000 miners participated in the strike, blocking the 
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entrances to mines and occupying the mining operations offices for a week.26 A 
combination of local grievances and the promulgation of new pension laws sparked off a 
work stoppage in at least two mining towns in Jiu Valley area. The miners demanded a 
reduction in the working day from eight to six hours, retirement at age of fifty and 
concessions on other issues workplace issues. Ceausescu interrupted his Black Sea 
holiday and hastily convened a government commission to deal with the crisis. He 
travelled to the Jiu Valley. According to the unofficial reports, the President had first a 
meeting, unaccompanied by advisers with the strike committee, which had presented him 
with a list of demands. One of these was that none of the strike leaders should be 
subsequently punished. Others were said to include shorter working hours, a change in 
the new pension law, better food and medical facilities, and safer and modern 
equipment.27 Ceausescu is said to have agreed to the demands, promising pension 
reforms and improvement of working conditions. In spite of Ceausescu’s promises to 
meet the grievances and not to take retaliatory measures against the organizers of the 
strike, the Jiu Valley was declared a ‘restricted area’, and the army together with security 
police began a crackdown. In the following months, several hundred miners were moved 
to other mining areas while others were sent to a labour camp on the Danube-Black Sea 
canal. 28 
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Other evidence suggests that the British public generally was aware that 
Ceausescu was far less benign than sometimes portrayed in the press. Letters addressed 
by many British people to their MPs, for example, expressed concern for human rights 
violation in Romania. One of the issues raised was the psychiatric abuse to which 
political prisoners were subjected and their maltreatment in detention. Amnesty 
International was in possession of papers indicating that the Romanian authorities applied 
psychiatric treatment to subjects found guilty only of having exercised their rights to 
freedom of expression and conscience.29 The case of Ion Vulcanescu who succeeded in 
leaving Romania a year before the state visit was typical of the experience of the thirty 
Romanian victims of psychiatric abuse then known. Between April and May 1975 
Vulcanescu was interrogated for between four and sixteen hours daily. The interrogation 
usually took place during the night or early morning. He was not allowed food or drink 
while being interrogated and he was severely beaten after refusing to sign a document 
saying he had committed crimes. The document did not specify however which crimes he 
had committed.30 
On the evening of 11 May 1975 Vulcanescu was sent to the prison hospital of 
Jilava, south west of Bucharest, after he had suffered severe head injuries caused 
by kicking. He was held in the psychiatric ward of the hospital until 3 June. This 
ward was at this time occupied by both political and common offenders who 
were subjected to treatment with various drugs. . .   Vulcanescu was irregularly 
injected with doses of Plegomazin and Mezoptil – up to 400 milligrams being 
administered daily by Dr. Serbanescu and Mr. Velicu. Some of the political 
offenders who had been tried already were treated with intramuscular injections 
of up to 800 milligrams of Plegomazin and Mezoptil per day. Plegomazin is a 
strong sedative generally invoking a state of apathy in a patient and slowing 
down both physical and mental reaction. Mezoptil has a similar effect.’31 
 
Another case mentioned by Amnesty International was that of Mihail, one of 
signatories of the Human Rights Appeal initiated by the writer Paul Goma. Mihail was 
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interrogated, beaten and force to drink methyl alcohol while he was in the hands of the 
Securitate. These cases were mentioned as evidence that the regime continued to sent to 
prison people whose only guilt was that they criticized the regime. Dr. Nicolae Ighisan, 
Lae Iorgulescu and Janos Torok were also indicated as suffering political repression. 32 
Writing on behalf of the people of Romania, Radu Campeanu, a Romanian exile, voiced 
strong opposition to the welcome to be given to Ceausescu. His reception would be a 
blow to freedom and an encouragement to totalitarian oppression. He referred to the 
brutalities inflicted on Romanians, and in particular to the extermination of the political 
and intellectual elite.33 
MPs wrote to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 
Lord Goronwy-Roberts, enclosing letters from their constituents. Most correspondents 
were concerned with human rights violations in Romania and were asking for the 
invitation to be cancelled. Since the question of personal freedom in Romania raised so 
much concern among the British and formed the subject of the many letters, the officials 
felt the need to point out that the British Government had taken ‘suitable opportunities, 
most recently during the visit to Britain of the Romanian Foreign Minister in mid-
November, to spell out to the Romanian authorities their attitude on matters of individual 
liberty. In their replies, the Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs did not forget to mention 
that ‘like all other signatories of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, Romania is committed to respect the freedom of thought, 
conscience, religion and belief.’34 
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Notwithstanding the criticism, the British Government remained inclined to see 
the visit happen, and to make it a success. The Minister of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, maintained that, 
‘governments of both parties have taken the view that contacts and exchanges of 
visits with Romania, and with other countries of Eastern Europe, are important 
in pursuing detente, in seeking to widen the area of cooperation, and in creating 
an atmosphere in which trade can flourish and bilateral problems be discussed 
and solved. 35  
 
One aspect of particular concern remained a number of personal cases in which 
Romanian citizens wished to marry British nationals or to leave Romania to join 
relatives in this country. According to the British the cases had been discussed with the 
Romanians ‘with very good results’.36 Nonetheless, when British officials were asked to 
intervene in specific cases such as the case of a persecuted Christian family for 
belonging to the Pentecostal faith, the standard answer prepared was addressed by the 
Foreign Office in response to complaints:37 ‘We should have no real standing to 
intervene directly to the Romanian Government in a case of this kind. However, the 
general issue of personal freedom is likely to be covered during discussions between 
President Ceausescu and the Prime Minister.’38 And although a meeting with the 
Romanian President was asked for by the Director of an organization ‘Christian support 
for the Persecuted’, it was not normal for a guest of The Queen to meet private groups 
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‘unless he specifically asks to do so and a convenient time can be found in the 
programme. As it is President Ceausescu’s programme had been fixed for some time, 
and it is very full.’39 The British government continually emphasized that:  
An invitation to pay a State Visit does not, of course, imply approval of 
particular policies pursued by the Government of the visitor’s country. But it 
does suggest the existence of shared interests, to which a State Visit would give 
impetus. Relations between Britain and Romania have become substantial, 
especially in trade, but also in the political and other fields. In the Government’s 
view, there is good scope for strengthening and broadening those ties. President 
Ceausescu’s State Visit will be an important contribution to this. 40  
 
The MPs were assured that the Prime Minister and other Ministers would during their 
discussions with Ceausescu the way in which the provisions of the Final Act have been 
implemented.’ 41 
 On the other hand, and oddly, a large proportion of the letters pouring into 
Britain arrived from Italy. Many of these were highly supportive of the visit. Managers 
and owners of various companies which had business interests or affairs in Romania 
expressed delight at the news concerning Ceausescu’s visit to London and did not forget 
to emphasize the ‘improvement of living standard in Romania’ or the ‘harmonious 
development’ of the country in which the people had every opportunity to enjoy their 
own languages.42 Why did all these Italians felt such a need to write to the British Prime 
Minister and inform him on the internal affairs of Romania? It seems probable that the 
Ceausescu regime had solicited the letters from its business partners in order to counter 
the anticipated avalanche of criticism. 
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In anticipation of Ceausescu’s visit to London, the Romanian press began to 
demonstrate a greater interest in British affairs, and with it, a more friendly editorial line.  
Britain was seeking, ‘with realism, calm and lucidity’, ways of overcoming the economic 
and social difficulties it had to face. The weekly Lumea pointed out that Britain had a 
solid tradition of efficiency in industrial, economic and commercial activities and that its 
people were highly competent, talented and earnest. Numerous statements by British 
political figures on the expansion and consolidation of relations between Romania and 
Britain were published including citations from statements by Lord Goronwy-Roberts, 
Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and Denis Hurd, the 
Conservative spokesman on international affairs.43  
The British press, likewise, began to demonstrate greater interest. A collection of 
Ceausescu’s speeches and declaration, entitled ‘Nicolae Ceausescu – An Effort to create a 
Modern Romania’ was published in Britain under the supervision of Stan Newens, MP.44  
On 1 June 1978 Ceausescu gave an interview to Keith Hatfield of the Independent 
Television News. 45 In anticipation of the interview, the Romanians had vetted questions, 
and indicated what might be asked. The result was a disappointment. Hatfield was 
frustrated by the ‘very standard answers’ he had obtained to some ‘very standard 
questions’. There was no prospect of ITN using all of the interview although Hatfield 
hoped to use a significant portion by spreading extracts around the various short items 
planned for News at Ten before and during the visit. Hatfield had to steer a difficult path 
between proper criticism and an appreciation of what was positive in Romania; between 
the President’s authoritarian government and the bureaucracy, inefficiency and corruption 
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of the system in general, and Romania’s foreign policy, her economic achievements and 
her treatment of minorities.46 
  
During his visit to London, Ceausescu was protected from disturbances which 
might have been caused by a projected meeting of the Romanian exiles in Britain. Their 
aim was to signal the repressive nature of the Romanian communism. 47 ‘A small group 
of protesters were carrying a placard reading ‘Human rights for Romanian Christians!’.48 
The protesters were members of the British-Romanian association, an émigré group 
whose demonstration, although authorized by the police, was obstructed. They were 
completely obscured from Ceausescu’s view by a police bus parked right in front of 
them.’49 One of the protesters, carrying a placard comparing life in Romania to Orwell’s 
‘1984’ was arrested for attempting to scale a police barrier. Ion Ratiu, the chairman of the 
British-Romanian association, claimed that there was a deliberate action by the police to 
block the demonstration.50 Ratiu also claimed to have had difficulty in getting letters 
critical of British foreign policy towards Romania into the British press.  
If the Government was, indeed, trying to censor Ratiu, it was not entirely 
successful. In a letter addressed to The Times, Ratiu revealed the shortcomings of the 
regime, pointing out that ‘there was no evidence that denial of human rights and break-
neck forced industrialization are the price Ceausescu must pay to maintain the country’s 
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independence’.51 ‘Little practical purpose is served by arguing whether or not Romania’s 
foreign policy involved genuine defiance of the Soviet Union as was asserted in The 
Times’. The British should be aware that Ceausescu ‘relied heavily on nationalistic appeal 
and professed a communist ideological purity which he constantly extolled to the party 
and country.52 Ratiu expressed the hope that Britain would exert a beneficial influence 
over Romania especially concerning human rights.53   
Concerned with the human rights abuses that took place in Romania, Lord 
Chelwood, a Conservative, asked in the House of Lords,54 
Which promises in the field of human rights -- according to the 1947 Peace 
Treaty and to the Helsinki Final Act signed by Romania – had President 
Ceausescu undertaken to carry out in return for the large increases proposed in 
the provision of British technology? 55  
 
The Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, 
avoided being explicit regarding the issue of human rights. He merely stated that 
negotiations with Romania were based ‘on normal commercial considerations’. He 
expressed his strong belief that Britain and Romania ‘will, indeed, derive very 
considerable economic and, it may be, political advantage’ from the agreement 
concluded. 56 The economic potential of the visit was very important from both British 
and Romanian points of view. In the Romanian view, the visit would establish the fact 
that the Romanian economy was growing rapidly, and now required greater cooperation 
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‘with economically developed countries on the basis of the latest gains of contemporary 
science and technology.’57 
The more economic ties Ceausescu had with the West, the stronger his political 
independence from the Soviet Union would become, the British government seemingly 
believed. Human rights, it seemed could wait and would improve provided other agendas 
were furthered.  
Since Helsinki East-West relations had tended to slide down-hill, according to 
the Prime Minister James Callaghan. During the plenary session of talks, which took 
place at No.10 Downing Street on 14 June, in the presence of British and Romanian high 
officials, Callaghan approached the international situation and disarmament and reviewed 
the state of East-West relations and détente. The talks held in the Cabinet room lasted for 
about an hour. Besides the Prime Minister, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, 
David Owen, the Secretary of State for Trade, Edmund Dell, and the Minister of State, 
from the Department of Industry, Gerald Kaufman, were also taking part. From the 
Romanian side besides Ceausescu, his First Deputy Prime Minister, Gheorghe Oprea, the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Stefan Andrei, the Minister for Machine Building Industry, 
Ioan Avram and the Minister for Presidential Affairs, Vasile Pungan took part in the 
meeting. The discussion centred largely on international political matters: East-West 
relations, detente, disarmament and developments in Southern Africa. 58 Callaghan 
mentioned three negative factors which led to the regression of détente: Soviet 
expenditure on arms which grew very fast; 59 the balance in Africa being disturbed by the 
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Soviet Union; and human rights which had been brought to the fore by the Helsinki 
Agreement. ‘Like the United States, the UK had a large Jewish community; the fate of 
their coreligionists naturally concerned them and this concern had spread into the more 
general field of the circumstances of intellectuals and the trials which had taken place for, 
in Western terms, no adequate reasons’, the Prime Minister maintained.60 This was 
apparently the only time Callaghan mentioned the issue of human rights during 
Ceausescu’s state visit. More important considerations were to be tackled. 
According to Ceausescu, East-West tensions resulted from the realization of 
both Blocs that their influence over the rest of the world was diminishing. ‘The 
development of countries outside the two world blocs would inevitably determine the 
world balance of forces. This was a trend which would become even stronger. Romania 
regarded these changes as a favourable development which would help to bring about 
new policies based on the independence and equality of rights of each nation. The new 
trends in international relations were being accentuated by the economic crisis, by the 
energy crisis – including the crisis in oil supply – and by the monetary and financial crisis 
in the Western world. While the Great Powers were seeking to maintain their spheres of 
influence and to win new ones, the redistribution of spheres of influence was bound to 
lead to further sharpening of international relations.’ 61  
Ceausescu also emphasized that in the period following Helsinki certain Western 
countries seemed to have lost sight of the essentials of East-West cooperation. This is 
why probably he insisted during the following tête-à-tête conversation with Callaghan on 
Britain’s greater involvement in Eastern Europe. ‘The Socialist countries were not 
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exempt from blame either,’ Ceausescu assessed. ‘They could have done more.’ What it 
was certain was that the existing tensions would increasingly limit existing contacts. 62  
The plenary session of talks followed a tête-à-tête conversation which the Prime 
Minister had with Ceausescu earlier that day. A further tête-à-tête discussion took place 
in the President’s suite at Buckingham Palace on 15 June. 63 During their first tête-à-tête 
conversation on 14 June, Callaghan asked Ceausescu on his opinion on whether the 
apparent deterioration in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States was 
real or not. Ceausescu was inclined to doubt that the tension would substantially affect 
the common concern of both governments to reach agreements in a number of areas. His 
conclusion was that the relations between the two superpowers were unlikely to head 
towards real deterioration. The major problems in international affairs could no longer be 
solved by the United States and the Soviet Union alone, Ceausescu added. 64 
 The second tête-à-tête meeting held at Buckingham Palace on 15 June focused 
at first on relations between China and the Soviet Union. Callaghan was interested in 
Ceausescu’s views on the best ways of regulating one’s relations with the Soviet Union 
and China. 65 The British Prime Minister found it difficult ‘to be punched by one and 
buffeted by the other into taking up particular positions’. Callaghan referred to this matter 
particularly in the light of Ceausescu’s recent visit to Peking. 66  
Romania enjoyed good relations with both China and the Soviet Union and was 
careful not to interfere in Sino-Soviet polemics when these flared up from time to time, 
Ceausescu assessed.  He noticed that the Soviets were ‘a bit more suspicious than China 
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of Romanian policies and did not always regard Romania’s relation with China 
benevolently’. The Russians had in fact no reason to be angry with Romania, Ceausescu 
added.67 Although he agreed with the Chinese principle that relations between countries 
should be based on mutual cooperation and Romania had a good relationship with China, 
this relation would not affect those with the Soviet Union or with any other country.68   
From his recent visit to Peking, Ceausescu derived the impression that the 
Chinese desired to accelerate economic development and were aware that they needed to 
cooperate with others. There was some prospect for the improvement of Sino-Soviet 
relations such as for the China’s relations with the United States, provided that the 
Americans gave up their position regarding Taiwan.69 The Chinese were clearly more 
willing to be active in the international arena. This was also clear from their performance 
at the United Nations, Ceausescu asserted. 70 
 Callaghan then tackled what was evidently his main interest: defence sales to 
China. The Chinese had given to the British a clear hint that they would like to purchase 
the Harrier vertical takeoff (VTO) aircraft for deployment on their border. Supplying 
aircraft to China could however create problems in Britain’s relations with the Soviet 
Union. In turn, if Britain did not respond to the Chinese request, they would feel rebuffed. 
Implicitly, Callaghan asked for an advice from Ceausescu. 71 Britain should be able to 
supply Harriers to the Chinese in the same way as the Rolls Royce Spey engines had been 
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supplied, ‘without too much publicity’, Ceausescu replied. 72 ‘[I]n these matters, the less 
talk, the better – the Chinese are quite competent at keeping secrets.’ Ceausescu added 
that, if necessary, the matter could be discussed further between Romania and Britain 
through other channels. In the meantime, he saw no reason why Britain should not go 
ahead, especially since if the Chinese were to acquire the Harrier, Romania ‘could also 
get her hands on it more easily!’ He said that smiling, intriguing Callaghan.73  Was 
Romania interested in acquiring Harrier? Not yet, replied Ceausescu. He recalled his 
agreement with General de Gaulle made in 1968 for the purchase of French Mirage 
aircraft. Besides, his first priority was to implement the programme which he had already 
agreed with the British aircraft industry. Romania was manufacturing a military aircraft 
of their own which was in the initial stages of development, Ceausescu added. 74 
Callaghan pointed out the qualities of the aircraft which would be valuable to the 
Chinese. Ceausescu assessed that he was sure that the Chinese wanted to buy it.  
The situation in North Korea was also approached by the Prime Minister as well 
as Romania’s relations with India. Close to the end of their conversation, Ceausescu 
insisted that Britain should develop its relations with ‘the other Socialist countries of 
Eastern Europe to the extent to that they had done with Yugoslavia’. Britain’s excellent 
relations with Yugoslavia had origins in their common experience during the Second 
World War, Callaghan mentioned. He reviewed Britain’s relations with Hungary and 
Bulgaria which were ‘correct, but rather lacked substance’. With Poland relations were 
‘closer, communications more natural and there was a significant higher level of trade’. 
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So far as Czechoslovakia was concerned, ‘there was considerable political feeling’ in 
Britain about it and he did not see the relations with this country improving as with the 
other Eastern European countries. Britain’s relations with Romania would be deeper and 
more substantial than with some of the Socialist countries,’ Callaghan pointed out. 75  
For their part, Romanians were most willing to develop this relationship. 
Although daring, the targets established for Anglo-Romanian trade, were feasible, 
Ceausescu maintained. 76 Both Ceausescu and Callaghan reaffirmed their determination 
to work towards raising the annual volume of two-way trade by two and a half times 
compared with the level achieved in 1974, by 1980.77 The evolution of trade and 
industrial cooperation was discussed in depth during the State Visit and the potential for 
further progress was taken into consideration.  
The growth of trade and cooperation followed the signature of the Long Term 
Agreement on Economic Collaboration and Industrial and Technological Cooperation. 
GATT agreements and the position granted to Romania under the European 
Community’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences also facilitated the access of Romanian 
goods to the markets of European Community. 78 
The two governments signed memorandums on cooperation in the Aerospace 
Industry and technological cooperation in matters concerned with exploration for and 
production of offshore oil and gas. 79 Agreements were concluded between the Romanian 
Aeronautical Industry and British Aerospace [BAE] and Rolls-Royce on long term 
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cooperation in the manufacture of the BAC 1-11 aircraft, and of aircraft engines. The 
agreements with Rolls-Royce and BAE were signed at Filton on 15 June.80 Rolls-Royce 
signed a framework agreement with Romania for sale of twenty five Spey engines and 
collaborative manufacture of 250 more over seventeen years.81 The framework agreement 
was valid until 30 September 1978. 82 BAE signed Licensing Agreement and Technical 
Assistance Agreement. In addition BAE obtained an instruction to proceed and 
commitment to a substantial down payment.  
The problem of COCOM restriction on transfer of technology arose in particular 
on aero engine castings and forgings. This was solved when Romanians acknowledged, 
only after considerable trouble, receipt of letter indicating that at the present time Rolls 
Royce could not guarantee transfer of technology for manufacture of all castings and 
forgings.83  
Documents had been also signed between the British groups Imperial Chemical 
Industries [ICI], Northern Engineering Industries, Shell International Petroleum 
Company, the National Coal Board and Romanian economic organizations. A record of 
understanding continuing for a further year the scientific and technological cooperation in 
agriculture and food processing was also signed during the State Visit. 84  
The official statement, the Joint Statement, on the talks between Callaghan and 
Ceausescu reaffirmed the importance of the Joint Declaration signed by Ceausescu and 
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Harold Wilson in Bucharest on 18 September 1975. Callaghan and Ceausescu noted the 
development of British-Romanian relations and co-operation since that time and agreed 
that Ceausescu’s State Visit represented a further stage in this process.85 They agreed to 
continue to work for the intensification of their bilateral relations and cooperation in 
Europe, the maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security, the 
settlement of current international problems and the construction of a better world. The 
Joint Statement underlined the importance of principles contained in the 1975 Declaration 
concerning the mutual relations between the two states for the promotion of friendship 
between the British and the Romanian peoples, and of international peace and 
cooperation. 86 Both sides expressed their concern over the fragility of the détente process 
and emphasized the need for further efforts to ensure that this process was continued until 
it becomes irreversible. Although they reaffirmed the importance of full implementation 
by all participating states of the provisions of the Final Act of the CSCE, there was no 
reference to human rights. 87 
Ceausescu and Callaghan agreed that meetings at the highest level would 
continue to be a decisive factor in the development of bilateral relations. 88 Britain and 
Romania would also continue to extend and diversify their cultural exchanges as a means 
of promoting fuller knowledge of each of two peoples about the other. As well, an 
Agreement on cooperation in the field of education, science and culture was signed. 89 
While Ceausescu’s opinions were apparently much valued by the British 
officials, he and his wife succeeded in astounding the Buckingham Palace administration, 
their hosts during the State Visit. According to Violeta Nastasescu, Elena Ceausescu’s 
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interpreter, the presidential couple behaved with unbelievably poor manners. The 
President’s wife yelled orders from the office assigned to her, to show perhaps that she 
was actually in charge and powerful. She convened and released generals, Security 
officers, journalists and assistants, treating them all like they were her servants. They 
were running through the palace unsure of what she needed from them to accomplish her 
contradictory and illogical instructions. She addressed them insultingly. Even General Ion 
Mihai Pacepa, the chief of the Securitate responsible for the couple’s safety, who, used to 
adopt an impassable attitude in tense circumstances, although unshaken, went from pale 
to red and grey as shock and shame set in.90 
Not to be outdone by his formidable wife, the President did not find a better way 
to spend time between various events than by strutting through the palace in ‘Napoleonic’ 
style. His Security officers rushed to convene ministers and councillors. Reaching the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei, one of those sent for him whispered breathlessly, 
‘The Comrade calls you, come quickly!’ ‘What is wrong with you people?’ Andrei 
replied. ‘Do you want me be seen running like you, the mockery of the palace personnel? 
Come to your senses!’91 Indeed, the Royal household looked on bewildered and tried to 
ignore the Ceausescu induced chaos. 
Although she was accorded a high distinction, Elena Ceausescu’s mood changed 
rapidly. The Romanians’ request that the President’s wife be conferred the title ‘Fellow 
of the Royal institute of Chemistry’ was granted. The ceremony was attended by 
Professor Mary Dorothy Hodgkin, Nobel Prize’s laureate, Lord Walston, president of the 
Centre Britain- Eastern Europe and Sir William Harpham, director general of the Centre 
Britain-Eastern Europe.92 
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To emphasize the friendship between the two states, high Romanian and British 
distinction were awarded during the State Visit. The Queen Elizabeth II made Ceausescu 
a Knight of the Order of the Bath. In return, Ceausescu awarded Elizabeth II the high 
order of the Star of the Socialist Republic of Romania First Class.93  
Overall the visit represented a success for both the British and the Romanians, 
marking the culmination of bilateral relations. The lack of emphasis placed on human 
rights was probably a mistake, and very shortly after the end of the London meeting 
became an embarrassment, as news of how harsh Ceausescu was appeared in the 
headlines of Western papers.  
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Epilogue 
 
 
A month after the State Visit an event shocked the Romanian leadership. The 
Deputy Director of the Romanian Intelligent Service and special advisor to Ceausescu, 
General Pacepa, defected to the United States in July 1978. He remained until the present 
time the highest-ranking defector from the former Eastern Bloc. Pacepa was apparently 
instructed to conduct assassinations of the Romanian exiles critical of Ceausescu regime. 
He refused and defected to the United States where he was granted political asylum. After 
his defection and until the end of the Communist regime in Romania, he was the target of 
several assassination attempts.94 
Among the targets of intimidations identified by Ceausescu had apparently been 
the Romanian and Hungarian émigrés in New York who had organized a demonstration 
on April 16, 1978. These included Cornel Dumitrescu, editor of the newspaper Lumea 
libera [Free World] edited in New York, in whose name the demonstration had been 
authorized, Viorel Trifa, leader of the Romanian Orthodox Bishopric in the United States, 
and Laszlo Kolman. Following the disclosures General Pacepa made immediately after 
his defection, the Securitate renounced the attempt to intimidate those mentioned above. 
The Securitate as well, commenced a smear campaign indicating that these émigrés were 
fascists and war criminals and that they were to blame for the murder of Jews during 
World War II.95 
Ion Ratiu, the person who organized the protest in London, was also included on 
the list of ‘undesirables’ to be silenced. Following the defection of General Pacepa and 
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his disclosures the Securitate did not go beyond the stage of preparation. Ratiu and his 
family were however monitored by the Securitate, for being suspected of conducting 
‘espionage for the benefit of the British secret services.’ 96  At the beginning of 1989 
Ratiu received a message through West-German sources that he was targeted by the 
Romanian regime and was offered protection. 97  
In the 1980s international protests against Ceausescu’s domestic policies eroded 
much of the credibility that he gained through its defiance of Moscow. The “utility” of 
Romanian deviance seemed to be diminishing. Ceausescu’s efforts to silence all real or 
potential opposition within and outside the country had a profound impact on the 
perception of the Romanian Communist regime. One of the most known episodes 
involved two Romanian dissidents that lived in France. Virgil Tănase, a dissident 
Romanian writer and, at that time, French citizen, accused the Romanian government of 
mounting a plot to assassinate him and another émigré, Paul Goma, for campaigning for 
human rights in Romania.98  
Ceausescu’s ‘systematisation’ program which implied a disregard for Romanian 
architectural heritage led environmental groups in Western Europe to co-ordinate an 
international protest. The most effective in terms of attracting media attention and in 
providing moral support to Romanian people was the so-called ”Operation Villages 
Roumains” that recommended to Western European villages to ‘adopt’ Romanian ones. 
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Consequently, tens of thousands of letters sent from European communities to Romania and 
addressed to the mayors of Romanian villages proposing the ‘adoption’. 
In 1989 the Prince of Wales criticized Ceausescu`s village resettlement plan and 
demolition of churches. In a speech delivered at the opening of Business Design Centre 
on 27 April 1989, talking about architectural inheritance and building in harmony with 
surroundings, he mentioned the careless type of developer who is not concerned with the 
lives of villages or towns but just with profit. According to the Prince of Wales, the 
purpose of the systematization was to create a new type of person, utterly subordinate to 
Ceausescu’s policy through the destruction of the cultural heritage of Romanians. He 
declared that was impossible to remain silent when “the peasant traditions and ancient of 
a fellow European society are bulldozed to make way for a uniform and deathly mock-
modernity”. The Prince of Wales declared that the British government and its European 
partners would bring pressure on the Romanian government ‘to reverse its policies,’ 
arguing that the “extraordinary cultural diversity of Romania is not only part of her 
natural wealth but a possession of inestimable value to all of humanity”. Systematization 
eventually ceased as a result of Romanian revolution of 1989 that overthrew the 
Communist regime.99 
In December 1989, while the Romanian revolution taking place, the Queen, on 
the recommendation of Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, considered cancelling the 
honorary knighthood awarded to Ceausescu during his State Visit to Britain in 1978. A 
spokesman said the Queen will also return the personal award, the Star of the Socialist 
Republic of Romania First Class, given to her during that visit. The Foreign Affairs 
Minister, William Waldegrave told BBC TV that the British were seeking ‘every further 
weapon we could find to encourage the Romanian people in their truly heroic resistance, 
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and anything else we could do to damage Ceausescu.’ Waldegrave admitted that when 
the honour was presented to the Romanian dictator it was thought his distancing from the 
Soviet Union may signal political reform within Romania and even himself believed it 
was a reasonable hope at that time. 
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Conclusion 
 
Britain’s relation with Romania evolved during the Cold War from cold and 
tense at the 1940s to warm and close in the second half of the 1970s. While at the end of 
the Second World War, Britain’s sphere of interests focused on an area which excluded 
Romania, in 1978 Ceausescu went to London in a State Visit and was received with much 
honour. It was the first time that a leader of a Communist country had been the Queen 
Elizabeth’s guest at Buckingham Palace. 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, although Britain’s representatives 
reported an increased Soviet interference in Romania’s domestic affairs, London warned 
them not to provide any advice or encouragement for King Michael and the opposition 
leaders. After the November 1946 elections the Communists had a virtually free hand in 
Romania. Little was done to protest the incorporation of Romania behind the Iron 
Curtain. On 10 February 1947, Britain signed a Peace treaty with Romania. Article 2 of 
the treaty contained a formal affirmation of the inviolability of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, in accordance with the Declaration on Liberated Europe 
promulgated at Yalta but there was little evidence that the Communists would observe 
their undertakings. While in Romania the situation was deteriorating, people being 
imprisoned for real or imaginary offenses, certain Labour MPs and Communists’ fellow 
travellers invited to visit Romania expressed admiration for the communist regime.  
Britain’s relations with Romania virtually ceased after King Michael’s forced 
abdication at the end of 1947. The new policy pursued by the Communist regime towards 
Britain was marked by accusations of espionage, demands for the recall of British 
diplomats and the closure of the Press Office. For more than a decade Romania was 
totally isolated from the West. Although nominally a sovereign country, it was in fact a 
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very Soviet satellite. Confined to Bucharest, British diplomats could hardly get any 
information on what was going on in the country. Significantly, the British Minister to 
Bucharest, Allan Dudley, tended to disbelieve the Western press reports on students’ 
unrest taking place in October 1956 echoing the Hungarian Revolution. Sitting in 
Bucharest, he had no access to any source of information independent of the regime. 
Peaceful co-existence proclaimed by Khrushchev from the rostrum of the 20th 
Congress of the Soviet Communist party inspired a Romanian to approach certain British 
MPs with proposals for resuming trade and cultural exchanges. Although admitting that 
the Romanians had been less disagreeable in the past two years in their treatment of the 
British Legation at Bucharest, the failure of the Romanian government to settle the 
problem of the outstanding financial debt and the refusal to release former employees of 
the Legation and the British Council hindered any reestablishment of amicable relations.  
Except for the short thaw in 1956, for the remainder of the decade, relations 
remained uncomfortably frigid. Although the Romanian regime changed its attitude 
towards Britain to some extent, no significant improvement was possible. While the 
practice of arresting employees of the British Legation and the demands for recall of 
British diplomats was discontinued, surveillance of diplomatic missions continued, 
accompanied by a virtual confinement of British representatives to Bucharest and a small 
perimeter surrounding the capital. Despite the openness they claimed, the Romanians did 
not agree to the British proposal for opening reading rooms in Bucharest since that would 
be an opportunity for the British to place their agents there. Instead, the Romanians 
argued for exchanges of scientists, writers, exhibitions and even exchanges between the 
two national Churches. 
A compromise emerged in the early 1960s when the Foreign Office, brushing 
aside the British Council - according to which the imprisonment of their former 
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employees prohibited any direct cultural liaison with Romania - decided on the 
resumption of limited cultural relations with Romania. The Romanians responded by 
releasing, in stages, the political detainees. Although the process was slow, by the time 
most of detainees were released, cultural relations were established on solid ground. 
A trade agreement was also signed in October 1960. Although financial claims 
represented an important issue in the re-establishment of relations, the fact that Romania 
had solved similar legacy debt problems with the United States, France, Switzerland and 
Austria, led the British to hope that they would also be able to solve the matter with the 
Romanians. The improvement of bilateral relations continued in the 1960s with a 1962 
Cultural Exchange Programme. Britain’s Legation was raised to level of Embassy in 
September 1963 and the newly appointed British Ambassador to Bucharest, J.D. Murray, 
reporting Bucharest’s efforts to obtain independence from Moscow, advised London not 
to encourage anti-Romanian publicity.  
The Romanians emphasized emphatically a new policy laid down in the 
Declaration of 22 April 1964. The Romanian leadership was cautious however not to 
precipitate a break with the Soviet Union which almost happened four years later, when 
the new leader, Nicolae Ceausescu, stunned the world with a speech in which he 
condemned the Soviet led invasion of Czechoslovakia. Romanian support for 
Czechoslovakia led to a serious worsening of relations with the Soviet Union to a point at 
which it seemed possible that Romania might have been invaded. Romania demonstrated 
once again that it was not subservient to the will of the Soviet Union, while indicating 
also that it had greatly come up in the world. All were aware, of course, that the Brezhnev 
doctrine might equally be applied to Ceausescu as to Alexander Dubcek. It was not 
unlikely that the Russians would have liked to see Ceausescu replaced by ‘someone more 
pliant to their wishes’. Ceausescu showed however great skill in making out a reasoned 
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case for Romania’s policies, calling for world peace, self-determination, non-interference, 
and friendship with all. His distinctive style of foreign policy had given Romania a 
special position in the international community and secured for him a reputation as a 
world statesman. 
The Labour Party Manifesto of 1974 provided for the improvement of relations 
with the Eastern European countries up to the limit which the situation permitted in each 
case. An important factor in the Prime Minister’s decision to visit Romania in 1975 was 
its independent foreign policy. Harold Wilson’s visit to Romania was the first by a British 
Prime Minister to an Eastern European state other than the Soviet Union since the Second 
World War. The visit marked a new foreign policy departure for Britain. Wilson and 
Ceausescu signed a Long Term Cooperation Agreement, which was a ten-year agreement 
on economic, industrial, and technical cooperation. The two sides expected a growth in 
trade over the duration of the agreement of two and half times. An agreement on financial 
issues was also reached, and from the British perspective this was probably the most 
important results of the visit since the Romanian debt had remained a bone of contention 
between the two sides for thirty years.  
The Romanians appreciated Britain as an influential voice in the development of 
world economic and financial arrangements. The Romanians were interested in British 
advanced technology especially as an important supplier of aircraft engines. If Britain had 
learned to view Romania primarily through a political and economic lens, Romania’s 
agenda might have been more extensive, but the hope for stronger and beneficial 
economic ties remained strong.  
Romania was the least enthusiastic and effective member of the Warsaw Pact. 
Unlike the other members of the Pact, in addition to its contacts with the West and 
idiosyncratic position concerning the Sino-Soviet split, it made considerable effort to 
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establish a special relationship with the non-aligned movement and maintain relations 
with both Israel and the Arab countries. Romania’s friendly relations with Yugoslavia and 
China and the non-aligned movement were designed to bolster its position. 
By this time Ceausescu was at the peak of his power. He had achieved a measure 
of success in three important respects: consolidating the independence of the state and the 
sovereignty of the Romanian Communist Party; reconciling his policies of developing 
contacts with the West and the Third World with the immediate requirements of alliance 
with the Soviet Union; and weathering the effects of the world economic recession. He 
had managed to do all of these things both while increasing his apparent domestic 
popularity, and without loosening the Party’s stranglehold on national life. While he 
might have appeared relatively liberal to London, and the Western world generally, 
Ceausescu remained in fact a ‘complete’ dictator, but he was also shrewd in playing a 
very complicated game. By courting Romanian nationalism he secured a measure of 
popular support which enabled him to maintain himself and his regime in power without 
Russian assistance. The illiberal nature of the regime in turn served the purpose of 
showing the Soviet Union that he was not a Dubcek and helped to allay misgivings about 
his overtures to Russia’s enemies.  
By this juncture, Romania’s relative independence was remarkable, and certainly 
unique in the Eastern Bloc. Ceausescu was still given wide credit internationally for 
having condemned the Soviet led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and for his 
continuing assertion of Romania’s political independence. He had cordial relations with 
China, Yugoslavia and other ‘renegades’. He cultivated warm relations with the West and 
the European Community. He took an irritatingly independent and non-conformist line at 
international Communist Party meetings.  
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Britain was increasingly intrigued by the possibility of ‘exploiting Romania’s 
independent attitude within the Eastern Bloc, although there was no chance of our 
persuading Ceausescu to ‘stray widely and become a Tito.’ It was in the West’s and 
particularly Britain’s interest to give encouragement to Romanian efforts to follow an 
independent path in foreign affairs, particularly in the context of detente, at the CSCE, in 
the UN and in the deliberations of the Warsaw Pact. The Foreign Office was interested in 
achieving the maximum benefit from information which Romania could provide on 
developments in the world communist movement, seemingly fracturing with some help 
from Bucharest. By diminishing its dependence on the Soviet Union and developing 
closer political, economic and commercial contacts with the West, Romania produced 
difficulties within the CMEA and the Warsaw Pact and provided opportunities for Britain 
and the West generally. Romania’s contacts with the EEC, its distinctive stand at the 
CSCE and its independent role at the United Nations had been helpful to the West. While 
maintaining internally the strictest communist regime in Eastern Europe, Ceausescu 
achieved considerable success in pursuing an independent and flexible foreign policy. 
During 1975 four British Ministers went to Romania and five Romanian 
Ministers visited Britain. The momentum of exchanges continued in 1976 with six 
Romanian Ministers going to Britain and three British Ministers visiting Romania. The 
tempo of working-level visits on subjects ranging from economics to ideology with the 
Soviet Union also increased dramatically. Although the Western leaders understood that 
there were limits within which the Romanians operated, the independent and 
nonconformist line seemed muted since Brezhnev’s visit to Bucharest and the Warsaw 
Pact meeting in November 1976. 
The deliberate policy of normalising relations with its Warsaw Pact allies 
created a period of relative calm for pursuing Romania’s national interests. Quieter 
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policies and safe-guarding gains pursued in the second half of the 1970s had an 
explanation. The Romanian leaders were in no doubt that they were continuously under 
critical surveillance through Moscow’s ideological telescope. They knew that they could 
not provoke the Russians too far. The necessity of keeping up Marxist-Leninist 
appearances was somehow imprinted on the collective mind by the events of 1956 and 
1968. Keeping up on the ideological front internally was important. 
In pursuit of foreign policy advantage, and export potentials, the cultural and 
human rights agendas were quietly shelved. The Romanian perspective on human rights 
was not encouraging. Romania’s application of the Helsinki Final Act concerning free 
movement of people, ideas, and information, had been far from satisfactory. Britain could 
not exert any beneficial influence on human rights issue without damaging more 
important interests. Encouraging the Romanians to introduce a greater measure of 
individual freedom internally was important in as much as it could facilitate easier human 
contacts and allow British consular officials to deal promptly with bilateral cases 
concerning British nationals. Representations were frequently necessary to support 
applications for travel documents in favour of Romanians to visit or join relatives in 
Britain and concerning delays in allowing British and Romanian nationals to marry.  
While the Romanian officials were in frantic search for new friends and 
associates in the Western world, official vigilance increased at home amounting almost to 
a freeze in foreign contacts concerning average people. In 1977 Ceausescu himself spoke 
angrily about the ‘seduction’ of citizens and the activities carried on in ‘certain countries’ 
to encourage the Romanian citizens to emigrate which he described as a grave 
interference in Romania’s internal affairs, hostile acts against Romania. However he did 
allow a distinction between the issues of integrating families towards which he showed 
understanding as ‘justified cases’ and emigration of which he strongly disapproved.  
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Although the British saw in Romania excellent trade opportunities which they 
were determined to pursue, British exports to Romania in 1977 totalled only 80.6 million 
pounds (0.25% of the UK total). The British share of total Romanian imports was higher 
(2.72%). Although a member of the CMEA, by the latter 1970s, Romania conducted less 
than half of its trade with Communist countries. The Romanians attached great 
importance to expanding their relations with the West in order to obtain support and 
credibility for their independent policies.  
Ceausescu’s visit to Britain from 13 to 16 June 1978 was the first State Visit to 
Britain by a Communist Head of State. In part the invitation was intended to recognise the 
special position of Romania as a Communist country with an independent foreign policy 
and one which, by maintaining good relations with countries of all political persuasions, 
had a unique contribution to make to the solution of international problems. The 
Government’s justification for inviting Ceausescu was that he alone in the Warsaw Pact 
bloc had consistently taken a foreign policy line independent of Moscow, and had 
therefore to be encouraged. The visit also encouraged closer commercial relations 
between the two countries and thereby increased the opportunities for British exporters in 
Romania. Notwithstanding the criticism, the British Government remained inclined to see 
the visit happen, and to make it a success.   
Britain’s relations with Romania would be deeper and more substantial than with 
some of the Socialist countries,’ Callaghan pointed out during Ceausescu’s visit to 
London. Both Ceausescu and Callaghan reaffirmed their determination to work towards 
raising the annual volume of two-way trade by two and a half times compared with the 
level achieved in 1974, by 1980. The growth of trade and cooperation followed the 
signature of the Long Term Agreement on Economic Collaboration and Industrial and 
Technological Cooperation.  
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In the 1980s, Ceausescu’s infringement of human rights became notorious. He 
lost much of the credibility that he had previously gained through his defiance of 
Moscow. His efforts to silence all real or potential opposition within and outside the 
country had a profound impact on the perception of the Romanian communist regime. In 
London Ceausescu reached his apogee. Ten years later he was executed during the 
Revolution of December 1989 which put an end to the Communist regime in Romania.  
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1963-1965 Dalton Murray, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary 
1965-1967 Leslie Glass 
1967-1968 Sir John Chadwick 
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1983-1986 Philip McKearney 
1986-1989 Hugh Arbuthnott 
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1956-1957 Nicolae Korcinski 
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1961-1964 Alexandru Lazareanu 
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